In the Matter of Christopher Osorio and Samantha McAllister

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0262, In the Matter of Christopher Osorio
and Samantha McAllister, the court on February 27, 2017,
issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The respondent, Samantha McAllister (mother), appeals an order of the
Circuit Court (Rein, Referee, approved by Albee, J.) on the parenting petition
filed by the petitioner, Christopher Osorio (father). The mother argues that the
court erred in awarding the father sole decision-making responsibility and
primary residential responsibility for the parties’ child.

The record shows that the father filed his parenting petition in March
2012, at approximately the same time that the New Hampshire Division for
Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) was investigating an incident involving
the mother and her two sons, one of whom is the parties’ child. DCYF filed a
neglect petition, and a finding of neglect was made. The father was awarded
temporary sole decision-making and residential responsibility for the child.
After the neglect case closed, the child’s half-sibling was returned to the
mother’s care, and the child remained in his father’s care. The father lives with
his mother, step-father, and step-brother in Manchester, and while this case
was pending, the mother moved two hours from Manchester, because she
“like[s] the community.” At the time of the final hearing on the parenting
petition, the mother was allowed supervised visitation every other weekend.

At the hearing, the guardian ad litem (GAL) recommended that the
mother continue with supervised visitation. The GAL expressed concerns as to
the mother’s mental health, parenting skills, and ability to control the child’s
half-sibling, who poses a risk of physical harm to the child. The GAL also
expressed concerns as to the mother’s attempts to undermine the child’s
relationship with his father and the father’s family by investigating them and
making unfounded reports to DCYF.

The trial court, after hearing testimony from the mother, the father, the
father’s mother, the GAL, and the program coordinator at a supervised
visitation center, concluded that continued supervised visitation is in the
child’s best interest. The court found that the child is “by all accounts (except,
perhaps, [the mother’s]) a happy and healthy . . . boy. He has a strong support
system on his father’s side of the family and is safe and secure among his
family members.” The court noted that the child “has been living under his
father’s care for most of his life and there is no reason to change his living
arrangement.” The court ordered supervised visitation to continue until the
mother can demonstrate progress in therapy, an ability to work with the father
and his mother regarding the child’s welfare, and the use of good judgment in
contacting the child’s health care, educational, and other providers.

On appeal, the mother argues that the trial court afforded too much
weight to the testimony of the father, his mother, and the GAL, and too little
weight to her evidence of the father’s alleged parenting deficiencies and her
own ability to parent the child. She also argues that the court erred in
declining to accept into evidence the child’s medical records. The court stated
that it did not need the records because it had heard “lots of testimony about”
the child’s medical care. In addition, the mother argues that the court failed to
properly sanction the father for the late disclosure of his financial affidavit and
other alleged discovery violations. The court ordered the father to pay 75
percent of the GAL’s fee, and the mother 25 percent, and it made no order of
child support.

“When reviewing a trial court’s decision on parenting rights and
responsibilities, our role is limited to determining whether it clearly appears
that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” In the
Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011). “We consider only
whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the
discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial court’s
determination if it could reasonably have been made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“The trial court’s discretion necessarily extends to matters such as assigning
weight to evidence and assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.”
Id. “Conflicts in testimony, questions about the credibility of witnesses, and
the weight assigned to testimony are matters for the trial court to resolve.” Id.

In addition, the trial court has broad discretion over the admission of
evidence in parenting cases and is not bound by the rules of evidence. Fam.
Div. R. 2.2; In the Matter of Thayer and Thayer, 146 N.H. 342, 345 (2001). We
review a trial court’s rulings on the management of discovery and the
admissibility of evidence under our unsustainable exercise of discretion
standard. In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 281 (2006).

We conclude that the record contains an objective basis sufficient to
sustain the trial court’s parenting plan, see Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585, and
cannot conclude that the court unsustainably exercised its discretion in its
management of the proceedings or its rulings on discovery and the
admissibility of evidence, see Hampers, 154 N.H. at 281.

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 We have reviewed the mother’s remaining arguments and conclude that
they are insufficiently developed, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49
(2003), and warrant no further consideration, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321,
322 (1993).

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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