Jared Goodell v. Brandie Wells Roof

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0281, Jared Goodell v. Brandie Wells Roof,
the court on February 12, 2025, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has
determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The
counterclaim plaintiff, Brandie Wells Roof, appeals the entry of judgment,
following a jury trial in Superior Court (Smith, J.), in favor of the counterclaim
defendant, Jared Goodell. Roof also appeals a number of the trial court’s
rulings in this case. She appeals orders by the Trial Court (Smith, J.): (1)
denying her motion for attorney’s fees and costs; (2) ruling that her attorney’s
fees could not be used as a measure of damages in her claim for fraudulent
registration of trade names, see RSA 349:10 (2022); and (3) ruling that her suit
could not include the private prosecution of a criminal violation of RSA 349:10.
Roof also appeals orders by the Trial Court (Ruoff, J.) dismissing her claims: (1)
under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), see RSA 358-A:2 (2022) (amended
2024); (2) under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 for false designation; and (3) for conversion.
Finally, she appeals an order of the Trial Court (Leonard, J.) granting Goodell’s
motion for summary judgment on her economic duress claim. We uphold all of
the enumerated rulings by the trial court, but reverse and remand for a new
trial because the trial court erred in entering judgment based on the jury
verdict.

The following facts are taken from the trial court’s orders.
Goodell brought a defamation action against Roof, who responded with a
number of counterclaims. Roof’s responsive pleading alleged that she operated
a psychic medium business and a retail business in Keene under the common
law trade names “Keene Intuition” and “Soul Emporium,” respectively. In
August 2018, a local newspaper published an article that described Roof’s
businesses and referenced both trade names. Immediately thereafter, Goodell
registered both trade names with the Secretary of State. Goodell subsequently
offered to release the trade names to Roof if she paid money and signed non-
disclosure and non-disparagement agreements. She declined.

Roof’s counterclaims included a claim under RSA 349:10 for fraudulent
registration of trade names and claims for both intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. By the time of trial, only those three
counterclaims and claims for enhanced damages and attorney’s fees had
survived motions for dismissal or summary judgment. Approximately two
weeks prior to trial, Goodell voluntarily nonsuited his defamation claim with
prejudice, leaving Roof’s remaining claims to be tried.

After a four-day trial, the jury was sent to deliberate with a verdict form
that asked four questions, designated A, B, C, and D. The first three questions
asked if the jury found that Roof had proved, respectively, each of her
substantive counterclaims — fraudulent registration of a trade name (Question
A), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Question B), and negligent
infliction of emotional distress (Question C). The jury answered “no” to all
three. Question D asked whether the jury found that Goodell’s conduct was
wanton, malicious or oppressive and, if the answer was “yes,” instructed the
jury to “enter the amount of enhanced compensatory damages, if any.” The
jury answered “yes,” and entered the amount of $75,000.

Following a hearing, the trial court ruled that it could not issue an award
of enhanced compensatory damages when the jury had found no liability on
Roof’s substantive tort claims. The court entered judgment in favor of Goodell
on the substantive claims and awarded no enhanced compensatory damages.
Roof moved for reconsideration, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to
set aside the verdict. Goodell objected, and the trial court denied the motions.
Roof also requested an award of attorney’s fees on the basis of RSA 507:15 and
Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687 (1977), which the trial court denied. See
RSA 507:15 (2010).

On appeal, Roof first argues that the trial court erred in setting aside the
jury’s $75,000 verdict in her favor. She contends that the trial court’s
conclusion that the enhanced damages award could not stand without a
finding of liability on one of Roof’s underlying tort claims is unsupported by
law. We disagree. In Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71
(1972), we noted:

In a civil action founded on a tort, nothing but compensatory
damages can be awarded, but the injured party is entitled to full
compensation for all the injury sustained, mental as well as
material. In some cases, compensation for the actual material
damage sustained will be full compensation. In other cases, the
material damages may be trivial, and the principal injury be to the
wounded feelings from the insult, degradation, and other
aggravating circumstances attending the act.

Vratsenes, 112 N.H. at 73 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also
Minion Inc. v. Burdin, 929 F. Supp. 521, 523 (D.N.H. 1996) (noting that
“[u]nder New Hampshire law, a claim for enhanced damages is not a separate
cause of action; it is a request for a particular remedy”).

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 Question D on the verdict form asked:

Does the Jury find that Ms. Roof has proven by a preponderance of
the evidence that [Goodell’s] conduct was wanton, malicious, or
oppressive?

....

If your answer is YES, enter the amount of enhanced
compensatory damages, if any.

By itself, Question D does not contain all the elements of any recognized
tort. The trial court was therefore correct in concluding that the jury’s answers
to Question D do not support an entry of judgment for $75,000. Cf. McVey v.
Phillips Petroleum Company, 288 F.2d 53, 59 (5th Cir. 1961) (noting that the
answers to interrogatories propounded to the jury could not support a
judgment because, “although those interrogatories deal with compensation for
injuries proximately resulting from the ‘accident made the basis of this suit,’
the element of negligence is nowhere mentioned”). Accordingly, the court did
not err in declining to award the enhanced compensatory damages found by
the jury.

Roof alternatively argues that the trial court should have granted a new
trial based on inconsistency of the verdicts. The parties agree that a new trial
is warranted if there is “no rational, non-speculative way to reconcile two
essential jury findings.” Grant v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 877 F. Supp. 806,
810 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we will assume, without
deciding, that that standard applies. We review the denial of a motion to set
aside the verdict and grant a new trial for an unsustainable exercise of
discretion. See Brigham v. Hudson Motors, Inc., 118 N.H. 590, 593 (1978);
State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

Goodell contends that the verdicts can be rationally reconciled. He notes
that the burden of proof stated in Question A was by clear and convincing
evidence, while on Question D, the burden of proof was by a preponderance of
the evidence. Thus, he argues, “[t]he jury could have found, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that Goodell’s trade name registration was
wanton, malicious or oppressive, but not fraudulent.” Even if we assume,
however, that the jury could have so found, it still could not have answered
Question D as it did consistently with the instructions it was given.

Questions A, B, and C on the jury verdict form asked if the jury found
that Roof had proven, respectively, her claims for fraudulent registration of a
trade name, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Each question instructed that if the answer was “no,”
the jury should proceed to the next question, but if the answer was “yes,” it

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asked “does the Jury find that Ms. Roof has proven her actual damages by a
preponderance of the evidence?” (Emphasis added.) Each question again
instructed that if the answer was “no,” the jury should proceed to the next
question, but if the answer was “yes,” it asked the jury to “enter the amount of
the proven damages.” The jury answered “no” to the part of each question
asking if Roof had proven her claim and left the answers to the damages
portion of each question blank.

Question D asked if Roof had proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that Goodell’s conduct was wanton, malicious or oppressive and, if the answer
was “yes,” instructed the jury to “enter the amount of enhanced compensatory
damages, if any.” (Emphasis added.) The jury instruction on enhanced
compensatory damages stated, in relevant part:

If you find that Ms. Roof suffered actual damages that were
caused or substantially caused by Mr. Goodell’s conduct, there are
certain circumstances under which the law permits you, but does
not require you, to consider an award of additional damages to
reflect aggravating circumstances. These damages are called
“enhanced damages” or “liberal compensatory damages.” You may
award these damages only if you find that Mr. Goodell’s conduct
was more probably than not wanton, malicious, or oppressive.

“We assume that the jury follows properly crafted instructions . . . .”
Great Am. Dining v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 164 N.H. 612, 628 (2013)
(quotation omitted). Under the instructions given, the jury could not have
awarded Roof “additional” enhanced compensatory damages without first
finding liability and actual damages on at least one of Roof’s claims. The
verdicts are therefore inconsistent and the trial court unsustainably exercised
its discretion in failing to order a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand for a new trial.

Roof next argues that the trial court erred in denying her attorney’s fees
and costs. Resolution of the issues involving attorney’s fees and sanctions for
counsel’s alleged misconduct will depend, at least in part, upon the verdict that
is reached on the merits. Because we have reversed and remanded for a new
trial, we decline, without prejudice, to address these issues.

Roof next challenges a number of the trial court’s pretrial rulings. She
argues that the trial court erred in: (1) ruling that her attorney’s fees could not
be considered part of her damages under RSA 349:10; (2) ruling that she could
not “prosecute the crime of fraudulent registration of a trade name as part of
this case”; and (3) dismissing, or granting summary judgment in Goodell’s
favor on, her claims for conversion, false designation under 15 U.S.C. § 1125,
violation of the CPA, and economic duress.

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 As the appealing party, Roof has the burden of demonstrating reversible
error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our review of the
trial court orders, the relevant law, and the record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that she has not demonstrated reversible error on any of the pretrial
rulings she challenges. See id.

Finally, to the extent Goodell argues that Roof does not have a statutory
civil cause of action under RSA 349:10, we agree with Roof that he has waived
that claim by failing to appeal the trial court’s ruling to the contrary.

Reversed and remanded.

DONOVAN and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred; NADEAU, J., retired
superior court chief justice, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, II, concurred;
HANTZ MARCONI, J., sat for oral argument but did not participate in the final
vote.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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