Taylor McCarthy v. Frank Styles & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0163, Taylor McCarthy v. Frank Styles &
a., the court on October 25, 2019, issued the following order:

Having considered the memoranda of law and record submitted on
appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup.
Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The plaintiff, Taylor McCarthy, appeals the order of the Circuit Court
(Weaver, J.) denying his motion for contempt and dismissing his petition filed
against the defendants, Frank Styles and Patricia Styles, under RSA 540-A:4
(Supp. 2018). We construe his memorandum to argue that the trial court’s order
is contrary to the evidence. He also argues that the court erred in awarding
attorney’s fees to the defendants, and that the judge was biased against him.

The record shows that the plaintiff petitioned the court for an order
prohibiting the defendants from locking him out of his apartment without prior
court approval. Based upon the allegations in the petition, the court granted
the requested relief on a temporary, ex parte basis. The plaintiff subsequently
moved for contempt, alleging that the defendants, after having been served with
the court’s order, had denied him access to the apartment. Following a
hearing, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion and dismissed his petition,
finding that no landlord and tenant relationship existed between the parties.

RSA chapter 540-A (2007 & Supp. 2018) prohibits certain acts by
landlords against their tenants. See RSA 540-A:3 (Supp. 2018); Wass v. Fuller, 158 N.H. 280, 283-84 (2009). RSA 540-A:1, II (2007) defines “tenant” as “a
person to whom a landlord rents or leases residential premises.” The court
found that the plaintiff was not the defendants’ tenant. We will uphold the trial
court’s factual findings if they are supported by the record. Vention Med.
Advanced Components v. Pappas, 171 N.H. 13, 28 (2018). We defer to the trial
court’s judgment on issues such as resolving conflicts in the testimony,
measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight of the
evidence. Id.

The plaintiff testified that his grandfather regularly deposited money into
the plaintiff’s bank account, which the plaintiff used to pay $3,000 per month
in rent to his father. The father admitted that he had recently been evicted
from the property, and that there was no separate agreement of tenancy
between the plaintiff and the defendants. The trial court found “this action to
be frivolous and filed for the purpose of harassing the defendants as a result of
their eviction against [the plaintiff’s] father.” The record supports the court’s
findings. See id. The trial court was not required to accept the plaintiff’s
testimony that his father accepted his money as the defendants’ property
manager or agent. See id.

The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees
without a finding of bad faith. Assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiff
preserved this issue for review, see Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H.
248, 250-51 (2004), we have held that “where litigation is instituted or
unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary,
capricious or bad faith conduct, an award of attorneys’ fees to his opponent is
within the court’s power.” St. Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662 (1977).
As previously noted, the trial court found “this action to be frivolous and filed
for the purpose of harassing the defendants as a result of their eviction against
[the plaintiff’s] father.” These findings, which are supported by the record,
amount to a finding of bad faith and are sufficient to support the court’s award
of attorney’s fees. See Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 502 (1988).

The plaintiff also argues that the trial court was biased against him.
Assuming, without deciding, that he preserved this issue for review, see Bean,
151 N.H. at 250-51, we conclude, based upon our review of the record, that no
reasonable person would have questioned the judge’s impartiality and that no
factors were present that would have per se disqualified him from participating
in this case. See State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 268-71 (2002).

We conclude that the plaintiff’s remaining arguments are insufficiently
developed, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003), and warrant no
further consideration, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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