Cited by

Ct. R. 38, Canon 2.11; State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 270-71 (2002) (observing, among other things, that adverse rulings alone do not render a judge biased).

ten decision, the referee confirmed that although his brother had presided over the domestic relations matter, the referee “knows nothing about that case and finds no conflict.” “The Code of Judicial Conduct requires disqualification of a judge in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned and to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.” State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 268 (2002); see Sup.

Ct. R. 38, Rule 2.11; State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 270-71 (2002) (observing, among other things, that adverse rulings alone do not render a judge biased).

Ct. R. 38, Canon 2.11; State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 268 (2002).

Ct. R. 38, Canon 2.11; State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 270-71 (2002) (observing, among other things, that adverse rulings alone do not render a judge biased).

Ct. R. 38, Canon 2.11; State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 268 (2002).

State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 282 (2002) (moving party must show that a different result would probably be reached in a new trial).

The mere fact that the trial court issued an adverse ruling to the respondent does not establish bias against her.

However, based upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude either that a reasonable person would have questioned the judge’s impartiality, or that any factors that would have per se disqualified her were present.

To the extent that the petitioner argues that the trial judge demonstrated bias against her, we note that adverse rulings alone do not establish judicial bias.

To the extent that the defendant argues that the trial judge demonstrated bias against him, we note that adverse rulings alone do not establish judicial bias.

See, e.g., State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 271 (2002); In the Matter of Tapply & Zukatis, 162 N.H. 285, 297 (2011).

To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the trial judge was biased, she has established neither that a reasonable person would have questioned the trial court’s impartiality, nor any factors that would have per se disqualified the trial judge.

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that no reasonable person would have questioned the judge’s impartiality and that no factors were present that would have per se disqualified the judge from participating in this case.

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that no reasonable person would have questioned the judge’s impartiality and that no factors were present that would have per se disqualified the trial judge from participating in this case.

State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 271 (2002) (quotation omitted).

Further, to the extent the administrator argues that Judge Leonard should have disqualified herself, we cannot conclude, based upon this record, either that a reasonable person would have questioned Judge Leonard’s impartiality, or that any factors 2 that would have per se disqualified her were present.

Whether an appearance of judicial bias exists that would require a judge’s disqualification is determined under an objective standard; that is, a judge’s disqualification is required if a reasonable person, and not the allegedly biased judge, would question the judge’s impartiality.

Assuming, without deciding, that he preserved this issue for review, see Bean, 151 N.H. at 250-51, we conclude, based upon our review of the record, that no reasonable person would have questioned the judge’s impartiality and that no factors were present that would have per se disqualified him from participating in this case.

Moreover, we conclude, based upon our review of the record, that no reasonable person would have questioned the trial judge’s impartiality, and that there were no factors that would have per se disqualified the judge.

To the extent that the mother argues that the trial court was biased against her or acted upon the judge’s “personal predeliction,” we have reviewed the record in this case and cannot say either that a reasonable person would have questioned Judge Lemire’s impartiality or that any factor that would have per se disqualified Judge Lemire was present.

s whether the trial court erred by not granting the plaintiff’s oral motion to disqualify the trial court judge because the defendant’s counsel allegedly “was allowed to lie.” We have reviewed the record in this case and cannot say either that a reasonable person would have questioned Judge Wageling’s impartiality or that any factors that would have per se disqualified Judge Wageling were present.

To the extent that the defendant argues that the trial court was biased, we have reviewed the record in this case and cannot say either that a reasonable person would have questioned Judge Abramson’s impartiality or that any factors that per se would have disqualified Judge Abramson were present.

Finally, we have reviewed the record in this case, and can find no basis upon which a reasonable person would have questioned Judge Ignatius’s impartiality, or any evidence that any of the factors that would have per se disqualified Judge Ignatius was present.

We conclude that no reasonable person would infer from the judge’s references to the appellant’s criminal charges that he was biased against her.

Upon this record, we cannot conclude either that a reasonable person would have questioned Judge Ashley’s impartiality or that any factors that would have per se disqualified her were present.

We cannot conclude, based upon the record provided, that a reasonable person would have questioned the judge’s impartiality or that any factors were present that would have per se disqualified him from participating in this case.

To the extent Haytayan argues that the trial court was generally biased against her and in favor of the plaintiff, we have reviewed the record in this case, and we cannot conclude either that a reasonable person would have questioned Judge Ignatius’s impartiality, or that any factors that would have per se disqualified Judge Ignatius were present.

State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 270 (2002) (noting that, typically, the same judge will try a case on remand).

“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 271 (2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 555 (1994)).

Based upon our review of the record provided on appeal, we cannot say either that a reasonable person would have questioned Judge Anderson’s impartiality, or that any factor that would have per se disqualified Judge Anderson was present.

Assuming, without deciding, that he preserved this issue for review, but see Bean, 151 N.H. at 250, we note that adverse rulings alone do not establish that the judge was biased, see State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 271 (2002).

Yet, as applied to this case, his argument overlooks a 6 The defendant criticizes the trial court’s reliance upon State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265 (2002), claiming that Bader is inapplicable because it did not directly address the question of whether a “hung jury” sufficed to meet the new trial standard.

We note that, with respect to the landlord’s arguments that the trial court was biased, based upon our review of the entire transcript, we cannot say either that a reasonable person would have questioned the trial judge’s impartiality, or that any factor that would have per se disqualified the trial judge was present.

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that no reasonable person would have questioned the master’s impartiality and that no factors were present that would have per se disqualified the master from participating in this case.

To prevail upon a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, the defendant must show: (1) that he was not at fault for failing to discover the evidence at the time of his trial; (2) the evidence is admissible, material to the merits, and not cumulative; and (3) the evidence is of such a character that a different result would probably be reached in another trial.

State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 269-70 (2002) (“While the civil and criminal cases were grounded in the same facts, they cannot be equated, and the defendant’s argument ignores the different standards and burdens of proof germane to each.”).

id.; see also Miller v. Blackden, 154 N.H. 448, 456 (2006) (holding that mere fact that trial court recused itself in prior matters involving defendant’s business partner, who was not a party to the case, did not establish appearance of bias); State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 271 (2002) (discussing per se rules of disqualification).

This is merely a manifestation of the broader principle that “[a]dverse rulings against the defendant in the same or a prior judicial proceeding do not render the judge biased.” State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 271 (2002) (quotation omitted).

Because the defendant has made no claim of extrinsic contact or communication in this case, we are concerned here only with possible improper intra-jury communication.

This line of cases is inapplicable when, as here, there is no allegation of any extrinsic contact or communication.

State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 272-73 (2002) (upholding trial court’s determination of an absence of “sine qua non” on the part of the State in return for its witness’s testimony and allowing cross-examination of the witness “regarding the terms and his understanding of his plea agreement, even if that understanding differed from the actual agreem

“Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 271 (2002) (quotation and brackets omitted).

The mere fact that the trial court rendered adverse rulings against the plaintiffs does not serve as evidence of the judge’s partiality.

See, e.g., State v. Looney, 154 N.H. 801, 802 (2007); State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 282 (2002), cert.

State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 270-71 (2002) (judges are able to set aside information gained in earlier proceeding and decide case solely on the evidence presented at a subsequent hearing), cert.

Merely because the family division issued orders restraining his access to the court and contact with third parties, and otherwise issued rulings that were adverse, does not establish that the judicial officer lacked impartiality.

We decline to consider this argument because it was not raised in the State’s brief.

To the extent that the motion did not raise collateral, subsidiary or independent matters, he could have asked this court to remand the case, in whole or in part, to the superior court so that it could decide the motion for new trial.

We review the trial court’s fact-specific determinations for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.