In re Name Change of Claire Bergeron

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0190, In re Name Change of Claire
Bergeron, the court on December 9, 2022, issued the following
order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The respondent, Susan Bergeron, the mother of the parties’
child, appeals an order of the Circuit Court (O’Neill, J.) granting the petition of
the child’s father, Jonathan Hall, to change the child’s last name from
Bergeron to Hall. We affirm.

We apply our discretionary standard of review to a trial court’s order on a
parent’s petition to change a child’s name. In re Name Change of Goudreau,
164 N.H. 335, 337 (2012). Under this standard, we consider only whether the
record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court’s
decision. Id. at 338. We will not disturb the court’s decision if it could
reasonably have been made. Id.

The respondent argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised its
discretion because it was biased in favor of the petitioner as the child’s father.
The respondent contends that the trial court’s decision “implies a presumption
[that] . . . children should bear the legal last name of their biological father over
the legal last name of the biological mother” and reflects “a bias towards a child
bearing her father’s last name only” and against a child bearing her mother’s
legal last name. The respondent further contends that, because the trial court
noted its “concern[]” that the respondent wanted to change the surname of the
child’s older sibling “from Hall to Bergeron-Hall, despite [the older sibling’s]
bearing the name Hall since birth,” the court treated the parties in a manner
that was inconsistent and “exemplary of both implicit, and explicit, bias
towards . . . the father.” We disagree.

We do not share the respondent’s interpretation of the trial court’s order.
See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H. 698, 702 (2008) (explaining
that we interpret a trial court order de novo). Nothing in the court’s order
indicates that the trial court applied a presumption that a child should bear
the father’s surname. Contrary to the respondent’s assertions, the trial court
did not rule that the petitioner “has a greater right for [the child] to share his
last name” than the respondent has “to continue [to] share her legal last name
with” the child. The mere fact that the trial court issued an adverse ruling to
the respondent does not establish bias against her. See State v. Bader, 148
N.H. 265, 270-71 (2002).

The respondent next contends that the trial court failed to “factor in at
all any of the credible testimony that [she] was seeking continuity of [her] last
name with her other children and her desire to share her last name with” the
child. However, “[t]he trial court’s discretion necessarily extends to matters
such as assigning weight to evidence and assessing the credibility and
demeanor of witnesses.” In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578,
585 (2011). Here, the trial court’s findings of fact relative to its decision to
change the child’s last name are supported by evidence in the record.

Although the respondent asserts that the trial court’s decision in this
case conflicts with our holding in Goudreau, she is mistaken. In this case, as
in Goudreau, the trial court had an objective basis sufficient to sustain its
decision. See In re Name Change of Goudreau, 164 N.H. at 339-40. As the
trial court correctly observed, the respondent shares two children with the
petitioner ― the child and an older sibling who has had the last name Hall
since birth. Changing the child’s last name so that it matches that of the
child’s older sibling constitutes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial
court’s decision. We conclude that the trial court could reasonably have found
that changing the child’s last name from Bergeron to Hall was in the child’s
best interest. See id. at 340.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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