Seacoast Helicopters, LLC v. Kevin Beaulieu

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0697, Seacoast Helicopters, LLC v. Kevin
Beaulieu, the court on August 14, 2020, issued the following
order:

Having considered the brief filed by the plaintiff, Seacoast Helicopters,
LLC, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is
unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). The plaintiff appeals an order
of the Circuit Court (Vetanze, J.) awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant,
Kevin Beaulieu. See Emerson v. Town of Stratford, 139 N.H. 629, 631-32
(1995). We affirm.

This is the second appeal involving the parties. In 2018, the trial court
awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant in the plaintiff’s small claims action
pursuant to the judicial exception that allows an award when a party has
“acted in bad faith, vexatiously, or wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, where
the litigant’s conduct can be characterized as unreasonably obdurate or
obstinate, and where it should have been unnecessary for the successful party
to have brought the action.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1997)
(quotation and citations omitted). In making that award, the trial court
considered the fact that the plaintiff had simultaneously sought an offset to the
defendant’s wage claim in superior court and sought recovery in its small
claims action. We vacated the award because we agreed with the plaintiff “that
the fact that it simultaneously sought an offset to the defendant’s wage claim
and sought recovery in this small claims action ‘cannot form the basis of a
finding that [it] acted unreasonably, oppressively, and in bad faith,’” and
because we could not determine whether the trial court would have awarded
attorney’s fees had it not relied upon that fact. Seacoast Helicopters, LLC v.
Kevin Beaulieu, No. 2018-0299, 2019 WL 1450298, at *3 (N.H. March 14,
2019).

On remand, after the court held a hearing on offers of proof and reviewed
the transcript in the 2018 proceeding, the court determined that it would have
awarded fees “regardless of the issue of the Plaintiff seeking simultaneous
recourse in multiple venues.” The court specifically acknowledged that “no
person should be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit,” but
found that a fee award was proper because the plaintiff’s basis for recovery in
the small claims action “was patently unreasonable and frivolous”; the
plaintiff’s “conduct throughout the proceedings,” including “affirmatively
making a material misrepresentation in a certificate of service,” was “contrary
to our civilized court system”; and the small claims action was “frivolous and
unduly vexatious” and was motivated by a desire “to punish the Defendant for
resigning from his post with the Plaintiff.” (Quotation omitted.)

We review awards of attorney’s fees and costs under our unsustainable
exercise of discretion standard, giving substantial deference to the trial court’s
decision. George v. Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., 162 N.H. 123, 139 (2011). Our task
on appeal is not to determine whether we would have found differently; rather,
we determine whether a reasonable person could have found as the trial judge
did. In re Adam M., 148 N.H. 83, 84 (2002). We will defer to the trial court’s
factual findings unless they are unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a
matter of law. N.H. Right to Life v. Dir., N.H. Charitable Trust Unit, 169 N.H.
95, 126 (2016).

Although the general rule in New Hampshire is that parties pay their own
attorney’s fees, a prevailing party may be awarded fees pursuant to an
established judicial exception to that general rule. See In the Matter of Mason
& Mason, 164 N.H. 391, 398 (2012). “We have recognized exceptions where an
individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and
established right if bad faith can be established; where litigation is instituted or
unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary,
capricious or bad faith conduct; as compensation for those who are forced to
litigate in order to enjoy what a court has already decreed; and [as
compensation] for those who are forced to litigate against an opponent whose
position is patently unreasonable.” Id. at 399.

In the instant case, the trial court appears to have awarded the
defendant attorney’s fees under two of the above-described exceptions: (1)
“where litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s
oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct”; and (2) where
a party is “forced to litigate against an opponent whose position is patently
unreasonable.” Id. Because we conclude that an award of fees was proper in
this case under the first exception, we need not consider whether the award
was also proper under the second.

The plaintiff first argues that the decision on remand constitutes an
unsustainable exercise of discretion because the court impermissibly relied
upon the fact that the plaintiff “simultaneously pursued its offset claim in the
wage claim proceeding and its small claim action.” The plaintiff observes that
the trial court quoted its earlier order and stated that its findings in that order
“even excluding [its] last two sentences” support the fee award. The plaintiff
also correctly observes that the last two sentences of the trial court’s earlier
order were not the only sentences that referred to the fact that the plaintiff had
pursued both an offset claim in the wage claim proceeding and a small claim
action. In fact, the order contained two additional sentences that referred to
that fact.

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 Nonetheless, we do not share the plaintiff’s interpretation of the trial
court’s order. See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H. 698, 702
(2008) (explaining that the interpretation of a court order is a question of law).
The trial court expressly stated that “it would have awarded fees regardless of
the issue of the Plaintiff seeking simultaneous recourse in multiple venues,”
which indicates that it did not consider that fact on remand. Moreover, the
trial court specifically enumerated the prior findings upon which it relied, and
none of them concern the plaintiff’s simultaneous pursuit of recovery in
multiple forums. Rather, they concern: (1) the plaintiff’s certification that
pleadings were mailed to the defendant when, in fact, they were not; (2) the
plaintiff’s “patently unreasonable” position in the small claims action that the
defendant owed the plaintiff “for flight time incurred when the Defendant was
working for the Plaintiff, while . . . completing tasks at the direction of the
Plaintiff, and . . . performing duties for the benefit of the Plaintiff”; (3) the
plaintiff’s intent to bring the small claims action so as to harass the defendant;
and (4) the plaintiff’s “pretrial tactics,” which “resulted in additional and
unnecessary legal expenses to the Defendant.” Thus, we conclude that the
court, in fact, did not rely upon any of its prior findings concerning the
plaintiff’s pursuit of simultaneous recourse in multiple venues.

The plaintiff next asserts that the trial court was incorrect when it found
that the plaintiff lied in the certificate of service. The plaintiff argues, “Contrary
to the Court’s conclusion, Plaintiff was honest.” However, “[t]he trial court was
in the best position to observe the parties and to determine their credibility.”
C & M Realty Tr. v. Wiedenkeller, 133 N.H. 470, 476 (1990). We defer to a trial
court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in testimony, measuring
the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given to
testimony. Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003).

The plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred when it found that
the plaintiff pursued the action, in bad faith, so as to punish the defendant for
leaving the plaintiff’s employ. The plaintiff asserts that “[c]ontrary to this
finding, Plaintiff initiated this cause of action to redress economic harm that
resulted from the breach of contract.” The trial court’s finding of bad faith,
however, is inextricably tied to its view that the defendant testified credibly,
while the plaintiff did not. We decline to disturb those credibility
determinations. See id.

The plaintiff next argues that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded is
excessive. We review the trial court’s calculation of attorney’s fees under our
unsustainable exercise of discretion standard, and if there is some support for
the trial court’s decision, we will uphold it. LaMontagne Builders v. Brooks, 154 N.H. 252, 261-62 (2006).

“Relevant factors in the determination of reasonable fees include the
amount involved, the nature, novelty, and difficulty of the litigation, the

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attorney’s standing and the skill employed, the time devoted, the customary
fees in the area, the extent to which the attorney prevailed, and the benefit
thereby bestowed on his clients.” Couture v. Mammoth Groceries, Inc., 117
N.H. 294, 296 (1977).

The plaintiff contends that the amount awarded in this case ($6,500 for
approximately 38 and ½ hours of legal work) was excessive because: (1) “[t]he
fees expended by Defendant were in excess of the amount claimed in this Small
Claims Complaint”; and (2) the defendant chose to file two dispositive motions.
The plaintiff asserts that it “should not be responsible for fees associated with
overzealous defense of a $4,900.00 claim.” The trial court was not compelled
to agree with the plaintiff that defense counsel’s defense in this case was
“overzealous.” “Keeping in mind the substantial deference accorded a trial
court’s decision on attorney’s fees, we cannot conclude that the court
unsustainably exercised its discretion.” Town of Barrington v. Townsend, 164
N.H. 241, 251(2012) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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