In the Matter of Deanne Lyons and Wayne Boucher

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0635, In the Matter of Deanne Lyons and
Wayne Boucher, the court on April 2, 2020, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The respondent, Wayne Boucher (father), appeals a final decree entered
by the Circuit Court (McIntyre, J.), following a hearing, on a parenting petition
filed by the petitioner, Deanne Lyons (mother). We construe the father’s brief
to argue that the trial court erred by finding that a shared parenting schedule
is in the best interest of the parties’ child, by not accepting or considering
certain evidence, by crediting other evidence, including testimony and a report
of the guardian ad litem and testimony of the mother, by not ruling on his
motions but ruling on the mother’s motions, and by allegedly being biased.

The trial court has broad discretion in matters involving parenting rights
and responsibilities. In the Matter of Miller & Todd, 161 N.H. 630, 640 (2011).
Its overriding concern in such matters is the best interest of the child. Id. We
will not overturn the trial court’s ruling on a parenting petition absent an
unsustainable exercise of discretion. This standard of review means that we
review only whether the record establishes an objective basis for the trial
court’s discretionary judgments, and will not disturb its determinations if they
reasonably could have been made. Id. We defer to the trial court’s judgment
on issues such as resolving conflicts in testimony, evaluating the credibility of
witnesses, and determining the weight of the evidence presented. In the Matter
of Aube & Aube, 158 N.H. 459, 465 (2009). The trial court is free to accept or
reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness, and is not required to
believe even uncontested evidence. Id. at 466.

Whether an appearance of judicial bias exists that would require a
judge’s disqualification is determined under an objective standard; that is, a
judge’s disqualification is required if a reasonable person, and not the allegedly
biased judge, would question the judge’s impartiality. See State v. Bader, 148
N.H. 265, 268 (2002). Merely rendering rulings adverse to a party does not
establish that the judge is biased against that party. See id.
 It is the father’s burden, as the appealing party, to provide a record that
is sufficient to decide the issues he is raising. Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt.,
151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004); see Sup. Ct. R. 15(3) (“If the moving party intends to
argue in the supreme court that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the
evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the moving party shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.”).
Absent a transcript, we assume that the evidence provided at trial supports the
trial court’s decision, see id., and we review its decree for errors of law only,
Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 397 (1997).

In this case, the father has not provided a transcript. Nor has he
provided an appendix with the report of the guardian ad litem, or with any of
the motions that he argues the trial court improperly failed to rule upon. See
Sup. Ct. R. 13(3). Accordingly, we assume that the trial court’s rulings are
supported by the record. Bean, 151 N.H. at 250. We find no error of law
appearing on the face of the trial court’s decree. Atwood, 142 N.H. at 397. Nor
do we find, upon this record, either that a reasonable person would have
questioned the trial judge’s impartiality, or that any factor that would have per
se disqualified the trial judge was present. See Bader, 148 N.H. at 268, 270.

Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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