In the Matter of Heather Mackesy-Boyle and David Boyle

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0416, In the Matter of Heather Mackesy-
Boyle and David Boyle, the court on January 22, 2025, issued
the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The respondent, David Boyle (Husband), appeals a final
divorce decree from the Circuit Court (Steckowych, J.) dividing marital real
estate between himself and the petitioner, Heather Mackesy-Boyle (Wife). On
appeal, Husband argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law and
unsustainably exercised its discretion when it divided the marital real estate
unequally. He argues that the trial court erroneously characterized the parties’
ten-year marriage as a relatively short-term marriage, improperly weighed
Husband’s limited contributions towards upkeep of the marital home, and
misapplied discretionary factors when dividing the marital real estate. We
conclude that the trial court did not err. We affirm.

The trial court found and the record supports the following facts, or they
are undisputed. Wife has resided in her home in Londonderry since 2003. She
has been the sole owner of that home since 2009. In 2013, Wife and Husband
married. Husband moved into the Londonderry home in 2014. During the
nearly ten-year marriage, Husband lived in the Londonderry home for
approximately six and a half years. During the years when Husband resided in
the Londonderry home, he contributed to the carrying costs of the home,
ranging from approximately forty to fifty percent of the aggregate costs of
expenses and improvements, with limited exceptions when he paid more than
half the cost for certain improvements. When Husband was living elsewhere,
he paid nothing towards the Londonderry home.

In 2019, Wife and Husband jointly purchased a property in Ogunquit,
Maine. They both contributed fifty percent to the down payment, both paid
half of the expenses when they were jointly using the property, and it was
deeded in both of their names.

In 2023, the trial court issued a final divorce decree. In that decree, the
trial court determined the value of the Londonderry and Ogunquit properties.
In considering the appraised value and the outstanding mortgage, the
Londonderry home had $300,000 in equity. Wife also had obtained $32,000 in
cash from refinancing the mortgage on the Londonderry home. The Ogunquit
property had $88,000 in equity.
 The trial court awarded the Londonderry home solely to Wife and the
Ogunquit property solely to Husband. The trial court concluded that such
division was consistent with the factors set forth in RSA 458:16-a (Supp.
2023), governing the distribution of marital property, due to the “relatively
short term of the marriage, the significant length of time [Wife] has solely
owned the [Londonderry] home, the limited contributions [Husband] has made
in the 6 years he’s occupied the [Londonderry home,] . . . the fact that while he
was separated from [Wife during the marriage] . . . he paid absolutely no costs
associated with the [Londonderry home, and because] he has not paid anything
towards the home since . . . July 2021.” Husband filed a motion for
reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

The trial court has broad discretion in determining matters of property
distribution when fashioning a final divorce decree. In the Matter of Gronvaldt
& Gronvaldt, 150 N.H. 551, 554 (2004). We review its decision under our
unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. See id. This standard requires
that we review only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient
to sustain the discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial
court’s determination if it could reasonably have been made. See In the Matter
of Heinrich & Heinrich, 164 N.H. 357, 365 (2012). If the court’s findings can
reasonably be made on the evidence presented, they will stand. Id. at 363. We
will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. In the Matter of
Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 799 (2015). Nor will we reweigh the
equities. See Heinrich, 164 N.H. at 365.

“When a dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may order an
equitable division of property between the parties.” RSA 458:16-a, II. “The
court shall presume that an equal division is an equitable distribution of
property, unless the court . . . decides that an equal division would not be
appropriate or equitable after considering” various factors, including “[t]he
duration of the marriage,” “[t]he actions of either party during the marriage
which contributed to the growth . . . in value of property,” “[t]he value of any
property acquired prior to the marriage,” and “[a]ny other factor that the court
deems relevant.” Id. The trial court need not consider all the enumerated
factors or give them equal weight. Heinrich, 164 N.H. at 363-64. Further, a
trial court is not precluded from awarding a particular asset in its entirety to
one party. Id. at 364.

Husband argues that the trial court erred in two respects when it
considered the length of the parties’ marriage. Husband first argues that the
trial court erred as a matter of law because it characterized the parties’ ten-
year marriage as “relatively short term.” We disagree. “[W]e have not adopted
a bright line rule that any marriage of fewer than ten years is a short-term
marriage and any marriage of ten years or longer is a long-term marriage.” In
the Matter of Barbara Bowman and Dennis Rooney, No. 2021-0353 (non-
precedential order at 2), 2022 WL 18446936 (N.H. Sept. 16, 2022). Husband

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also asserts that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion when it
considered the length of the parties’ marriage as a factor supporting an
unequal division of the marital real estate because, in this case, it is not
possible to return the parties to their pre-marriage positions. We disagree. On
the facts of this case, given the relatively short term of the marriage, the fact
that Husband only lived in and contributed to the Londonderry home for
approximately six and a half years, and Wife’s pre-marital ownership of that
home, the court acted within its discretion in attempting to return the parties
to their pre-marriage positions by granting Wife sole ownership of the
Londonderry home. Cf. Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 224-25 (1983) (holding
unequal division of nearly thirty-year jointly-owned marital home unwarranted,
and citing precedent concluding that “long-term” marriages exceeding twenty
years — during which spouses worked and lived in jointly owned homes —
supported equal division of those homes). Accordingly, we cannot conclude
that the court erred when it found the ten-year marriage to be “relatively short
term” or when it considered the length of the marriage as a factor justifying
unequal division of the marital real estate.

Husband further argues that the court erred when it considered his
limited contributions to the upkeep of the Londonderry home after July 2021.
He argues that he was merely following a court order which provided that Wife
was responsible for the expenses of that home during that time. We disagree.
RSA 458:16-a, II(f) permits the court to consider “[t]he actions of either party
during the marriage which contributed to the growth . . . in value of property.”
In recognizing that Husband made no contributions to the Londonderry home
after July 2021, the court accurately described the operative facts. Put another
way, Wife made all the contributions to the upkeep of the Londonderry home
during that time. Accordingly, the court did not err when it accurately
described Husband’s contributions to the Londonderry home.

Husband next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
trial court’s characterization of the facts supporting the decree. We disagree.
The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Wife owned the
Londonderry home for a “significant length of time.” Wife testified that she has
been the sole owner of that home since 2009. The evidence also supports the
court’s finding that Husband’s contributions to the Londonderry home were
“limited.” Wife testified that Husband contributed to the upkeep of the home
only during the approximately six and a half years that he lived there and that,
with limited exceptions, he paid forty to fifty percent of the expenses
attributable to the Londonderry home when he contributed. Wife’s testimony is
sufficient evidence that his contributions towards the total cost of the
Londonderry home for the ten-year period were “limited.” Finally, as we have
addressed above, the trial court did not err when it characterized the marriage
as “relatively short term.” Accordingly, we conclude that the record establishes
an objective basis sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling and we will not
disturb it. See Heinrich, 164 N.H. at 365.

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 Nonetheless, Husband argues that the trial court erred in balancing the
equities when it divided the marital property. He argues that the trial court
erred, first, because the statute presumes that an equal distribution is
equitable and, second, because most of the statutory factors favor equal
distribution. Further, Husband argues that, even if unequal distribution is
warranted, an award of real estate with $300,000 in equity to Wife, in addition
to the $32,000 in cash she was allowed to retain from the refinancing, as
compared to an award of real estate with $88,000 in equity to Husband is so
disproportionate as to be an unsustainable exercise of discretion. He also
argues that the trial court gave “undue weight” to the amount of time that Wife
owned the Londonderry home and too little weight to his contributions to the
value of that home and other marital property. Based upon our review of the
limited record before us, we disagree. We observe that, other than the marital
real estate and a few small items not challenged on appeal, the trial court
distributed the marital property in a manner consistent with what the parties
agreed to in their testimony at the final hearing. With respect to Husband’s
challenge specifically to the distribution of the homes, although the statute
contains a presumption in favor of equal division, RSA 458:16-a, II, that
presumption can be overcome by “special circumstances” such as “a short
marriage” and “a party’s exclusive premarital possession of an asset that
continues after the marriage,” Hoffman v. Hoffman, 143 N.H. 514, 520 (1999).
The trial court appropriately considered the duration of the marriage and Wife’s
pre-marriage ownership of the Londonderry home. To the extent that Husband
argues the trial court unfairly weighed certain factors when it divided the
marital real estate unequally and granted Wife proportionally more value in
assets, we observe that the trial court is not required to consider every factor or
give them equal weight. See Heinrich, 164 N.H. at 363-64. Husband asks us
to reweigh the equities, and we decline to do so. See id. at 365.

In sum, the trial court weighed the proper factors and there is an
objective basis in the record to support its decree. Husband has waived his
remaining arguments, see Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Dev., 168 N.H. 377,
379-80 (2015), or they otherwise do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel
v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993). Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT, DONOVAN, and COUNTWAY, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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