Cited by

As an exception to the general rule that parties pay their own counsel fees, see Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977), New Hampshire has long recognized that the trial court has the discretion to award a party attorney’s fees in a divorce proceeding, Guay v. Association, 87 N.H. 216, 222, 177 A. 409, 413 (1935).

The superior court may order a party “who has instituted or prolonged litigation through bad faith or obstinate, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or oppressive conduct” to pay the opposing party’s counsel fees: Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 688, 377 A.2d 617, 617 (1977).

The same may be said on considering the propriety of the fee award under the general standard expressed in Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), and its progeny.

The modern law on the subject rests on Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977), which affirmed Hodge and related cases by explaining that it was the “unnecessary” character of the judicial proceeding that justified the fee award, and by expanding Hodge’s principle generally to cover cases “[w]here an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a cle

Citing Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), the court ordered the complainant to pay the defendants’ counsel fees, based on the express finding that the complainant had acted out of vindictiveness and spite in bringing frivolous complaints for the purpose of harassment.

The board’s conduct meets the test we set out in Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), where we stated that “[w]here an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right, which should have been freely enjoyed without such intervention, an award of counsel fees on the basis of bad faith is appropriate.” Id.

In Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), we held that “[wjhere an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right, which should have been freely enjoyed without such intervention, an award of counsel fees on the basis of bad faith is appropriate.

Superior Court Rule 59 authorizes the assessment of “reasonable costs, including reasonable counsel fees, against any party whose frivolous or unreasonable conduct makes necessary the filing of or hearing on any motion.” In addition, Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977) and its companion case, St.

Moreover, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated any bad faith on the part of the State.

The plaintiff claims attorney’s fees under Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), for failure of the DES to follow unambiguous and binding precedent.

In Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), we held that an exception to the general rule that parties pay their own counsel fees exists “where an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined right” if bad faith can be established.

“Where an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right, which should have been freely enjoyed without such intervention, an award of counsel fees on the basis of bad faith is appropriate.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

Silva v. Botsch, 121 N.H. 1041, 1043, 437 A.2d 313, 314 (1981); Pugliese v. Town of Northwood, 119 N.H. 743, 752, 408 A.2d 113, 118 (1979); Morse v. Ford, 118 N.H. 280, 281, 385 A.2d 229, 230 (1978); Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

Because we concluded above that there was no “bad faith or obstinate, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or oppressive conduct,” on the part of the lenders, we see no reason to stray from our general rule that the prevailing litigant is not entitled to collect attorney’s fees from the loser.

*464 Finally, the claimant seeks an award of attorney’s fees under the standard set by Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977).

This court has held that an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate “[w]here an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right, which should have been freely enjoyed without such intervention....” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

Burrows v. City of Keene, supra at 601, 432 A.2d at 22; Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

*791 In Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), we held that “[w]here an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right, which should have been freely enjoyed without such intervention, an award of counsel fees on the basis of bad faith is appropriate.” Id.

The plaintiff argues that this conduct falls within the description of “bad faith” as discussed in Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977).

Accordingly, we reject the union’s request for reimbursement of its legal expenses pursuant to our decision in Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

Brock, J. The only issue to be decided in this appeal is whether the Trial Court’s (DiClerico, J.) order requiring the defendant, Avery Johnson, to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the plaintiff, Town of Milford, which prevailed against him in an action for injunctive relief, was proper under Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977).

In addition, the trial court is empowered to award reasonable attorney’s fees under Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), against “a party who has instituted or prolonged litigation through bad faith or obstinate, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or oppressive conduct.

Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977) and citations therein.

The matter is remanded for a determination of damages and for assessment of additional reasonable counsel fees and costs at the trial level *602 incurred after the effective date of the regulation.

Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977); cf. Win-Tasch Corp. v. Town of Merrimack, 120 N.H. 6, 11, 411 A.2d 144, 147 (1980).

The rule in effect in this State is that when “an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right, which should have been freely enjoyed without such intervention, an award of counsel fees on the basis of bad faith is appropriate.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977); see Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.

In the absence of such specific findings supportable by the evidence, courts are precluded by the reasoning and holding of Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), from awarding attorney fees.

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to attorney fees under King v. Thomson, 119 N.H. 219, 400 A.2d 1169 (1979) and Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977).

These exceptions are flexible, not absolute, and have been extended on occasion.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977) (citations omitted).

The conditions of Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), were not met.

[has] caused the plaintiff unnecessary legal expenses for which the defendants should be held responsible.” We therefore sustain the award of $750 toward plaintiffs legal expenses.

party who has acted in bad faith to prolong the litigation Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977).

She argues that the instant case comes within the rule of Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), in which we held that if litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive or bad faith conduct, the court may award attorney fees to the party’s opponent.

Jeannont v. N.H. Personnel Comm'n, 118 N.H. 597, 392 A.2d 1193; Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977).

Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977); Griffin v. N.H. Dep’t of Employment Security, 117 N.H. 108, 370 A.2d 278 (1977).

In Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 692, 377 A.2d 617, 620 (1977), we held that in the de novo trial authorized by RSA 282:5 G, superior court review is limited to issues raised in the complaining party’s petition.

In Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), this court held that “the superior court’s de novo review takes place within the parameters set by the claimant’s petition.” Id.

y order or decision of the commission shall be taken unless the appellant shall have made application for rehearing as herein provided and when such application shall have been made, no ground not set forth therein shall be urged, relied on, or given any consideration by the court unless the court for good cause shown shall allow the appellant to specify additional grounds.” Cf. Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977).

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977); see Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977); see Wilko v. Tap Realty, Inc. 117 N.H. 843, 379 A.2d 798 (1977).

This court has specifically held that a “court, in the exercise of its general equitable powers, can order a party who has instituted or prolonged litigation through bad faith or obstinate, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or oppressive conduct, to pay his opponent’s counsel fees.” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977).

In Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977), decided this day, we held that where litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct, an award of attorneys’ fees to his opponent is within the court’s power.