In the Matter of Stacey Spewock and Scott Spewock

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0028, In the Matter of Stacey Spewock
and Scott Spewock, the court on December 29, 2022, issued the
following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The respondent, Scott Spewock (Husband), appeals an order
recommended by a referee (Cross, R.) and approved by the Circuit Court
(Weaver, J.), which, among other things, denied his motion to modify his
obligation to pay alimony to the petitioner, Stacey Corris f/k/a Stacey Spewock
(Wife), under the parties’ 2015 stipulated divorce decree. We affirm.

“We review an order on a motion to modify a support obligation for an
unsustainable exercise of discretion.” In the Matter of Arventis & Arventis, 152
N.H. 653, 654 (2005). To establish an unsustainable exercise of discretion,
Husband must demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was clearly
untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. In the Matter of
Peirano & Larsen, 155 N.H. 738, 750 (2007). We “determine only whether
there is an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment
made.” In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 803 (2015). “Our
standard of review is not whether we would rule differently than the trial court,
but whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the
trial court based upon the same evidence.” Id. at 799.

We will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are
unsupported by the evidence or legally erroneous. In the Matter of Nyhan and
Nyhan, 147 N.H. 768, 770 (2002). Moreover, “we defer to the trial court’s
judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the
credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence.”
Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003). “If the court’s findings can
reasonably be made on the evidence presented, they will stand.” In the Matter
of Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31, 36 (2002).

The trial court found, and the parties do not dispute, that “[b]ecause the
alimony obligation was established in 2015, before New Hampshire’s more
recently enacted alimony statutes (RSA 458:19-a and 458:19-aa [(Supp.
2022)]), the prior legal standard for modification [of alimony orders] applies.”
See RSA 458:19-aa, X(a)(1), (2). “To obtain an order modifying a support
obligation, a party must show that a substantial change in circumstances has
arisen since the initial award, making the current support amount either
improper or unfair.” Laflamme v. Laflamme, 144 N.H. 524, 527 (1999)
(quotation omitted). “Changes to a party’s condition that are both anticipated
and foreseeable at the time of the decree cannot rise to the level of a
substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of an
alimony award.” Id. at 528-29.

The trial court determined that Husband failed to satisfy this burden of
proof. The court found that Husband’s initial decrease in income after selling
his business in March 2020 “was entirely foreseeable and should have been
anticipated by him.” The court further found that, even if the change in
Husband’s income had been unforeseeable, it did not render the alimony order
unfair because, now, Husband earns more and Wife earns less than when the
parties divorced in 2015.

On appeal, Husband argues that he satisfied his burden of proof with
evidence that he earns less and Wife earns more than the parties earned in
2015, that Wife’s increase in income was unforeseeable and unanticipated, and
that the decrease in his income and increase in Wife’s income constitute
substantial changes in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of the
alimony award. Husband’s arguments, however, are premised upon income
figures that the trial court was not compelled to accept or credit.

When the parties divorced in 2015, they submitted financial affidavits
showing that each party had monthly income of $6,313, which, Husband
asserts, represented one-half of the total monthly income generated by the
parties’ business awarded to Husband in the final divorce decree. Despite this,
Husband contends that, when the alimony award was first ordered in 2015,
“the entire monthly income” from the business “should have been attributed” to
him and that none of the income from the business should have been
attributed to Wife. If this had occurred, Husband claims that his monthly
gross income at the time of the divorce was $12,626, and Wife’s monthly gross
income was $0. Because Husband now earns $7,504 monthly and Wife earns
$3,083 monthly, Husband asserts that he earns less and Wife earns more than
in 2015. Given the financial affidavits submitted when the parties divorced in
2015, we cannot conclude that the trial court either unsustainably exercised
its discretion or erred as a matter of law by rejecting Husband’s income figures.

Husband next contends that the trial court either unsustainably
exercised its discretion or erred as a matter of law because it did not consider
how much alimony he would be required to pay under the amended version of
the alimony statute. Although he acknowledges that the amended version of
the statute does not apply to this case, he contends that it “would have

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provided guidance” and would have alerted the trial court to the unfairness of
its decision. This argument warrants no further discussion. See Vogel v.
Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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