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[¶9] “A court lacks the authority to hear or determine a case concerning subject matters over which it has no jurisdiction.” Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 742 (2019).

Nevertheless, as in Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 740 (2019), “this opinion will refer to the circuit court, probate division as the ‘probate court’ to avoid any confusion with our prior decisions concerning probate jurisdiction.” Rogers, 171 N.H. at 740 n.1.

Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743 (2019); RSA 491:7 (Supp. 2023); RSA 491:22 (Supp. 2023); cf. RSA 304-C:190 (2015) (providing that “[n]othing in this subdivision shall be construed to restrict the right of a member [of a New Hampshire limited liability company] to bring a direct action on his or her own behalf against [another] member” of the li

generally Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 745 (2019) (we interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not add words that the legislature did not include).

Resolving the issues in this appeal requires that we analyze the subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court and the probate division of the circuit court to determine whether the plaintiff’s claims fall exclusively within the probate division’s jurisdiction.

Whether a proposed subdivision’s failure to meet the street access requirement of RSA 674:41 deprives the Planning Board of jurisdiction is an issue of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law subject to our de novo review.

The petitioner’s argument raises an issue of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law subject to our de novo review.

Whether the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of statutory interpretation.

“In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed by the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743 (2019).

The probate division is not a court of general jurisdiction; rather, its powers are limited to those conferred on it by statute.

Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743 (2019); see also In the Matter family that raises concern about a child’s welfare, the court may refer the case to DCYF by calling central intake.

Shelton, 164 N.H. at 502; see Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743 (2019) (“We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.”).

In contrast with the circuit court, “the superior court is a court of general jurisdiction and has authority to entertain actions in equity.” Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743 (2019); see also RSA 498:1 (2010) (granting the superior court “the powers of a court of equity” in “cases in which there is not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law”).

This argument raises an issue of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law subject to de novo review.

Because the superior court’s jurisdiction to hear de novo appeals from circuit court is conferred by statute, determining the jurisdiction of the superior court in this case is a matter of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law subject to our de novo review.

The defendant’s argument raises an issue of statutory interpretation which presents a question of law subject to our de novo review.