In the Matter of Jill Content and Edward Content

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0408, In the Matter of Jill Content and
Edward Content, the court on March 3, 2016, issued the
following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The respondent, Edward Content (husband), appeals the final decree of
the Circuit Court (Carbon, J.) in his divorce from the petitioner, Jill Content
(wife). The husband argues that the trial court erred in: (1) awarding alimony
based upon incomplete information; (2) ordering him to pay an unreasonable
amount of alimony; (3) assigning him responsibility for three-fourths of the
$24,000 loan incurred to pay for college for the wife’s daughter from a prior
marriage; and (4) assigning him responsibility for any deficiency that may
result from the foreclosure of the marital residence.

The husband first argues that the trial court erred in awarding alimony
based upon incomplete information. The trial court has broad discretion in
managing the proceedings before it. In the Matter of Conner & Conner, 156
N.H. 250, 252 (2007). We review a trial court’s rulings in this area under an
unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. Id. To establish that the court
erred under this standard, the husband must demonstrate that the court’s
ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Id.
The record shows that the husband provided the court his updated financial
affidavit prior to the start of the final hearing. The wife explained that although
she prepared an updated financial affidavit for the hearing, she experienced
problems e-mailing it to the husband prior to the hearing and experienced
problems printing copies for the hearing. The court allowed the wife to submit
her updated affidavit later in the day, after the hearing.

The husband does not assert that the wife failed to submit an updated
affidavit after the hearing, or that the court issued its decree without having
reviewed the wife’s updated affidavit. Nor does he assert that the wife’s
updated affidavit was incomplete or inaccurate. Accordingly, we conclude that
the record does not support the husband’s claim of error. See Coyle v. Battles, 147 N.H. 98, 100 (2001) (appellant has burden to show error).

The husband also argues that the court’s management of this procedural
issue deprived him of an adequate opportunity to review and challenge the
wife’s updated financial affidavit at the hearing. It is a long-standing rule that
parties may not have judicial review of matters not raised in the trial court.
Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004); see also In the Matter
of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006) (self-represented
litigants are bound by the same procedural rules that govern parties
represented by counsel). The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial court an
opportunity to correct any error it may have made. See In the Matter of
Mannion & Mannion, 155 N.H. 52, 54 (2007). Because the record fails to show
that the husband raised this issue in the trial court, we decline to address it.
See Bean, 151 N.H. at 250-51. We note, however, that even if the husband had
preserved this issue, we would conclude that he failed to show that he was
prejudiced by the court’s decision, given the absence of any showing that the
wife’s updated financial affidavit was incomplete or inaccurate. See Conner,
156 N.H. at 252.

The husband next argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay
an unreasonable amount of alimony. The trial court is afforded broad
discretion in awarding alimony. In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H.
425, 430 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin &
Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007). We will not overturn its decision on
such matters absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. The amount
of alimony awarded must be sufficient to cover the wife’s needs, within the
limits of the husband’s ability to pay. Id. at 433; see RSA 458:19, I (Supp.
2015). In determining the amount of alimony to be awarded in this case, the
trial court considered: the length of the marriage; the wife’s role as the primary
caregiver for the children; and the wife’s decision to forgo employment
opportunities to care for the children. See 458:19, IV (Supp. 2015). The court
also considered the wife’s interest in returning to school to better provide for
her family. Based upon these factors, as well as the husband’s annual salary
of $85,000, the wife’s annual salary of $33,000, and the parties’ respective
expenses, the court awarded the wife alimony of $500 per month for five years,
in order to allow her “to complete her school, which she anticipates will take
four years,” and to provide “a modest time to get on her feet to be able to
support herself more appropriately.”

The husband argues that the trial court should have calculated his
income based upon a forty hour week, rather than his typical forty-five hour
week, that the wife is intentionally under-employed, and that the alimony
award will provide her with a standard of living higher than the one to which
the parties became accustomed during the marriage. See RSA 458:19, I. The
record fails to show that the husband raised any of these issues with the trial
court. Accordingly, we conclude that they are not preserved. See Bean, 151
N.H. at 250-51; see also N.H. Dep’t of Corrections v. Butland, 147 N.H. 676, 679
(2002). Based upon this record, we cannot conclude that the court’s alimony
award constitutes an unsustainable exercise of its discretion. See Harvey, 153
N.H. at 430.

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 The husband next argues that the trial court erred in assigning him
responsibility for three-fourths of the $24,000 loan incurred to pay for college
for the wife’s daughter from a prior marriage. The trial court may allocate
responsibility for debts in a manner it deems equitable. See In the Matter of
Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327-28 (2007). We will not overturn its decision
absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. In the Matter of Hampers &
Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 285 (2006). The husband acknowledges that he
raised the child as a member of the family since she was young, and there is no
dispute that the wife incurred this debt during the parties’ marriage. The wife
testified that she was not able to obtain college financial aid for her daughter
because of the husband’s income. The court did not order the husband to pay
future college expenses for the wife’s daughter. Cf. RSA 461-A:21 (Supp. 2015)
(Agreement on College Expenses). The court calculated the husband’s three-
fourths’ share of the debt based upon the parties’ incomes. Based upon this
record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision constitutes an
unsustainable exercise of its discretion. See Hampers, 154 N.H. at 285.

Finally, the husband argues that the trial court erred in assigning him
responsibility for any deficiency that may result from the foreclosure of the
marital home. He argues that the court could not have reasonably determined
responsibility for this debt because the amount of the deficiency was unknown
at the time of the final hearing. However, he did not raise this issue in the trial
court. Instead, he argued that responsibility for the deficiency should be
divided equally. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue is not preserved. See
Bean, 151 N.H. at 250-51. Moreover, even if we presume the issue is
preserved, we reject the husband’s argument that responsibility for any
deficiency should be divided equally between the parties, given that the debt
was incurred during the marriage. As previously noted, the trial court may
allocate responsibility for debts in a manner it deems equitable. See Costa,
156 N.H. at 327-28 (2007) (affirming trial court’s assignment of approximately
$252,000 in debt to petitioner that might otherwise have been assignable in
whole or in part to respondent). Based upon our review of the record, we
cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision constitutes an unsustainable
exercise of discretion. See Hampers, 164 N.H. at 285.

We have considered the husband’s remaining arguments, and have
concluded that they do not warrant further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137
N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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