In the Matter of Mary Schwarzer-Hampton and R. Scott Hampton

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0451, In the Matter of Mary Schwarzer-
Hampton and R. Scott Hampton, the court on November 22,
2016, issued the following order:

Having considered the parties’ briefs and the record submitted on appeal,
we conclude that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The
petitioner, Mary Schwarzer-Hampton (Mother), appeals an order of the Circuit
Court (Lemire, J.) denying her petition to: (1) bring forward to enforce the
parties’ final parenting plan; (2) find the respondent, R. Scott Hampton
(Father), in contempt; and (3) modify the parties’ final parenting plan. We
affirm.

The following facts were found by the trial court or are supported by the
record. The parties were divorced by final decree in November 2012. The final
divorce decree incorporated a final parenting plan and parenting plan
addendum (collectively “parenting plan”) agreed upon by the parties. The
parenting plan provides the parties with shared decision-making responsibility
over their daughter and outlines a process for resolving co-parenting disputes.
In August 2014, Mother filed the present petition and Father objected.

The trial court held a hearing on Mother’s petition in March 2015, at
which Father testified and Mother made offers of proof and offered numerous
exhibits into evidence. Following the hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s
petition by narrative order. The trial court did, however, sua sponte modify the
parenting plan in two respects: to permit each parent to take a two-week
summer vacation with their daughter; and “to clarify that the parties only need
to contact and seek input from a parenting coordinator if they are unable to
agree directly with one another about major decisions concerning [the child].”
(Emphasis added.) The trial court denied Mother’s motion to reconsider and
this appeal followed.

On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred by: (1) sua sponte
modifying the parties’ parenting plan to require consultation with a parenting
coordinator regarding only “major decisions”; (2) modifying this provision of the
parenting plan absent an objective basis for doing so; (3) finding that the
modification was in the child’s best interests; (4) failing to explain how it was in
the child’s best interests; (5) finding Father’s conduct excused under a “good
cause” exception to contempt; (6) finding insufficient evidence of Father’s
contempt; and (7) excluding one of Mother’s proposed exhibits on hearsay
grounds when the parties had purportedly agreed to that exhibit’s admission
and the trial court considered other hearsay evidence.

These arguments require us to review the trial court’s findings regarding
the parties’ parenting rights and responsibilities, contempt, and exclusion of
evidence at the hearing. On all of these issues, our review is limited to
determining whether it clearly appears that the trial court engaged in an
unsustainable exercise of discretion. See In the Matter of Kurowski &
Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011) (standard of review regarding parenting
rights and responsibilities); In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H.
275, 280 (2006) (standard of review regarding admissibility of evidence); In the
Matter of Giacomini & Giacomini, 150 N.H. 498, 500 (2004) (standard of review
regarding contempt).

As the appealing party, Mother has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s well-reasoned order, Mother’s challenges to it, the
relevant law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that Mother has
not demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Affirmed.

HICKS and BASSETT, JJ.; and SMUKLER, J., retired superior court
justice, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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