In the Matter of Eva Stilkey and Alexander Marsters

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0628, In the Matter of Eva Stilkey and
Alexander Marsters, the court on September 28, 2017, issued the
following order:

Having considered the parents’ briefs and record submitted on appeal,
we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R.
18(1). We affirm.

The petitioner, Eva Stilkey (mother), appeals the order of the Circuit
Court (Foley, J.) awarding the respondent, Alexander Marsters (father), equal
residential responsibility for their son and joint decision-making responsibility
for major decisions, with the father having final decision-making authority in
educational and medical matters. The mother argues that the trial court erred
in its factual findings and applied the wrong legal standard. She also argues
that the court required her to meet a higher burden of proof and gave her
insufficient time to cross-examine the guardian ad litem (GAL).

When reviewing a trial court’s decision on parenting rights and
responsibilities, our role is limited to determining whether it clearly appears
that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion. In the
Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011). “We consider only
whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the
discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial court’s
determination if it could reasonably have been made.” Id. (quotations omitted).

The mother first argues that the trial court’s conclusions regarding the
child’s best interest are contrary to the record. Specifically, she notes that the
court granted a number of her requested findings of fact and argues that, in
light of such findings, the court erred in concluding that the child’s best
interest will be served by awarding the father final decision-making authority in
educational and medical matters. In particular, she points out that the court
granted her requested findings that: (1) in October 2014, the father removed
the child from daycare without informing the mother; (2) on October 24, 2014,
the father contacted the child’s pediatrician to inform him that the mother was
disparaging him; (3) the father’s use of the Our Family Wizard website to
communicate with the mother was inconsistent; and (4) the father has
frequently disagreed with the mother’s suggestions regarding the child’s health
care, counseling, and education.
 These findings do not mean that the father should not have final
decision-making authority in educational and medical matters. Rather, they
illustrate the high level of discord between the parents. The mother had been
awarded final decision-making authority on a temporary basis, and things did
not go well. It led to numerous disputes and frequent court involvement, to the
detriment of the child. The child’s health care providers threatened to
discontinue their services as a result of the parents’ conflict. The trial court
found that it is in the child’s best interest to award the father final decision-
making authority in medical and educational matters at this time, and the
record supports this finding. See In the Matter of Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585.

The mother also argues that the trial court erred in denying certain
requested findings of fact that, she asserts, are supported by the record. We do
not find it necessary to address each requested finding separately. Even
assuming, without deciding, that the requested findings cited by the mother
contain facts that are supported by the record, we conclude that they also
contain inferences from those facts which the court was not required to make.
For the same reason, we do not find the trial court’s rulings on her requested
findings of fact to be inconsistent with one another, or with the facts contained
in its narrative order. The record contains a sufficient basis to sustain the trial
court’s decision. See id.

The mother next argues that the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard in deciding parenting issues by stating that each parent has “equal
value” to the child. In determining parental rights and responsibilities, the
court is guided by the best interest of the child. RSA 461-A:6, I (Supp. 2016);
In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 281 (2006). The trial
court’s order cites the correct legal standard and concludes that its parenting
plan is in the child’s best interest. The court also noted that “[t]he residential
schedule needs to demonstrate to [the child], notwithstanding what he may be
learning in one parent’s home, that both of his parents have value.” We find
nothing in this statement to suggest that the court applied an incorrect legal
standard in deciding parenting issues. See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky,
157 N.H. 698, 702 (2008) (The interpretation of a trial court order is a question
of law, which we review de novo.).

The mother next argues that the trial court erred in the determination of
each party’s income for purposes of child support. We will uphold the trial
court’s decision with respect to child support unless it is unsupported by the
evidence or erroneous as a matter of law. In the Matter of Hampers, 154 N.H.
at 283. The record shows that the trial court relied upon the parties’ pay
stubs, rather than the income figures they reported on their financial affidavits,
to determine income for purposes of child support. The mother has failed to
show that the trial court’s decision to calculate income in this manner was
unsupported by the evidence or legally erroneous. See id.

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 The mother next argues that the trial court required her to meet a higher
burden of proof than was required of the father. Her argument essentially
challenges the weight given by the trial court to the evidence. Conflicts in the
testimony, questions about the credibility of witnesses, and the weight
assigned to testimony are matters for the trial court to resolve. In the Matter of
Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585. We will not disturb the trial court’s findings if they
are supported by the evidence. Id. In particular, the mother argues that the
court erred in crediting the father’s testimony that she committed acts of
domestic violence against him, when there was no reference to such acts in his
response to the GAL’s questionnaire. She also argues that the court gave
insufficient weight to the father’s acts of domestic violence against her. “[I]t is
not our role to calculate how much weight a trial court should accord specific
evidence.” In the Matter of Choy & Choy, 154 N.H. 707, 714 (2007). The court
found that the parties’ relationship was “tumultuous,” to the child’s detriment.
It also found the father’s previously-adjudicated domestic violence against the
mother to have been harmful to the child, though not to a degree requiring
supervised visitation or participation in a batterer’s intervention program. In
addition, the court found the father’s claims of abuse by the mother to be
credible, and this was supported by the GAL’s report and witness testimony.
We conclude that the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain
these findings. See id. at 713.

The mother next argues that the trial court gave her insufficient time to
cross-examine the GAL at the final hearing, given the GAL’s decision not to
interview the mother’s older child. She also asserts that the court erred in the
weight it gave to the GAL’s recommendations. The trial court has broad
discretion in managing the proceedings before it. In the Matter of Conner &
Conner, 156 N.H. 250, 252 (2007). We review a trial court’s rulings in this
area under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. Id. First, the
record does not support the mother’s contention that the court gave the GAL’s
recommendations any greater weight than the other evidence. Although the
court relied upon the GAL’s report and testimony, it also relied upon the
parties’ testimony, the testimony of other witnesses, and documentary
evidence. The record also shows that the trial court gave each party equal time
to examine the GAL, and that the mother did not object to this procedure at the
hearing. The GAL explained at the hearing that she decided against
interviewing the mother’s older son regarding the father’s alleged domestic
violence because the boy was only twelve years old, and he was in a very close
relationship with the father. We conclude that the record provides an objective
basis for the trial court’s reliance upon the GAL’s report and testimony, and for
its decision to allocate equal time for each party to examine the GAL at the
hearing. See id.

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 We have considered the mother’s remaining arguments, and have
concluded that they do not warrant further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137
N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Lynn, Bassett, and Hantz Marconi, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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