Petition of John Doe

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0705, Petition of John Doe, the court on
August 6, 2020, issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The
petitioner, a police officer, seeks review pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 11
(Petition for Original Jurisdiction) of an order issued by the Circuit Court
(Steckowych, J.) after the court conducted an in camera review of a file relating
to an internal police department investigation into the petitioner’s conduct. We
affirm.

The following summary of the case is relevant to our analysis. The
petitioner was scheduled to testify on the State’s behalf during a criminal case
in the district division of the circuit court. Although the precise timing is
unclear from the record before us, in the months leading up to trial, the trial
court conducted an in camera review of a file relating to an internal police
department investigation into the petitioner’s conduct.1 The court determined
that the file contained exculpatory evidence; accordingly, it ordered that
portions of the file be disclosed to the defendant. See RSA 105:13-b (2013);
State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 327, 333 (1995).

Approximately two weeks before trial, the petitioner filed a motion in
limine addressing the investigation file. The petitioner argued that he had been
improperly placed on the Attorney General’s “Exculpatory Evidence Schedule”
(EES).2 The petitioner asked the court: (1) to find that the file “is not
exculpatory, and does not contain Laurie, Brady, or Giglio matter”;3 (2) to
“[i]ssue an order prohibiting the disclosure of this information in any future
litigation”; and (3) to “[g]rant such other and further relief as is deemed just
and necessary.” The court denied the motion, ruling that the officer’s
placement on the EES was justified. The court noted that it had previously

1 In the weeks before trial, the trial court also reviewed a different file relating to a separate police

department investigation into the petitioner’s conduct. The court found that this separate file did
not contain exculpatory evidence. That ruling is not at issue before us.

2 See State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1995).In accordance with a 2017 memorandum issued by
then-Attorney General Joseph Foster, the former so-called “Laurie List” is now referred to as the
“Exculpatory Evidence Schedule.”

3 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972).
reviewed the investigation file, and had previously determined that that file
contained exculpatory evidence. The petitioner filed a motion to reconsider,
which the court denied. The petitioner then filed this petition for original
jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 11.

The petitioner argues that, because the trial court failed to consider the
underlying facts in the investigation file, the trial court erred in ruling that his
name should remain on the EES. The petitioner asserts that his name should
be removed from the EES because the investigation file does not contain
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the file is exculpatory.

The State argues that we should deny the petition because the circuit
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief
sought by the petitioner. Alternatively, the State argues that, if we conclude
that the circuit court had jurisdiction, we should affirm on the merits because
the investigation file contains exculpatory evidence justifying the petitioner’s
placement on the EES.

Although the petitioner did not file a reply brief responding to the State’s
jurisdictional argument, the issue of jurisdiction was discussed at length
during oral argument. We agree with the State that, to the extent that the
petitioner requested equitable relief — such as an order that he be removed
from the EES maintained by the Attorney General, and prohibiting disclosure
of the investigation file in any future litigation — the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction to grant such relief.

“Our circuit court is a statutory court of limited subject matter
jurisdiction.” In re Search Warrant for Records of AT&T, 170 N.H. 111, 113
(2017). When the legislature created the circuit court in 2011, the court was
granted “the jurisdiction, powers, and duties conferred upon the former . . .
district courts” by RSA chapter 502-A. RSA 490-F:3 (Supp. 2019). Although
the district division of the circuit court has jurisdiction over certain civil
actions for monetary damages, see RSA 502-A:14 (2010), “it does not have
jurisdiction to resolve issues of title or actions in equity.” Friedline v. Roe, 166
N.H. 264, 266 (2014) (emphasis added). This lack of equity jurisdiction bars
the district division from ordering equitable remedies, even when the district
division has jurisdiction over the underlying case. See Holloway Automotive
Group v. Lucic, 163 N.H. 6, 11-12 (2011) (ruling that, although the district
court had jurisdiction over the underlying contract case, the court lacked
authority to grant the remedy of piercing the corporate veil because that
remedy is an equitable remedy); Matte v. Shippee Auto, 152 N.H. 216, 223
(2005) (ruling that, although the district court had jurisdiction over eviction
proceeding, the court lacked authority to deny eviction based on equity

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principles because the former district courts “[did] not have a general grant of
equitable power” and “[did] not have equity jurisdiction” (quotations omitted)).

In contrast with the circuit court, “the superior court is a court of general
jurisdiction and has authority to entertain actions in equity.” Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743 (2019); see also RSA 498:1 (2010) (granting the superior
court “the powers of a court of equity” in “cases in which there is not a plain,
adequate and complete remedy at law”). In fact, in two recent cases appealed
to this court, police officers properly sought such equitable relief in the
superior court. See Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774,
775 (2015) (officers brought request for declaratory judgment and an
injunction to remove their names from the so-called “Laurie List” in the
superior court, rather than the circuit court); Gantert v. City of Rochester, 168
N.H. 640, 642 (2016) (officer brought several claims arising out of his allegedly
wrongful placement on the “Laurie List” in the superior court, rather than the
circuit court). Accordingly, we hold that, although the circuit court had subject
matter jurisdiction to make an evidentiary determination as to whether the
investigation file contained exculpatory evidence warranting disclosure to the
defendant in the pending criminal case, it did not have jurisdiction to grant the
equitable relief sought by the petitioner. See Holloway, 163 N.H. at 11-12.
Such equitable relief may only be ordered by the superior court. See RSA
498:1; Rogers, 171 N.H. at 743.

Next, to the extent that, in addition to seeking equitable relief, the
petitioner argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the
investigation file contains exculpatory evidence and ordered the disclosure of
those portions of the investigation file to the defendant in the pending criminal
case, we disagree. A trial court’s decision as to whether a police officer’s
personnel file contains exculpatory evidence is reviewed for an unsustainable
exercise of discretion. See Duchesne, 167 N.H. at 783, 785. Likewise, “[w]e
review challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under our unsustainable
exercise of discretion standard and reverse only if the rulings are clearly
untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of a party’s case.” State v. Noucas, 165 N.H. 146, 158 (2013) (quotation omitted). “In determining whether a
ruling is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we consider whether the record
establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary decision
made.” State v. Costella, 166 N.H. 705, 714 (2014) (quotation omitted). “Our
task is not to determine whether we would have found differently, but is only to
determine whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision
as the trial court on the basis of the evidence before it.” State v. Plantamuro, 171 N.H. 253, 255 (2018). Having reviewed the investigation file at issue, we
conclude that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion.

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 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in denying the relief
requested.
Affirmed.

HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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