Cited by

Both of the plaintiffs’ requests for attorney’s fees were based upon the allegation that the defendants engaged in bad faith conduct.

Roof also requested an award of attorney’s fees on the basis of RSA 507:15 and Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687 (1977), which the trial court denied.

In the motion to dismiss, Benoit specifically argued that ARNE II was “an evasive litigation tactic amounting to an act of bad faith,” and requested an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687 (1977).

defendant in the plaintiff’s small claims action pursuant to the judicial exception that allows an award when a party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, or wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, where the litigant’s conduct can be characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, and where it should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1997) (quotation and citations omitted).

We conclude by addressing the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by not awarding attorney’s fees for bad faith conduct.

Here, the trial court awarded fees pursuant to the judicial exception that allows such an award when a party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, where the litigant’s conduct can be characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, and where it should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977) (quotation and citations omitted).

has instituted or prolonged litigation through bad faith or obstinate, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or oppressive conduct.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 688 (1977).

“Underlying the rule that the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect his counsel fees from the loser is the principle that no person should be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690 (1977).

Finally, the trial court granted the defendants an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690 (1977).

Nonetheless, on April 6, the trial court “order[ed] the State to pay Bedford School District the withheld funds for FY 2016 within 30 days of April 1, 2017.” The court also ordered the State to pay Bedford’s attorney’s fees, citing Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977), for the proposition that an exception to the general rule that parties are responsible for their own attorney’s fees is warranted “[w]here an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and e

for having to defend against a lawsuit under the provisions of [RSA chapter 91-A], when the court finds that the lawsuit is in bad faith, frivolous, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or oppressive.” The Harkeem standard is substantially similar.

The Associations argue that they are entitled to attorney’s fees on the basis of the plaintiffs’ bad faith conduct, see Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690-91 (1977), and under RSA 507:15 (2010) (authorizing award of costs and 16 reasonable attorney’s fees plus $1,000 to prevailing party in contract or tort action if court finds “the action or any defense is frivolous or intended to harass or intimidate the prevailing part

“Underlying the rule that the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect his counsel fees from the loser is the principle that no person should be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690 (1977).

r an improper motive.” Settlers reasons that, even though the trial court set aside the jury’s verdict on Settlers’ abuse of process counterclaim as it related to the initiation and pursuit of this lawsuit, the trial court should have granted Settlers attorney’s fees, nonetheless, under the “bad faith litigation” exception to the general rule that the prevailing party is not entitled to such fees.

When attorney’s fees are awarded against a private party who has acted in bad faith, the purpose is to “do justice and vindicate rights,” as well as to discourage frivolous lawsuits.

In Arcidi, we noted that, in Burrows, we relied upon Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977), “which provides for attorney’s fees when an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right and the opposing party has acted in bad faith.” Arcidi, 150 N.H. at 704.

LaMontagne Builders v. Brooks, 154 N.H. 252, 259 (2006) (stating we have exclusive authority to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal); Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977).

In doing so, we relied upon the “test we set out in Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), [stating that] where an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right, which should have been freely enjoyed without such intervention, an award of counsel fees on the basis of bad faith is appropriate.” Id.

[,] repetitive and unabated” and “unreasonably obstinate, wanton, and in bad faith” entitling him to attorney’s fees under Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687 (1977).

An award of attorney’s fees “merely shifts the cost of what should have been an unnecessary judicial proceeding to the responsible party...” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977) (emphasis added).

he had an adequate avenue for relief, which he forfeited by failing to pursue it in a timely fashion.” Finally, the petitioner argues that he is entitled to his attorney’s fees because the Town acted in bad faith, see Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690-91 (1977), or, in the alternative, because the litigation conferred a public benefit, see Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 145 N.H. 578, 596 (2000).

In Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690-91 (1977), we recognized that the trial court may award attorney’s fees based upon the conduct of one of the parties.

The specific exception he cites allows an award of attorney’s fees when “one party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, where the litigant’s conduct can be characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, and where it should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977) (quotation and citations omitted).

Under the “bad faith litigation” theory, an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate where “one party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, where the litigant’s conduct can be characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, and where it should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977) (quotations and citations omitted).

VII Finally, Lassonde argues that the trial court erred by failing to award him attorney’s fees under the rule of Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690-91 (1977) (litigation conducted in “bad faith” may justify award of *596 counsel fees).

The petitioner also argues that she was entitled to attorney’s fees in the domestic matter under Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687 (1977).

However, we can say at this point that the estate is not entitled to costs or fees incurred in litigating the two issues upon which it *577 has not prevailed, see Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690-91 (1977), and we cannot help but observo that a substantial portion of the estate’s attorney’s fees in this ease appear to have been generated by the estate’s dogged reliance upon a plainly incorrect interpretation of our decision in Angley-Cook.

(quotation omitted), and where a claimant was forced to litigate in order to receive unemployment benefits to which his right was “clearly established” by statute and a prior decision of this court, Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977).

Furthermore, in remanding for attorney’s fees and costs at the trial level, we relied upon Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977), which provides for attorney’s fees when an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right and the opposing party has acted in bad faith.

The plaintiff therefore relies on a recognized exception to the general rule: attorney’s fees may be awarded when “an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

Absent a remedy for malicious defense, the plaintiffs have, on the facts before us, only a claim that sanctions be imposed by the trial court based upon the use of false evidence by the defendants.

Because “no person should be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit,” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977), “[a]n award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule,” Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 576, 644 A.2d 51, 62 (1994).

“[W]hen overriding considerations so indicate, the award of fees lies within the power of the court, and is an appropriate tool in the court’s arsenal to do justice and vindicate rights.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

The trial court acknowledged that Coffey was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, but relied on Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), to deny the division’s motion to reconsider the *347 award of attorney’s fees, affirming his original determination that Coffey’s actions justified the order.

We have not previously decided this question, and the plaintiffs did not have such a “clearly defined and established right” that they should not have been forced to litigate the issue.

We have recognized exceptions “[w]here an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right” if bad faith can be established, Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977); “where litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct,” St.

The focus in such cases is on “a litigant’s unjustifiable belligerence or obstinacy” where an action is “commenced, prolonged, required or defended without any reasonable basis in the facts provable by evidence.” Id.-, see Town of Nottingham v. Bonser, 131 N.H. 120, 133, 552 A.2d 58, 65 (1988) (persistent course of contumacious action warranted fee award), cert.

Although we appreciate that the grounds for awarding fees are flexible, see Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977), we find no reason in this case to depart from the American rule that each party bear its own fees.

Relying upon Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), the defendant argued below that the prosecutor’s conduct was “in bad faith, vexatious, wanton and oppressive” so as to be “unreasonably obdurate or obstinate.” Id.

As a rule, a “prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect counsel fees from the loser.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

The town sought attorney’s fees on the basis that the defendants’ conduct was “unreasonably obstinate” and that the town should not have had to bring the action.

Exceptions include: “[w]here an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right” if bad faith can be established, Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977); “where litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct,” St.

In its order of March 12,1991, the superior court ruled that Preston’s actions, just prior to the September 30, 1986 hearing, and his conduct during the hearing, constituted bad faith and that the planning board as a whole acted in bad faith in not accepting the application in spite of its “deficiencies.” The defendants were awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), which allows a party to recover attorney’s feesjf bad faith is established and the p

We have recognized exceptions to this rule “‘where an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined right’ if bad faith can be established,” Funtown v. Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 312, 315, 499 A.2d 1337, 1339 (1985) (quoting Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977)); see also Indian Head National Bank v. Corey, 129 N.H. 83, 88, 523 A.2d 70, 73 (1986); “where litigation is instituted or unnecessarily pro *17 longed through a party’s oppressive, ve

The Guay exceptions as expanded over the years, see Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977), and as recently reported in Town of Nottingham v. Bonser, 131 N.H. 120, 132, 552 A.2d 58, 65 (1988), cert.

Woodstock was not forced to litigate to secure a clearly defined and established right.

Furthermore, we reject the plaintiffs’ request for sanctions because the board’s conduct cannot be “characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

rs” and was “thereby needlessly maintaining litigation as a perpetual and professional litigant.” Included in this motion was a request that the trial court vacate its previous order denying the award of attorney’s fees and schedule oral argument so that the Condemnee could have an opportunity “to establish new judicial precedent and to expand existing precedent” consistent with Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), and its progeny.

In other cases we have recognized that the authority to award attorney’s fees rests in the “court’s power” or in the exercise of the court’s “general equitable powers.” See Keenan, 130 N.H. at 502, 543 A.2d at 1383-84; Archer v. Dow, 126 N.H. 24, 29, 489 A.2d 574, 578 (1985); Harkeem, v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690-91, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).