Cited by

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 600- 01 (2011).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 591 (2011).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 600 (2011) (“It is not our role to calculate how much weight the trial court should afford specific evidence, second guess its decision on matters of witness credibility, or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on a discretionary ruling.”).

RSA 461-A:6, VII (requiring trial court, “[a]t the request of an aggrieved party,” to “set forth the reasons for its decision in a written order”); cf. In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 598 (2011) (observing that the factors considered by the trial court in resolving a parenting dispute were consistent with the factors set forth in RSA 461-A:6, I).

“When reviewing a trial court’s decision on parenting rights and responsibilities, our role is limited to determining whether it clearly appears that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

RSA 461-A:6, VII (Supp. 2015) (requiring trial court, “[a]t the request of an aggrieved party,” to “set forth the reasons for its decision in a written order”) (Emphasis added.); cf. In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 598-99 (2011) (observing that the factors considered by the trial court were consistent with the factors set forth in RSA 461-A:6, I).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011) (standard of review regarding parenting rights and responsibilities); In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 280 (2006) (standard of review regarding admissibility of evidence); In the Matter of Giacomini & Giacomini, 150 N.H. 498, 500 (2004) (standard of review regarding contempt).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

RSA 461-A:6, VII (requiring trial court, “[a]t the request of an aggrieved party,” to “set forth the reasons for its decision in a written order” (Emphasis added.)); cf. In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 598-99 (2011) (observing that the factors considered by the trial court in resolving a parenting dispute were consistent with the factors set forth in RSA 461-A:6, I).

“We will not overturn the superior court’s decision on appeal simply because we might have ruled differently.” State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 226 (1989); see In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 600-01 (2011) (explaining that “the fact that the trial court reasonably could have reached a different decision based upon the evidence before it” does not “mean that its decision constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion”).

“[R]esolution of the best interests of a child depends to a large extent upon the firsthand assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and the findings of the trial court are binding upon this court if supported by the evidence.” In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 588 (2011).

Id.; In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

Accordingly, “our role is limited to determining whether it clearly appears that the trial court *338 engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).