Cited by

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 799 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 793 (2015) (concluding that respondent’s “mere reference to ‘due process’” was insufficient to preserve state constitutional claim for review).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 799 (2015).

The statute identifies a number of factors for a trial court to consider when determining whether an unequal distribution is an equitable distribution, including “[t]he actions of either party during the marriage which contributed to the growth or diminution in value of property owned by either or both of the parties.” RSA 458:16-a, II(f); see also In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 801 (2015) 4 (husband awarded more retirement assets than wife because the wife’s criminal conduct

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 798 (2015).

We “determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 798 (2015).

We “determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015).

We “determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015) (quotation omitted).

We “determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015).

We “determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 798 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 799 (2015).

We will uphold the trial court’s findings unless they are unsupported by the evidence or legally erroneous, In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 798 (2015), deferring to the trial court on matters such as resolving conflicts in testimony, evaluating credibility, and determining the weight of evidence, In the Matter of Aube & Aube, 158 N.H. 459, 465 (2009).

We “determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 793 (2015).

Estate of Sicotte v. Lubin & Meyer, 157 N.H. 670, 673 (2008) (concerning dismissal); In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 793 (2015) (concerning continuance).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 798 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 792 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 792 (2015); see also In the Matter of Jones and Jones, 146 N.H. 119, 121 (2001).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 800 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 792 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 801-02 (2015); RSA 458:19, I (2018) (amended 2018).

We “determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 798 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 792 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 793 (2015).

The family division’s equitable powers in a divorce proceeding include the full authority to divide the parties’ marital property, Maldini, 168 N.H. at 195, in a manner it deems “‘just’ based upon the evidence presented and the equities of the case,” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 799 (2015); see RSA 458:16-a, II (2004) (creating presumption that an equal division of marital property is “equitable”).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 804 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 802 (2015) (stating primary purpose of alimony is rehabilitative).

Under that standard of review, we “determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 804 (2015).

“Our role is not to review the alimony award de novo, but to determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803-04 (2015) (quotation omitted).

“Our role is not to review the alimony award de novo, but to determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803-04 (2015) (quotation omitted).

“Our role is not to review the alimony award de novo, but to determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803-04 (2015) (quotation omitted).

“Our role is not to review the alimony award de novo, but to determine only whether there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803-04 (2015) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 798 (2015).

In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 793 (2015) (concluding that respondent’s “mere reference to ‘due process’” at a hearing and in a motion was insufficient to preserve state constitutional claim for review).

See, e.g., In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015) (recognizing that matters of public policy are reserved for the legislature).