Cited by

Id.; In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 326 (2007).

cf., In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 325, 330-31 (2007) (vacating division of husband’s retirement benefits in case where husband’s employment began in 1987 and the parties married in 1992, and remanding with instruction that if “buyout is not a feasible option.

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327-28 (2007) (affirming trial court’s assignment of approximately $252,000 in debt to petitioner that might otherwise have been assignable in whole or in part to respondent).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327 (2007).

The trial court applied the Hodgins formula by awarding the petitioner “one-half of the marital portion of this account valued as of March 21, 2008 (date of marriage) through the date this Decree is approved.” See Hodgins, 126 N.H. at 715-16; see also In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 330 (2007) (explaining that, when dividing pension assets in certain circumstances, “the trial court should enter a decree, per Hodgins, that upon maturity of the pension rights the recipient will pay a

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327 (2007).

In any event, the trial court, as the trier of fact, “is in the best position to assess and weigh the evidence before it,” Abrams v. Abrams, 131 N.H. 522, 525 (1989), and may “accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented,” In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 332 (2007) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (explaining that we assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decision).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 326 (2007).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (explaining that we assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decision).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (We assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decree.).

The trial court has discretion to allocate responsibility for debts in the manner it deems equitable, see In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327-28 (2007), and to require security for payments required by the decree, see In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 436-37 (2006).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327-28 (2007) (affirming trial court’s assignment of approximately $252,000 in debt to petitioner which might otherwise have been assignable in whole or in part to respondent).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 326 (2007).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007).

We review its decisions on such matters under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard, see In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 326 (2007), which means that we review only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (we assume trial court made all subsidiary findings necessary to support its decision).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (“[I]n the absence of specific findings, a court is presumed to have made all findings necessary to support its decree.” (quotation omitted)).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327 (2007).

“Further, in the absence of specific findings, a court is presumed to have made all findings necessary to support its decree.” In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (quotations omitted).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (We assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decree.).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (We assume that the trial court made all subsidiary findings necessary to support its decree.).

Thus, he contends that the trial court erred “when it failed to apply the deviation factors in RSA 458:16-a, as those factors support awarding [him] a greater percentage of the marital estate.” “The trial court is afforded broad discretion in determining matters of property distribution when fashioning a final divorce decree.” In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 326 (2007).

“We will not overturn a trial court’s decision on these matters absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion or an error of law.” In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 326 (2007) (citation omitted).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (stating that when a court does not make specific findings, we presume it made all findings necessary to support its ruling).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327-28 (2007).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327-28 (2007) (affirming trial court’s assignment of approximately $252,000 in debt to petitioner that might otherwise have been assignable in whole or in part to respondent).

See, e.g., In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 325, 329 (2007) (in divorce action, family division divided debt owed to a third party, marital home subject to outstanding mortgage, and a “hybrid retirement savings” — “retirement savings from paycheck withdrawals with an ascertainable present value, which will eventually be combined with a pension of unknown conti

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 326 (2007).

See, e.g., In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327 (2007) (family division’s award to one party of *519 bulk of divisible marital assets and debt was sustainable exercise of discretion when supported by factors set forth in RSA 458:16-a).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327 (2007).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327 (2007).

In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 333 (2007) (failure to exercise discretion constitutes unsustainable exercise of discretion); cf. Buzzard, 161 N.H. at 30 (trial court must consider “countervailing considerations such as expense, security, or logistics” before denying incarcerated prisoner’s request to participate in civil proceeding telephonically

In the Matter of Costa, 156 N.H. 323,326 (2007).