In the Matter of Jodi Monroe and Matthew MacDonald

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0285, In the Matter of Jodi Monroe and
Matthew MacDonald, the court on February 27, 2023, issued the
following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on
appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct.
R. 20(2). The petitioner, Jodi Monroe (Mother), appeals an order of the Circuit
Court (Countway, J.) granting her request to relocate to Mississippi upon certain
conditions, including that the respondent, Matthew MacDonald (Father), have
supervised visits with the parties’ daughter. We affirm.

We review a trial court decision on a parent’s motion to relocate under our
unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. See In the Matter of St. Pierre &
Thatcher, 172 N.H. 209, 221 (2019). Under that standard of review, we consider
only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the
discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial court’s
determination if it could reasonably have been made. In the Matter of Kurowski
& Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011). We uphold the trial court’s factual
findings unless the evidence does not support them or they are legally erroneous.
See In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 798 (2015).

RSA 461-A:12 governs motions to relocate. See RSA 461-A:12 (Supp.
2022). RSA 461-A:12, V requires the party seeking to relocate to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) relocation is for a legitimate purpose; and
(2) the proposed relocation is reasonable in light of that purpose. If the burden of
proof established under RSA 461-A:12, V is met, then the burden shifts to the
other parent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proposed
relocation is not in the best interest of the child. RSA 461-A:12, VI.

In this case, the trial court assumed without deciding that Mother had
proved that her relocation is for a legitimate purpose and that it is reasonable in
light of that purpose. The trial court found, however, that Father had met his
burden of proving that the relocation is not in the child’s best interest. The court
determined that the child’s best interest could be met if, among other things,
“[r]eunification counseling [began] immediately” and if, beginning in one month,
Father had supervised visits with his daughter. Although the parties’ original
2018 parenting plan had required Father to engage in reunification counseling
before having supervised visits, the trial court determined that because the
daughter was now older, “completing this counseling is not a prerequisite to
visits.”

On appeal, Mother first argues that the evidence fails to support the trial
court’s finding that relocation without the court-required conditions is not in the
child’s best interest. We disagree.

The trial court found that, although Father had not seen his daughter
since she was two and “has had virtually no relationship with her,” he “has
consistently fought to maintain some kind of relationship with [her].” The court
further found that Mother had not taken steps to facilitate Father’s relationship
with the child. Given these findings, which the record supports, we conclude
that it was reasonable for the court to determine that, without the court-required
conditions, relocation is not in the child’s best interest. See In the Matter of
Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585.

Mother also contends that the trial court’s order impermissibly modified
the parties’ parenting rights and responsibilities. We disagree.

Although the parties’ original 2018 parenting plan had required Father to
engage in reunification counseling before having supervised visits, as the trial
court found, and as the record supports, when the child was subsequently in a
guardianship with the maternal grandmother, Father had contact with the child.
Indeed, a February 2020 order in the guardianship proceeding granted Father’s
motion for visitation, allowing him supervised visitation for two, two-hour visits
each month and, after four such visits, to have a two-hour visit each week, even
though he was not enrolled in reunification counseling. That order also allowed
Father to send the child cards and gifts. Finally, we emphasize that the trial
court reasonably found that relocation, absent the conditions, is not in the child’s
best interest. Under these circumstances, we disagree with Mother that the trial
court order now on appeal impermissibly modified the parties’ parenting rights
and responsibilities.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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