In the Matter of George McAlpin and Susan McAlpin

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0024, In the Matter of George McAlpin
and Susan McAlpin, the court on November 29, 2022, issued the
following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The respondent, Susan Tremain f/k/a Susan McAlpin
(Mother), appeals an order recommended by a judicial referee (Cross, R.) and
approved by the Circuit Court (Hall, J.), which granted her petition to modify
the parenting plan between her and the petitioner, George McAlpin (Father), by
making “more specific orders regarding communication between her” and her
14-year-old child. We affirm.

Following a hearing at which both parties testified and at which their
attorneys submitted offers of proof, the trial court ordered that Mother could
contact her child “directly by phone, text message, or email but not more often
than once every 4 days unless [the child] asks for more contact,” and that if the
child requests less contact, Mother “shall respect [the child’s] wishes, but she
may continue to try to contact [the child] . . . once every 3 weeks.” The court
further ordered Mother to be “civil and respectful” and that, although she may
ask the child about how the child is doing and for other information about her
daily life, she “shall not ask for information about [Father], his wife, [the
parties’ older adult child], or anyone else.” The court declined to force the child
to communicate with Mother.

On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court’s order was contrary to
RSA 461-A:2, I(a), which states that “unless it is clearly shown that in a
particular case, it is detrimental to a child,” it is the policy of this state to
“[s]upport frequent and continuing contact between each child and both
parents.” She also asserts that the trial court’s order was arbitrary and
unsupported by the evidence.

We review a trial court decision on a motion to modify a parenting plan
under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. See In the Matter of
Muchmore & Jaycox, 159 N.H. 470, 472 (2009). Under that standard of
review, we consider only whether the record establishes an objective basis
sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb
the trial court’s determination if it could reasonably have been made. In the
Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011). We uphold the trial
court’s factual findings unless the evidence does not support them or they are
legally erroneous. See In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785,
798 (2015).

Mother did not seek to change the allocation of parenting time between
the parents. RSA 461-A:11, I(f) allows a trial court to modify a permanent
order concerning parenting rights and responsibilities when “[t]he modification
makes either a minimal change or no change in the allocation of parenting time
between the parents, and the court determines that such change would be in
the best interest of the child.” Based upon our review of the record, we
conclude that the trial court reasonably determined that its specifications
regarding Mother’s contact with the youngest child are in the child’s best
interest. We find unpersuasive Mother’s challenges to those specifications, and
uphold the trial court’s decision.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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