State of New Hampshire v. Scott Traudt

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0528, State of New Hampshire v. Scott
Traudt, the court on January 26, 2021, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The
defendant, Scott Traudt, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Bornstein, J.)
denying his motion for a new trial based on the State’s failure to provide him
favorable evidence in violation of his due process rights under the State and
Federal Constitutions. We affirm.

The following facts are supported by the record or are otherwise
undisputed. In 2007, a grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of
simple assault of a police officer and the Grafton County Attorney charged him
by information with one count of disorderly conduct. See RSA 631:2-a, I
(2016); RSA 651:6, I(g) (2016); RSA 644:2, II(d) (2016). Those charges arose out
of a physical altercation between the defendant and two police officers that
occurred during a traffic stop. At trial, both the defendant and the officers,
whom he was charged with assaulting, testified. In closing, defense counsel
emphasized that the jury should weigh the credibility of the witnesses equally,
without respect to whether the witness was a law enforcement officer, and
described the officers’ version of events as a “fabricated scenario.” The State
responded in its closing, highlighting the credibility of the officers by
representing that there had been “absolutely no evidence of any kind of a
disciplinary mark . . . [or] any former complaint” regarding either of the officers.
The jury acquitted the defendant on one of the simple assault charges and
convicted him on the other two charges. On January 27, 2009, the trial court
sentenced the defendant to one to three years of imprisonment and a fine.

Following his conviction, the defendant engaged in vigorous and
protracted post-conviction litigation — at times representing himself and at
times represented by counsel. Between 2008 and 2009, he filed four motions
seeking either to set aside the verdict or for a new trial on various grounds,
including newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel; he
prevailed on none. He then filed a direct appeal, and we affirmed his
convictions. See State v. Traudt, No. 2009-0150, at 1 (N.H. Feb. 4, 2010).
While that appeal was pending, the defendant filed three additional motions for
a new trial in the trial court that were unsuccessful. In May 2011, the
defendant filed another motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of
counsel, which the trial court denied. We then accepted the defendant’s
discretionary appeal of that order and affirmed the trial court. See State v.
Traudt, No. 2011-0591, 2012 WL 12830664, at *2-3 (N.H. May 17, 2012).

Meanwhile, the defendant also pursued relief in federal court. In 2010,
he filed a civil suit against the two officers he was charged with assaulting,
asserting violations of his federal constitutional rights. See Traudt v. Roberts,
No. 10-CV-12-JL, 2013 WL 3754862, at *1 (D.N.H. July 15, 2013). That
litigation was ultimately resolved by the grant of summary judgment in the
officers’ favor in July 2013. Id. at *2, 16. At approximately the same time, the
defendant unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. See Traudt v. N.H. Att’y
Gen., No. 13-CV-234-PB, 2013 WL 4119198, at *1-2 (D.N.H. Aug. 13, 2013).

Six years later, in July 2019, the defendant, represented by counsel, filed
the motion for a new trial that gives rise to this appeal. He argued in the trial
court that his conviction should be vacated and he should receive a new trial
because the State failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence to him before
trial, violating his due process rights under Part I, Article 15 of the State
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Specifically, he represented that, in the context of his federal
civil suit, the officers filed two partially redacted affidavits, which the defendant
claimed reveal that the State failed to disclose evidence that — contrary to the
State’s representations in its closing — one of the officers did indeed have prior
disciplinary history. He argued that the State’s failure to disclose evidence of
this disciplinary history, combined with its closing argument, left the jury with
a false impression of the officers’ credibility and deprived him of a fair trial.

The trial court denied the motion. It also denied the defendant’s motion
to reconsider, noting that he had filed the motion for a new trial “more than ten
years after he was sentenced . . . and more than six years after he obtained the
evidence on which he bases his motion.” This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied
his motion for a new trial because the undisclosed evidence regarding the
officer’s disciplinary history was favorable, material, and knowingly withheld by
the State. See State v. Shepherd, 159 N.H. 163, 170-71 (2009) (outlining
framework for analyzing due process claim based on undisclosed evidence).
The State counters that we should affirm because the defendant’s motion for a
new trial was untimely under the three-year limitation period set forth in RSA
526:4 (2007). We agree with the State.

As a threshold matter, the defendant argues that the State’s timeliness
argument is not preserved for our review. We assume without deciding that
the defendant is correct. Nonetheless, we elect to address the issue on appeal
because preservation is a limitation upon the parties to an appeal, not upon
the reviewing court, and because the issue presents a discrete question of

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statutory interpretation, requiring no further factual development. See State v.
Kardonsky, 169 N.H. 150, 152 (2016).

Determining whether the defendant’s motion for a new trial was timely
under RSA 526:4 requires us to engage in statutory interpretation. “In matters
of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the
legislature as expressed by the words of the statute considered as a whole.”
Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743 (2019). We first examine the statutory
language, and, where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to
the words used. Kardonsky, 169 N.H. at 152. We interpret legislative intent
from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might
have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id.

RSA 526:1 authorizes a trial court to grant a new trial “when through
accident, mistake or misfortune justice has not been done and a further
hearing would be equitable.” RSA 526:1 (2007). But that discretion is not
unlimited: the court may not grant a new trial unless the motion “is filed within
three years after the rendition of the judgment complained of, or the failure of
the suit.” RSA 526:4.

We have previously interpreted the meaning of “rendition of the
judgment” and “failure of the suit” in the context of RSA 526:4. See State v.
Looney, 154 N.H. 801, 802-04 (2007); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Hosp., 115 N.H.
709, 712 (1975). In Bricker, we explained that a judgment is rendered when
the court files its decision with the clerk of court, and that “failure of the suit”
means when the “action is terminated otherwise than by the rendition of a
judgment.” Bricker, 115 N.H. at 712. We later clarified in Looney that, in the
context of a criminal case, “a judgment is ‘rendered’ when the sentence has
been imposed by the trial court.” Looney, 154 N.H. at 804. Here, the criminal
prosecution of the defendant was terminated by rendition of the judgment
when the court sentenced the defendant on January 27, 2009, making that the
date upon which the three-year limitation period began to run. See id. The
defendant did not file the instant motion for a new trial until 2019 — over ten
years after his sentencing. He, therefore, failed to file the motion within three
years after the rendition of the judgment as required by RSA 526:4.

We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments to the contrary. At
oral argument, the defendant asserted that the time limitation imposed by RSA
526:4 does not apply to his motion because his request for a new trial alleged a
constitutional violation and was premised on alleged misconduct by the State.
But the reach of the new trial statute, RSA chapter 526 (2007), is not so
limited: it applies to motions for a new trial claiming that “through accident,
mistake or misfortune justice has not been done and a further hearing would
be equitable.” RSA 526:1. The defendant’s motion, asserting a violation of his
due process rights occasioned by the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence, falls within the statute’s ambit.

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 The defendant also argues that, if RSA 526:4 applies to his motion, the
three-year limitation period should not begin to run until “the moment the
State cease[s] shirking its obligation to provide [the defendant] with exculpatory
evidence.” The defendant acknowledges that he became aware of the possible
existence of exculpatory evidence by way of the partially redacted affidavits
filed in his civil suit in 2013. Nevertheless, he contends that the start of the
three-year period has “yet to come” because the State has yet to either: (1)
disclose unredacted copies of the affidavits; or (2) affirm that, after reviewing
the unredacted affidavits, they do not contradict the State’s assertion at trial
that the officers had no prior disciplinary history. We are not persuaded. The
language of RSA 526:4 is clear and unambiguous: a motion for a new trial
must be “filed within three years after the rendition of the judgment
complained of, or the failure of suit.” RSA 526:4. The statute provides no
exceptions or tolling provisions.1 See id. This interpretation is consistent with
the purpose of RSA 526:4, which “is to put an end to litigation.” Bricker, 115
N.H. at 712; see also Perez v. Pike Inds., 153 N.H. 158, 160 (2005) (observing
that one of the principal purposes of a statute of limitations is “to eliminate
stale or fraudulent claims” (quotation omitted)).

The defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it did not hold
a hearing on his motion for a new trial, which prevented him from “mak[ing] a
record on the issue.” We disagree. In the absence of a statutory mandate, the
superior court generally has discretion to determine whether a hearing is
necessary. State v. Tsopas, 166 N.H. 528, 530 (2014); cf. Super. Ct. Civ. R.
13(b). Although the New Hampshire Rules of Criminal Procedure require the
superior court to hold a hearing on certain petitions and motions, see, e.g.,
N.H. R. Crim. P. 31(d) (petition for annulment), 15(b)(2) (motion to suppress),
no rule requires the court to hold a hearing on a motion for a new trial. Unless
a hearing is mandated by statute or court rule, to obtain a hearing, the party
seeking it must articulate why a hearing would assist the court. Tsopas, 166
N.H. at 530. We review the court’s determination not to hold a hearing under
our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. Id. To meet this standard,
the defendant must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable
or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Id.

Here, the defendant has not identified any statute or court rule granting
him the right to a hearing and there is no such provision in the Rules of
Criminal Procedure or in RSA chapter 526, which govern motions for a new
trial. See RSA ch. 526. Further, neither the defendant’s motion for a new trial
nor his motion to reconsider articulated reasons why a hearing would assist
the court. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not unsustainably
exercise its discretion when it denied the defendant’s request for a hearing.
See In re Erik M., 146 N.H. 508, 511 (2001) (affirming trial court’s refusal to

1 Given the procedural history of this case, we need not address whether the discovery rule

applies. See RSA 508:4, I (2010).

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hold hearing where defendant failed to set forth any reason why a hearing
would assist the court).

Finally, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to
treat his motion for a new trial as a petition for a writ of coram nobis and that
we should remand to the trial court with instructions that it construe the
motion as such. We disagree. The defendant filed the instant motion in the
trial court with the benefit of counsel. That motion was titled “Motion For New
Trial” and relied heavily on State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 32-33 (1998), which
involved the appeal of a denial of a motion for a new trial. Further, neither the
defendant’s motion, nor his motion to reconsider, mentioned coram nobis
relief. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court
erred when it construed the defendant’s pleading as a motion for a new trial,
rather than as a petition for a writ of coram nobis. Nor are we inclined, as the
defendant suggested at oral argument, to exercise our discretion and reframe
the defendant’s appeal as one seeking coram nobis relief. Cf. Hart v. Warden,
N.H. State Prison, 171 N.H. 709, 715-16 (2019) (construing petitioner’s petition
for writ of habeas corpus as one for writ of coram nobis based, in part, on
unique procedural posture of appeal).

We conclude that the defendant’s motion for a new trial was untimely
filed under RSA 526:4, and, therefore, affirm the trial court’s denial of his
motion. Given this conclusion, we need not reach the defendant’s other
arguments. See Gosselin v. N.H. Dep’t of Corrections, 153 N.H. 696, 700
(2006).
Affirmed.

HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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