In the Matter of Andrew Turgeon and Jamie Turgeon

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0205, In the Matter of Andrew Turgeon
and Jamie Turgeon, the court on March 9, 2020, issued the
following order:

Having considered the brief and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We
affirm.

The petitioner, Andrew Turgeon (husband), appeals the post-divorce
order of the Circuit Court (Cooper, M., approved by McIntyre, J.) allocating
responsibility for the fees of the commissioner appointed to sell the parties’
former marital residence. The husband argues that the trial court erred in
dividing responsibility for the fees equally between him and the respondent,
Jamie Turgeon (wife).

The record shows that, pursuant to the parties’ December 21, 2015
divorce decree, the court awarded the marital residence entirely to the wife,
with responsibility for the “payment of the mortgage, insurance, and real estate
taxes for this property and all expenses for this property.” Pursuant to the
decree, the wife was required to refinance the property in order to remove the
husband’s name from the mortgage by January 1, 2017, “or the home will be
placed on the market and sold.” The wife did not refinance the property by
January 1, 2017, and on March 21, 2017, the husband moved for an order
granting him sole authority to list the property for sale. The trial court granted
the motion without a hearing. On May 31, 2017, the husband moved for
contempt, arguing that the wife was not cooperating with the sale.

During a hearing on the motion, the wife’s counsel represented that the
husband’s realtor sought to list the property for $230,000, and that the wife
believed that the property was worth substantially more. In an August 25,
2017 order following the hearing, the court noted that the parties could not
agree on a real estate agent or a listing price and that “[b]oth parties have some
responsibility for the present impasse.” The court appointed a commissioner to
sell the property, with the fees to be divided equally. The husband moved for
reconsideration, arguing that the wife should be fully responsible for the
commissioner’s fees. On September 18, 2017, the trial court denied the motion
“without prejudice to request re-allocation if [the wife] does not cooperate with
the commissioner.”

On January 4, 2019, the court held a hearing during which the
commissioner testified regarding the $9,130.62 in fees he incurred in selling
the property. He testified that the wife, who was reluctant to sell, tried
unsuccessfully to refinance the property with help from her father. Doing so
required a 24-hour extension of the time for signing the purchase and sale
agreement. The commissioner also testified that he had particular difficulty
with the closing company, which was the fault of neither party. He reported
that the property sold for $250,000, which we note was substantially higher
than the listing price suggested by the husband’s realtor. In a January 19,
2019 order following the hearing, the court noted that it had previously found
both parties responsible for the impasse requiring the appointment of the
commissioner and found “no compelling reason to change” its order dividing
responsibility for the fees equally.

At the outset, we reject the husband’s argument that the trial court, by
ordering the equal division of the commissioner’s fees, impermissibly modified
the final property division in the parties’ divorce decree. The trial court’s order
did not modify the distribution of any marital assets. Nor do we consider the
language in the divorce decree requiring the wife to pay “the mortgage,
insurance, and real estate taxes for this property and all expenses for this
property” to apply to the commissioner’s fees. Given the trial court’s finding
that both parties were responsible for the impasse requiring the appointment of
a commissioner, the trial court had the authority to divide responsibility for the
commissioner’s fees equally. See In the Matter of Muller & Muller, 164 N.H.
512, 518 (2013) (noting that “the need to render equitable orders is inherent in
the resolution of divorce matters”). We will not overturn the trial court’s
equitable decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. In the
Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 326 (2007).

The husband also argues that the trial court, in referencing its August
25, 2017 order, overlooked its September 18, 2017 order, which denied his
motion for reconsideration “without prejudice to request re-allocation if
respondent does not cooperate with the commissioner.” We disagree. The trial
court’s order on reconsideration allowed the husband to request re-allocation,
which he did. Based upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude that
the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in reaffirming its decision
to divide equally the parties’ responsibility to pay the commissioner’s fees. See
Costa, 156 N.H. at 326.

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 In light of our decision, we need not address the husband’s remaining
arguments. See Antosz v. Allain, 163 N.H. 298, 302 (2012) (declining to
address parties’ other arguments where decision on one issue is dispositive).

Affirmed.

Hicks, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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