Nancy Haskell v. Elizabeth Millett & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0355, Nancy Haskell v. Elizabeth Millett &
a., the court on September 10, 2024, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The plaintiff, Nancy Haskell, appeals a decision of the
Circuit Court (Boyle, R., approved by Keating, J.), following an evidentiary
hearing on the plaintiff’s small claim seeking damages for conversion against
the defendants, Stephanie Millett f/k/a Stephanie Irish, Elizabeth Millett, and
Donald Trent, II, ruling that the plaintiff failed to prove her case by a
preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred
by: (1) not granting her motion to recuse the presiding judicial referee; (2)
allowing the defendants’ attorney to represent one of the defendants despite not
filing an appearance on that defendant’s behalf; (3) not allowing a witness,
whom she had not previously disclosed, to testify; (4) not closing the courtroom
to persons unconnected with the case; (5) allowing one of the defendants to exit
the courtroom during the testimony of one of her witnesses; (6) allowing
testimony regarding certain court proceedings that, she claims, were
confidential; (7) allowing the defendants’ attorney to refer to one of the
defendants by that defendant’s last name as established by divorce decree; (8)
allowing certain testimony and exhibits into evidence, and not allowing other
testimony and exhibits into evidence; and (9) crediting certain witnesses and
placing weight upon certain evidence, and not crediting other witnesses or
placing weight upon other testimony. We affirm.

We first address whether the trial court erred by denying the plaintiff’s
motion to recuse the presiding judicial referee. At the start of the evidentiary
hearing, the plaintiff asserted that the referee was disqualified because the
referee’s brother was a judge who had presided over certain proceedings
involving one of her witnesses, and because the judge in the other proceedings
had ruled against her witness. In denying the motion, the referee stated:

I don’t know any of the parties in this case. I haven’t dealt with
any of the parties in this case. I have no idea what you’re talking
about in the case involving my brother . . . .
And I have no idea what you’re even talking about. So there
is no conflict that I could legitimately recuse myself on.

Subsequent evidence introduced at the hearing established that the other
proceedings involved a domestic relations matter between the plaintiff’s witness
and one of the defendants, and in its written decision, the referee confirmed
that although his brother had presided over the domestic relations matter, the
referee “knows nothing about that case and finds no conflict.”

“The Code of Judicial Conduct requires disqualification of a judge in a
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned
and to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.” State v. Bader, 148 N.H.
265, 268 (2002); see Sup. Ct. R. 38, Canon 2.11. An appearance of
impropriety exists if a reasonable person would question the impartiality of the
judge. See Bader, 148 N.H. at 268. Adverse rulings, alone, “almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion,” regardless of whether
the rulings were issued in the same or a related judicial proceeding. In re
C.M., 166 N.H. 764, 776 (2014) (quotation omitted). Here, the plaintiff offered
no justification for the referee’s disqualification beyond the fact that the
referee’s brother had issued rulings adverse to one of her witnesses in a
different proceeding. The referee confirmed that he does not know any of the
parties, had not dealt with any of the parties, and was unfamiliar with the
other proceeding. Based upon our review of the record, the plaintiff has not
established that a reasonable person would have questioned the impartiality of
the referee. See Bader, 148 N.H. at 268.

The trial court has broad discretion to manage the proceedings before it.
Achille v. Achille, 167 N.H. 706, 713 (2015). Its discretion encompasses
matters such as whether to allow a previously undisclosed witness to testify;
Murray v. Developmental Servs. of Sullivan County, 149 N.H. 264, 267 (2003),
whether to allow evidence over a party’s objection that such evidence is not
relevant, see id.; RSA 503:7 (2010) (providing that technical rules of evidence
do not apply in small claim proceedings, and that the trial judge may admit
any evidence the judge finds material and proper); whether to waive strict
application of a court rule for good cause, see In the Matter of Britton &
Britton, 174 N.H. 702, 707-08 (2022); Dist. Div. R. 1.1; and whether to exclude
witnesses from the courtroom in an otherwise public proceeding, see State v.
Blake, 113 N.H. 115, 119 (1973). The trial court’s discretion likewise extends
to matters such as assigning weight to evidence, assessing the credibility and
demeanor of witnesses, and resolving conflicts in testimony. In the Matter of
Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

To establish that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion, it
is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that its rulings were clearly untenable
or unreasonable to the prejudice of her case. Murray, 149 N.H. at 267. It is
likewise the plaintiff’s burden, as the appealing party, to demonstrate
reversible error. See Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon
our review of the record and the plaintiff’s remaining arguments, we are
unpersuaded that the trial court’s rulings were clearly untenable or
unreasonable to the prejudice of the plaintiff’s case, and we uphold the trial

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court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proof. See
id.; Murray, 149 N.H. at 267.

In light of this order, the defendants’ request to dismiss the appeal is
moot. The defendants’ request for an award of attorney’s fees is denied.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Donovan, and Countway, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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