State of New Hampshire v. William Argie

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0008, State of New Hampshire v. William
Argie, the court on February 11, 2025, issued the following
order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has
determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The
defendant, William Argie, appeals his conviction for first-degree murder. See
RSA 630:1-a, I(a) (2016). The defendant argues that the Superior Court
(Wageling, J.) improperly admitted prior bad act evidence under New
Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b), and deprived him of due process in
violation of the State and Federal Constitutions when it denied his request for
an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of the Rule 404(b) evidence. We
conclude that the defendant failed to preserve his due process argument for
our review and that the trial court’s admission of the prior bad act evidence did
not violate Rule 404(b). Accordingly, we affirm.1

The following facts are supported by the record or are undisputed. At the
time of the victim’s death, the defendant and the victim were married and had
two minor children together. The defendant had a gambling habit and was
unable to maintain stable employment, which put a significant financial strain
on the family. The defendant had gambling debts, had exhausted his personal
bank account, and had stated to family and friends that he was considering
filing for bankruptcy. The defendant was the sole beneficiary of the victim’s
$400,000 life insurance policy. The defendant knew that the victim was
planning to divorce him, take custody of their children, sell the family home,
and move in with his mother. On or about April 4, 2019, the victim was
murdered. The police apprehended the defendant on April 5, 2019 while he
was gambling at a casino in Connecticut.

After the victim’s death, one of the defendant’s gambling associates (the
associate) contacted the police. The associate told the police that the
defendant and the associate had known each other socially for several years
prior to the victim’s death and would occasionally travel to casinos together.
The associate informed the police that in February 2019 — less than two

1 Although the defendant appended the sentencing decisions for both his first-degree murder and

falsification of physical evidence convictions to his notice of appeal, the defendant does not raise
any arguments related to his conviction for falsification of physical evidence in his brief and,
therefore, we deem this issue waived. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003).
months before the victim’s death — he met the defendant at a restaurant where
the defendant told the associate of the victim’s life insurance policy and offered
the associate a portion of the life insurance proceeds if he helped the defendant
kill the victim or found a hitman to kill her.

In December 2019, a grand jury indicted the defendant for first-degree
murder and falsifying physical evidence. See RSA 630:1-a, I(a) (purposeful
first-degree murder); RSA 641:6, I (2016) (falsifying physical evidence).
Because the defendant’s solicitation of the associate occurred in a different
county than the victim’s murder, the State did not file charges related to the
defendant’s murder solicitation.

Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to admit evidence
regarding the defendant’s solicitation of the associate for the victim’s murder.
The trial court held a non-evidentiary pretrial hearing on the motion during
which the State argued that the evidence of solicitation was admissible under
Rule 404(b). It sought to introduce the testimony to show the defendant’s
“motive and intent to harm the victim, and . . . his identity as the person who
murdered her.” The defense argued that the evidence was inadmissible
because it did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 404(b). The trial court
granted the State’s motion, and the associate testified about the solicitation at
trial without further objection.

Following trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of purposeful first-
degree murder and falsifying physical evidence. See RSA 630:1-a, I(a); RSA
641:6, I. This appeal followed.

The defendant raises two issues on appeal: first, whether the trial court
erred when it granted the State’s pretrial motion to admit evidence of the
uncharged murder solicitation, see N.H. R. Ev. 404(b); and second, whether the
trial court deprived him of due process under the State and Federal
Constitutions when it denied his request for an evidentiary hearing on the
admissibility of the Rule 404(b) evidence. We begin by addressing the trial
court’s decision to grant the State’s motion in limine.

We review the trial court’s ruling for an unsustainable exercise of
discretion and will reverse only if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to
the prejudice of the defendant’s case. State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 573
(2010). Because the trial court ruled before trial regarding the admissibility of
the challenged evidence, we consider only the arguments and evidence
presented at the pretrial hearing. See id. We so limit our review to avoid the
pitfall of justifying the court’s pretrial ruling upon the defendant’s response at
trial to the evidence. Id.

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 Rule 404(b)(1) states that:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.

To ensure that this rule is followed, we have held that before a trial court
admits “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), it
generally must first determine: (1) that the evidence is relevant for a purpose
other than character or disposition; (2) that there is clear proof that the
defendant committed the prior act; and (3) that the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to
the defendant. State v. Roy, 167 N.H. 276, 287 (2015). The State bore the
burden of demonstrating the admissibility of the prior bad act evidence. See
State v. Ericson, 159 N.H. 379, 388 (2009).

On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the relevancy of the prior
bad act evidence. Rather, he asserts that there was not clear proof that he
committed the prior bad act and that the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

We begin with the defendant’s clear proof argument. Rule 404(b)
requires “clear proof, meaning that there is sufficient evidence to support a
finding by the fact-finder that the other crimes, wrongs or acts occurred and
that the person committed them.” N.H. R. Ev. 404(b)(2)(B) (emphases
added). Whether there was clear proof of the solicitation for purposes of Rule
404(b) is a preliminary determination concerning the admissibility of evidence,
and the trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence in making this
determination. See Ericson, 159 N.H. at 388; see also N.H. R. Ev. 104(a).

The defendant raises two overarching arguments as to why the clear
proof standard was not met: first, that our prior “decisions indicate that ‘clear
proof’ requires more than uncorroborated and unsworn statements from a
single witness with a motive to lie”; and second, that the trial court failed to
adequately assess the reliability of the proffered evidence.2 We disagree.

2 The defendant relies on State v. Michaud, 135 N.H. 723 (1992), to support his clear proof

argument. The defendant’s reliance on Michaud, however, is misplaced. In Michaud we
concluded that there was not clear proof that the defendant, rather than another person, had
committed the prior bad act. See Michaud, 135 N.H. at 728. By contrast, here, the defendant has
not claimed that the State insufficiently established his identity as the person who solicited the
associate. Rather, he argues that there was insufficient evidence that the solicitation occurred.
Additionally, in Michaud all of the evidence that the defendant committed the prior bad act was
circumstantial, id. at 726, whereas here the associate’s “eyewitness” statement was before the trial

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 Corroboration is not required to satisfy the Rule 404(b) clear proof
requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1047 (11th
Cir. 2001) (“[T]he uncorroborated word of an accomplice provides a sufficient
basis for concluding that the defendant committed extrinsic acts admissible
under Rule 404(b).” (quotation and ellipsis omitted)). Even if corroboration
were required, here there was evidence that corroborated the associate’s
statement and provided sufficient indicia of reliability. To establish clear proof,
the State presented a detailed description of the solicitation in its motion in
limine, a screenshot of text messages between the defendant and the associate
that supported the associate’s statement that he and the defendant met during
the relevant time period, and a transcript of a statement given to the police by
a third party to whom the associate described the defendant’s solicitation.

Nor did the State’s evidence lack reliability. As we have observed, it is for
the jury to ultimately determine credibility and to decide what weight should be
given to the evidence. See State v. Torrence, 134 N.H. 24, 27 (1991). The trial
court also had ample opportunity to evaluate the parties’ arguments regarding
the associate’s reliability and motive to lie. In addition to the corroborating
evidence referenced above, the trial court had before it a transcript of the
associate’s statement to the police and a police sergeant’s narrative regarding
the associate’s statement. These documents contained details of the encounter
as well as the associate’s relationship with the defendant. At the pretrial
hearing, the defendant argued that the associate should not be allowed to
testify because the defendant owed the associate money, which gave the
associate a motive to lie. The trial court considered this argument and rejected
it, reasoning that the associate’s “chances of recouping the outstanding debt
would become lower if [the] Defendant is convicted.” Accordingly, we conclude
that the record contains evidence with sufficient indicia of reliability to provide
an objective basis for the trial court’s decision. Therefore, the trial court did
not unsustainably exercise its discretion when it determined that the evidence
the State presented constituted clear proof that the defendant committed the
prior bad act of solicitation.

We next address whether the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
See State v. Howe, 159 N.H. 366, 377 (2009). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if
its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury’s sympathies, arouse its
sense of horror, or provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings
of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision upon something
other than the established propositions in the case. Id. at 377-78. “It is not,
however, evidence that is merely detrimental to the defendant because it tends
to prove his guilt.” Id. at 378 (quotation omitted). Among the factors that we
consider in weighing the evidence are: (1) whether the evidence would have a
great emotional impact upon a jury; (2) its potential for appealing to a juror’s

court at the time it made its clear proof determination.

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sense of resentment or outrage; and (3) the extent to which the issue upon
which it is offered is established by other evidence, stipulation or inference. Id.
We accord considerable deference to the trial court’s determination in
balancing prejudice and probative worth under Rule 404(b). Id.

First, we consider the probative value of the evidence. Id. Determining
the probative value of evidence entails analyzing how relevant it is. Id.
Relevant evidence may have limited probative value. Id. Here, the trial court
determined that the evidence of the murder solicitation was highly probative of
the defendant’s intent. The defendant argues that the trial court’s
determination was error. He asserts that the probative value of the associate’s
testimony regarding the solicitation was weak because mens rea and motive
could have been established through the testimony of other witnesses, it is
unclear whether the defendant had the same intent on the occasions of the
charged and uncharged acts, and the fact that the defendant was “soliciting
someone else to commit murder has no bearing on” the defendant’s “intent to
commit murder himself.” We disagree.

When intent is not conceded by the defense, and it is an element of the
crime to be proven by the State, it is sufficiently at issue to require evidence at
trial. State v. Cassavaugh, 161 N.H. 90, 97 (2010). Here, the defendant was
charged with first-degree murder, pursuant to RSA 630:1-a, I(a), and he did not
stipulate to intent. Therefore, the State was required to prove that the
defendant acted purposely. See RSA 630:1-a, I(a). For the purpose of RSA
630:1-a, I(a), a person acts purposely when his or her “conscious object is the
death of another,” and “his act or acts in furtherance of that object were
deliberate and premeditated.” RSA 630:1-a, II (2016). Rather than showing a
general propensity for violence, the associate’s proposed testimony that the
defendant solicited him to murder the victim would be highly probative of the
defendant’s intent and purpose because his conduct in soliciting the associate
was an affirmative step towards effectuating his expressed desire — to murder
the victim in order to collect life insurance proceeds.

The defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it determined
that the probative value of the evidence of solicitation was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We disagree. Particularly
pertinent to determining this balance is whether the evidence is relevant to
prove an issue that is actually in serious dispute. Howe, 159 N.H. at
378. Although evidence of a prior offense or bad act is always prejudicial, the
prejudice is frequently outweighed by the probative value of the evidence when
the defendant’s knowledge or intent is a contested issue in the case. Id. As
noted above, the challenged evidence was highly probative of the
defendant’s purposeful mens rea — which was actually in dispute and could
not be established as readily by other evidence that the trial court anticipated
being presented at trial. See State v. Thomas, 168 N.H. 589, 603 (2016).

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 Nor was the evidence of the defendant’s solicitation so inflammatory as to
substantially outweigh its highly probative nature. The evidence of solicitation
of murder was not as inflammatory as the evidence that the jury would hear at
trial regarding the defendant’s murder of the victim by strangulation or
smothering. See Howe, 159 N.H. at 378 (concluding that other bad act images
were not likely to have any greater emotional impact on the jury than the
charged images). Moreover, as the State argued during the pretrial hearing,
the proffered testimony “would constitute just a small portion of the testimony
of a single witness,” and the “details of the solicitation [were] not gory or
particularly malicious.” Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not
unsustainably exercise its discretion when it ruled that evidence of the
defendant’s attempted solicitation would be admissible at trial. See
Cassavaugh, 161 N.H. at 95, 98-99 (concluding that admission of evidence of
defendant’s prior threat to kill victim in first-degree murder case was not so
inflammatory as to substantially outweigh its probative value where
defendant’s intent was contested).

Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of his request
for an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of the Rule 404(b) evidence
deprived him of his right to due process under the State and Federal
Constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15. The
State argues that the defendant failed to preserve this argument for appellate
review and urges us not to reach its merits.

To preserve a state constitutional claim, the defendant must: (1) raise it
in the trial court; and (2) specifically invoke a provision of the State
Constitution in his brief. State v. Kuchman, 168 N.H. 779, 794 (2016). Here,
the defendant’s assertion in his objection to the State’s motion in limine that
“an evidentiary hearing is appropriate in this case” is insufficient to preserve a
state constitutional claim for our review. See In the Matter of Kempton &
Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 793 (2015) (concluding that respondent’s “mere
reference to ‘due process’” was insufficient to preserve state constitutional
claim for review). Similarly, we do not reach the defendant’s federal
constitutional claim because it was not raised by the defendant prior to the
court’s pretrial ruling or in a motion to reconsider. It has, therefore, not been
preserved for appeal. See State v. Murray, 134 N.H. 613, 615 (1991).

In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it granted the
State’s motion in limine to admit evidence of the defendant’s murder
solicitation. In addition, we conclude that the defendant failed to preserve his
due process argument. The remaining issues that the defendant raised either
do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322
(1993), or are waived. See Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Dev., 168 N.H. 377,
379-80 (2015) (issues raised in notice of appeal but not briefed are waived);

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State v. Barnes, 150 N.H. 715, 720 (2004) (inadequately developed arguments
are waived). Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

BASSETT and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred; ABRAMSON, J., retired
superior court justice, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, II, concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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