In the Matter of James Lagace and Katharine Lagace

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0642, In the Matter of James Lagace and
Katharine Lagace, the court on November 17, 2020, issued the
following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The petitioner, James Lagace (husband), appeals the final decree of the
Circuit Court (McIntyre, J.) in his divorce from the respondent, Katharine
Lagace (wife), arguing that the trial court erred in: (1) awarding alimony for an
unreasonably lengthy period; (2) failing to consider the contributions of the
parties’ adult children to the wife’s household expenses; (3) failing to consider
the allocation of the marital debt and the requirement that he maintain life
insurance; (4) requiring him to maintain $250,000 in life insurance for the
benefit of the wife; (5) ordering him to pay the balance due on a credit card that
was used in the past by the wife to pay her attorney’s fees; and (6) not dividing
the marital estate equitably.

The husband first argues that the trial court erred in awarding alimony
for a period of thirteen years after child support terminates, even if he elects to
retire before alimony terminates. The trial court is afforded broad discretion in
awarding alimony. In the Matter of Nassar & Nassar, 156 N.H. 769, 772
(2008). We will not overturn the trial court’s decision absent an unsustainable
exercise of discretion. Id. At the outset, we note that neither party challenges
the trial court’s decision to apply the alimony statutes effective June 25, 2018.
See RSA 458:19 to RSA 458:19-c (Supp. 2019).

RSA 458:19-a, III (Supp. 2019) provides that “[t]he maximum duration of
term alimony shall be 50 percent of the length of the marriage, unless the
parties agree otherwise or the court finds that justice requires an adjustment.”
The record shows that the parties were married for 29 years. The trial court
awarded alimony for roughly 50 percent of the length of the marriage. The
husband argues that his alimony obligation will not end until he is 66 years
old, and that although he has no plan to retire prior to age 66, “an unexpected
and unforeseeable change in his ability to continue working might occur,
forcing hi[m] to stop working.” RSA 458:19-aa (Supp. 2019) provides that the
court may modify the duration of alimony based upon clear and convincing
evidence that there has been “a substantial and unforeseeable change of
circumstances since the effective date of the alimony order.” RSA 458:19-aa,
I(a)(1). Although the court ordered that the husband’s alimony obligation “shall
not be diminished” if he elects to retire prior to age 66, nothing in the order
precludes him from seeking modification of alimony based upon a substantial
and unforeseeable change of circumstances. See id. Accordingly, we find no
error.

The husband next argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider
in its award of alimony the contributions of the parties’ two adult children to
the wife’s household expenses. The wife testified that each adult child
contributes $200 per month for health insurance and $50 per month for
cellphone use. One of the children also contributes $50 per month for his car
insurance. The mother testified that the children also contribute by “buy[ing]
dinners.” We reject the husband’s argument that such payments constituted
income to the wife requiring the court to adjust its alimony award.
Accordingly, we find no error. See In the Matter of Nassar, 156 N.H. at 772.

The husband next argues that the trial court erred in its alimony order,
given its allocation of the marital debt and the requirement that he maintain
life insurance. The trial court has discretion to allocate responsibility for debts
in the manner it deems equitable, see In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H.
323, 327-28 (2007), and to require security for payments required by the
decree, see In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 436-37 (2006).
The husband argues that the court erred by ordering him to pay the alimony
awarded in addition to debts totaling $35,460, and to maintain a $250,000 life
insurance policy for the benefit of the wife for the duration of his obligations
under the decree, as well as a $25,000 life insurance policy for the benefit of
the parties’ minor son for the term of his child support obligation. The trial
court ordered the wife to be responsible for other debts, including the home
mortgage, the home equity line of credit, and any debts she incurred since the
date of separation, including her attorney’s fees. The court found this to be a
“just distribution.” Based upon this record, we cannot conclude that the trial
court unsustainably exercised its discretion. See In the Matter of Nassar, 156
N.H. at 772.

The husband next argues that the court’s order requiring him to
maintain $250,000 in life insurance for the benefit of the wife is unreasonable.
RSA 458:19-aa, IV (Supp. 2019) provides that the court may require
“reasonable security for the payments due the payee in the event of the payor’s
death prior to the completion of payments.” The husband concedes that his
alimony obligation for the thirteen-year period after child support ends totals
$312,000, which is greater than the amount of life insurance he was ordered to
maintain. He argues, however, that after three years of alimony payments, the
balance of his alimony obligation will be less than $250,000. We conclude that
the trial court’s life insurance order constitutes reasonable security for the
alimony payments due at this time. See RSA 458:19-aa, IV.

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 The husband next argues that, given the trial court’s order requiring
each party to be responsible for his or her attorney’s fees, the court erred in
ordering him to pay the balance due on a credit card that was used by the wife
to pay her attorney’s fees. We note, however, that when the husband raised
this issue with the court in his motion for reconsideration, the court revised its
prior order, requiring the husband to pay the balance on the USAA account
“except for . . . [the wife’s] attorney’s fees.” Thus, we construe the court’s order
to require the wife to pay the portion of the balance due on the account
attributable to her attorney’s fees and find no error.

Finally, the husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding the
wife 55% of certain marital assets, the $30,356 of equity in the marital home,
her pension of approximately $10,000, and most of the personal property
remaining in the marital home. We afford trial courts broad discretion in
determining matters of property distribution in fashioning a final divorce
decree. In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 285 (2006). We
will not overturn the trial court’s decision absent an unsustainable exercise of
discretion. Id. On appeal, the husband does not challenge the trial court’s
finding that his adultery caused the breakdown of the marriage, or that it
caused the wife substantial physical or mental pain and suffering. See RSA
458:16-a, (l)(1) (Supp. 2019). The court found the property distribution to be
equitable “in light of the finding of fault, the length of the marriage and the lack
of employment history of [the wife] during the marriage,” and because the
husband “has a significant ability to accumulate future wealth to a far greater
degree than [the wife].” Our role on appeal is not to reweigh the equities, but
“to determine whether the trial court’s decision was a sustainable exercise of
discretion, meaning that we review only whether the record establishes an
objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” In the
Matter of Heinrich & Heinrich, 164 N.H. 357, 365 (2012) (quotation omitted).
We conclude that the record in this case supports the trial court’s discretionary
judgment. See id.

Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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