Branch Banking and Trust Company v. Samson Duclair & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0545, Branch Banking and Trust Company
v. Samson Duclair & a., the court on May 2, 2016, issued the
following order:

Having considered the briefs, the memorandum of law, and the record
submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this
case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The defendants, Samson Duclair and Paulette Duclair, appeal an order of
the Superior Court (Wageling, J.) ordering them to make periodic payments, in
the amount of $300 per month, to the plaintiff, Branch Banking and Trust
Company (lender). We construe the defendants’ brief to argue that: (1) the
Florida court did not properly credit them for the fair market value of the Florida
real estate upon which the lender foreclosed; (2) the lender failed to supply them
with the real estate appraisal used in connection with the origination of the loan
in 2005; (3) the Florida judgment against them had not been reduced to a sum
certain; (4) the lender acted in bad faith and committed fraud upon the court
when it filed its New Hampshire action against them; (5) New Hampshire lacked
jurisdiction over the lender’s action; (6) our December 9, 2014, order in Samson
Duclair & a. v. Branch Banking and Trust Company, Case No. 2014-0413, was
“self-contradictory”; and (7) the trial court’s periodic payment order did not state
the “sum certain” that they owe to the lender.

A number of these issues were resolved by our prior orders, and others are
not properly before us. See Samson Duclair & a. v. Branch Banking and Trust
Company, Case No. 2014-0413 (decided Dec. 9, 2014); Branch Banking and
Trust Company v. Samson Duclair & a., Case No. 2013-0244 (decided Nov. 7,
2013). To the extent that the defendants raise other arguments, they are either
not sufficiently developed, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003), or
otherwise do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321,
322 (1993).

At this time, we deny the lender’s request for attorney’s fees and other
sanctions. However, if in future cases the defendants continue to press issues
that have been finally resolved or are not properly before us, we will entertain a
properly supported motion for attorney’s fees. See RSA 490:14-a (2010); Sup. Ct.
R. 23. This order is without prejudice to the trial court considering an award to
the lender for attorney’s fees incurred in proceedings before the trial court. See
LaMontagne Builders v. Brooks, 154 N.H. 252, 259 (2006) (stating we have
exclusive authority to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal); Harkeem v.
Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977).

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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