In the Matter of James Anderson, Jr. and Jennifer Tveter

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0617, In the Matter of James Anderson,
Jr. and Jennifer Tveter, the court on April 3, 2024, issued the
following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on
appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct.
R. 20(2). The respondent, Jennifer Tveter (mother), appeals a final decree of the
Circuit Court (Steckowych, J.), issued following a two-day hearing, adopting,
among other things, a parenting plan and uniform support order with respect to
the mother, the father, James Anderson, Jr., and their child in common. We
affirm.

The trial court is afforded wide discretion in determining matters of
parental rights and responsibilities and child support; accordingly, when
reviewing such decisions, “our role is limited to determining whether it clearly
appears that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion.”
In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011); see also In the
Matter of Ndyaija & Ndyaija, 173 N.H. 127, 140 (2020). “We consider only
whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the
discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial court’s
determination if it could reasonably have been made.” Kurowski, 161 N.H. at
585 (quotation omitted). “The trial court’s discretion necessarily extends to
matters such as assigning weight to evidence and assessing the credibility and
demeanor of witnesses.” Id. “Conflicts in the testimony, questions about the
credibility of witnesses, and the weight assigned to testimony are matters for the
trial court to resolve.” Id. Indeed, resolution of what is in the best interest of a
child, which is the trial court’s overriding concern, depends to a large extent
upon the firsthand assessment of the credibility of witnesses; accordingly, the
findings of the trial court are binding upon this court if supported by the
evidence. See id.; In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 281
(2006). “To the extent an appealing party argues that the trial court committed
error involving questions of law, we review such issues de novo.” Kurowski, 161
N.H. at 585.

On appeal, the mother first argues that the trial court “failed to consider”
or “ignored” a variety of evidence, circumstances, and arguments advanced by
the mother. For example, among many other things, the mother contends that
the trial court failed to consider the best interest of the child when it ordered an
approximately equal parenting schedule, and when it ordered joint decision-
making with respect to major decisions such as medical and educational matters.
 The extensive record in this case demonstrates, to the contrary, that the
trial court did carefully consider the evidence and arguments advanced by both
parties. Indeed, in weighing the evidence and the parties’ respective positions,
the trial court expressly considered the best interest of the child, and, in reaching
its thorough and well-reasoned decision, correctly noted that the child “deserves
no less than the full measure of proper parenting each parent can provide.” See,
e.g., RSA 461-A:2, I (2018) (“[C]hildren do best when both parents have a stable
and meaningful involvement in their lives . . . .”). The trial court also emphasized
that its findings and rulings “were made after due consideration of all arguments
presented, the affidavits and exhibits admitted[,] and after carefully assessing the
demeanor and credibility of each witness,” and that they “were made to provide
for the best interests of [the child], moving forward, and take into account the
high level of mistrust each parent has for the other, and the history of inability to
effectively co-parent this child.” At base, the mother’s arguments challenge the
trial court’s credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence; however, it is
well-established that those matters are for the trial court to resolve. See
Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585. Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we
are not persuaded that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in
reaching its decision. See id.; Ndyaija, 173 N.H. at 140.

The mother’s remaining arguments — alleging constitutional violations and
purportedly discriminatory decisions by the trial court — either are not
preserved, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 48 (2003), are not adequately
developed for our review, see id. at 49 (explaining that complaints about adverse
rulings, and off-hand or passing references to constitutional rights, without
developed legal argument, are insufficient to warrant appellate review), or
otherwise do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321,
322 (1993). To the extent that the mother contends that the trial judge was
biased, or that he otherwise should have disqualified himself, we disagree. Based
upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude that a reasonable person
would have questioned the trial judge’s impartiality. See Sup. Ct. R. 38, Rule
2.11; State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 270-71 (2002) (observing, among other
things, that adverse rulings alone do not render a judge biased). Lastly, we note
that any issues raised in the mother’s notice of appeal that were not briefed are
waived. See In re Estate of King, 149 N.H. 226, 230 (2003).

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Hantz Marconi, Donovan, and Countway,
JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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