Linda L. Knowles v. Kelli Cassidy

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2021-0489, Linda L. Knowles v. Kelli Cassidy,
the court on June 20, 2022, issued the following order:

Having considered the brief of the plaintiff, Linda L. Knowles, and the
record submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in
this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). The plaintiff appeals an order of the Superior
Court (St. Hilaire, J.) denying her request for a writ of replevin brought against
the defendant, Kelli Cassidy, a volunteer at a New Hampshire cat rescue
agency, to recover a cat that the plaintiff called “Patches.” See RSA ch. 536-A
(2021). We affirm.

The trial court found or could have found the following facts. See In the
Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 331 (2007) (explaining that we assume
that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decision).
Patches was abandoned in the plaintiff’s neighborhood by a prior owner
approximately two years ago. Since then, she has been fed outside by the
plaintiff and her neighbors. Although the plaintiff fed Patches, she never took
her to the veterinarian or let her inside her home. During the winter, the
plaintiff did not provide a warm shelter for Patches, and Patches would
disappear for weeks at a time without the plaintiff knowing her whereabouts.

On August 16, 2021, the cat rescue agency for which the defendant
volunteers set a humane trap to locate a lost cat in the plaintiff’s neighborhood.
The following day, the rescue agency discovered two cats in the trap — the lost
cat and Patches. Although Patches had a microchip, the microchip was
unregistered. Because Patches’s microchip was not registered, and there was
no other means of identifying an owner on her, the cat rescue agency was
unable to locate an owner. The cat rescue agency posted information about
Patches on its Facebook page. Neighbors responded to the post that Patches
was a neighborhood cat whom the whole neighborhood fed.

A veterinarian examined the cat on August 17. He found her to be
friendly and manageable for the entire examination. He determined that she
had an active flea infestation, but was otherwise healthy “for an outdoor,
homeless cat.” The veterinarian gave Patches the requisite vaccinations and,
on August 24, cleared her for adoption.

In the early evening of August 25, the plaintiff called the cat rescue
agency, asking that Patches be returned to her. The cat rescue agency asked
the plaintiff to provide a current rabies certificate, vet records, and Patches’s
microchip number, but the plaintiff was unable to do so. On August 28, the
plaintiff and the defendant met at the cat rescue agency. The plaintiff admitted
that Patches was not her cat, but said that she had fed Patches and wanted
her back. After the rescue agency declined to return Patches to the plaintiff,
she brought the instant petition for a writ of replevin.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s
writ, finding that she had failed to prove that she was Patches’s owner. The
plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and this appeal followed.

We review the trial court’s decision under our unsustainable exercise of
discretion standard. See Foley v. Wheelock, 157 N.H. 329, 332 (2008) (stating
that we review a trial court’s equitable order for an unsustainable exercise of
discretion); National Shawmut Bank v. Cutter, 105 N.H. 206, 208 (1963)
(explaining that replevin is a form of action that “has become impregnated with
equitable principles”). We will uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings
unless they are not supported by the evidence or are legally erroneous. Cook v.
Sullivan, 149 N.H. 749, 780 (2003). Our standard of review is not whether we
would rule differently than the trial court, but whether a reasonable person
could have reached the same decision as the trial court based upon the same
evidence. Id. Thus, we defer to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as
resolving conflicts in testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and
determining the weight to be given to the evidence. Id.

Resolving the issues in this appeal requires us to engage in statutory
interpretation. We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo.
Anderson v. Robitaille, 172 N.H. 20, 22 (2019). We first look to the language of
the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain
and ordinary meaning. Id. We also review the trial court’s application of law to
facts de novo. Loon Valley Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Pollock, 171 N.H. 75, 78
(2018).

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it found
that she is not the owner of Patches. For the purposes of RSA chapter 437, an
“‘[o]wner’ means the person having the right of possession of an animal,
whether such right was acquired by gift, purchase, or other means.” RSA
437:18, II (2020). The plain meaning of the word “possession” as used in RSA
437:18, II is “[t]he action or fact of holding something . . . as one’s own or in
one’s control; the state or condition of being so held.” The Oxford English
Dictionary,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/148352?rskey=9EPg2n&result=1&isAdvanc
ed=false#eid (last visited May 25, 2022).

The plaintiff contends that she acquired the right to possess Patches
because when she “found Patches [a]bandoned on her property two years ago[,]
[she] considered Patches a gift from the relinquishing owner.” She argues that
“[p]ossession of an animal over a period of time is presumptive evidence of
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ownership thereof, and long possession of [an] animal[] is[] strong evidence of
ownership.” The plaintiff asserts that her “sworn testimony and Exhibits
showed proof of [her] possession and ownership” of Patches “over [an] extended
period of time.” That proof included photographs of Patches in the plaintiff’s
yard, the plaintiff’s September 1, 2021 statement to the police, and a note from
the plaintiff’s neighbor stating that the plaintiff has provided “food, love and
care as well as vet visits as needed.” The plaintiff contends that she gave
Patches “food, water, shelter and medical care on an as needed basis,” but that
Patches needed no medical care because she is “a healthy[,] chunky cat,” that
was spayed and microchipped by her prior owner.

The trial court was not compelled to find as the plaintiff argues it should
have found based upon the record before it. Although the plaintiff contends
that she was in “possession” of Patches, the record does not support that
contention. There was no evidence before the trial court that the plaintiff ever
held Patches in her control. Rather, the evidence was that Patches roamed the
neighborhood freely and that, although the plaintiff fed her and clearly loved
her, Patches was fed by other neighbors as well. Based upon our review of the
record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that
the plaintiff was not the owner of Patches within the meaning of RSA 437:18,
II. We decline to address the plaintiff’s remaining appellate arguments either
because they are insufficiently developed, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47,
49 (2003), or they lack merit and do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel
v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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