Gaetane Benner v. Claudette Grenier

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2021-0506, Gaetane Benner v. Claudette
Grenier, the court on December 1, 2022, issued the following
order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The plaintiff appeals an order of the Superior Court
(Nicolosi, J.) dismissing her complaint against the defendant, who is her sister,
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate
in part, and remand.

In June 2021, the plaintiff filed a complaint in superior court requesting
a jury trial and alleging the following. For the purposes of this appeal, we
accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true. We also rely upon documents the
plaintiff provided to the trial court to set forth the following facts.

The parties’ mother, Jeannette Jacques (Mother), died in July 2020. In
1982, Mother executed a will, which bequeathed “all of [her] property, whether
real, personal or mixed, to which [she] may be entitled or over which [she] may
have any power of disposition or appointment at the time of [her] death to [her]
children,” the parties. The will also nominated the parties as her co-
executrices.

In January 2019, Mother executed a notarized document setting forth
her “final instructions” as to the distribution of certain items of personal
property upon her death. The document identified the plaintiff as the recipient
of Mother’s “Wedding Ring/Band,” among other items, and instructed that, if
the plaintiff did not want Mother’s clothes dryer, the defendant was “to buy [it]
& pay [the plaintiff] $150 for it.”

Mother and the plaintiff had at least one joint account at Members First
Credit Union. In January 2019, Mother signed a document to remove the
plaintiff as an owner of one of the joint accounts. According to the plaintiff, the
defendant “appeared to have used [her power of attorney to act for Mother] to
. . . remove[] [the plaintiff] as the sole beneficiary” of one of Mother’s Members
First Credit Union accounts. In addition, the defendant appeared to have used
the power of attorney “to make unauthorized transactions.” Specifically, at
some point, $7,831 was withdrawn from the plaintiff’s and Mother’s joint
Citizens Bank account and was deposited into a joint savings account the
defendant had at St. Mary’s Bank.1 Also, $14,142 was withdrawn from the
plaintiff’s and Mother’s joint certificate of deposit and deposited into the
defendant’s joint savings account.

After Mother died in July 2020, and contrary to the document detailing
her final instructions, the defendant “prohibited [the plaintiff] from entering
[Mother’s] apartment and proceeded to distribute [Mother’s] assets herself even
though [the plaintiff] was also named as a co-executrix.” The defendant “gave
away [Mother’s] wedding ring/band to [the defendant’s] daughter . . . instead of
[the plaintiff]” even though Mother had bequeathed the ring to the plaintiff in
the January 2019 document, which the plaintiff terms a “Codicil.” The
defendant also “refused to give [the plaintiff] the $150 for mom’s clothes dryer
as listed in [her] 1/3/19 Codicil.” Since Mother’s death, the defendant “has
kept the $447 that was withdrawn in January 2019 . . . from a joint account
[the plaintiff] had with [Mother],” instead of spending the money on an after-
funeral luncheon as Mother had “request[ed] in many of her notes.” The
defendant has also refused to give the plaintiff $965 “from the Member’s 1st
account,” although the plaintiff “was listed as the sole beneficiary to this
account.”

The plaintiff requested that the court order the defendant to give her
Mother’s “wedding ring and band that had been bequeath[ed] to [her] via the
Codicil dated 1/3/19.” She also sought “restitution” in the amount of
$52,935.36. According to a demand letter from the plaintiff’s attorney, which
the plaintiff included in the appellate record, $52,935.36 includes the
following:

 The $10,000.00 difference between the “real value” of Mother’s life estate
in certain property and the value the defendant “recorded” in 1997, plus
$4,683.00 in interest;
 $4,713.12 “in unaccounted for monies that was withdrawn from
[Mother’s] Member’s First Credit Union checking account, . . . which
named [the plaintiff] as the sole beneficiary”;
 $965.00 in cash from “the Member’s First Credit Union Account, . . . in
which [the plaintiff] was also listed as the sole beneficiary”;
 $6,025.45, “which was the balance in [Mother’s] Member’s First Credit
Union checking and shares account as of 8/3/2020,” for which the
plaintiff was also the sole beneficiary;
 $150.00 for Mother’s dryer;
 $14,142.00, “withdrawn from [Mother’s] and [the plaintiff’s] St. Mary’s
Bank CD . . . back in August 2016 and deposited into [the defendant’s]
Joint Savings Account at St. Mary’s Bank”;

1 The plaintiff’s complaint does not identify the other joint owner(s) of this account.

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  $7,831.24 “that was in a Citizens Bank Checking Account” the plaintiff
held with her daughter and with Mother, which was withdrawn in
January 2019 and deposited into the defendant’s St. Mary’s Bank joint
savings account;
 $447.00 withdrawn in January 2019 from the plaintiff’s joint savings
account with Mother;
 $1,089.55, “which represents half of [Mother’s] unused Tax Exemption”;
 $2,500.00 in cash that Mother had left in her home; and
 $220.00 “of damages owed to Manchester Memorial for the writing placed
on [Mother’s] monument.”

The trial court subsequently determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction “to adjudicate the matters presented in the [plaintiff’s] complaint.”
The court explained that the complaint’s allegations fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate division of the circuit court pursuant to RSA 547:3,
I, and, on that basis, dismissed the complaint.

The plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider asking the court to reinstate the
case because she had requested a jury trial and “Superior Court is the only
Court where trial by jury exists.” The plaintiff asserted that the superior court
had ancillary jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to RSA 547:3-l. In her
motion, the plaintiff acknowledged that her mother’s estate “should have
originally gone to Probate Court,” but averred that the defendant “refused to
enter the Will or Estate in Probate Court” and had already liquidated “all of [her
mother’s] estate.” The plaintiff asserted that, because the defendant had
already liquidated her mother’s assets, there was “now no Estate to Probate.”
The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider, and this appeal
followed.

Resolving the issues in this appeal requires that we analyze the subject
matter jurisdiction of the superior court and the probate division of the circuit
court to determine whether the plaintiff’s claims fall exclusively within the
probate division’s jurisdiction. See Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 742 (2019).
A court lacks the authority to hear or determine a case over which it lacks
jurisdiction. Id. The ultimate determination as to whether a trial court has
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. In
the Matter of O’Neil & O’Neil, 159 N.H. 615, 622 (2010).

The superior court is a court of general jurisdiction. Id. at 743; see RSA
491:7 (Supp. 2021). By contrast, the powers of the circuit court probate
division are limited to those conferred by statute. Rogers, 171 N.H. at 743. As
relevant to this case, the probate division has exclusive jurisdiction over:

(b) The granting of administration and all matters and things
of probate jurisdiction relating to the composition, administration,

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 sale, settlement, and final distribution of estates of deceased
persons, including the establishment of death of a person
presumed dead and assignment of homestead and claims against
the executor or administrator for those services related to the prior
care and maintenance of the decedent and the administration of
insolvent estates and appeals therefrom.

(c) The interpretation and construction of wills and the
creation by judgment or decree, interpretation, construction,
modification, and termination of those trusts described in RSA
564-A:1, I.
....

(m) Declaratory judgment actions pursuant to RSA 547:11-b.

RSA 547:3, I (b)-(c), (m) (2019). RSA 547:11-b provides:

Any person claiming a present legal or equitable right or title
to real or personal property in the estate of deceased persons or to
guardianship, conservatorship, or trust assets may maintain a
petition against the estate, guardian, conservator, or trustee to
determine the question as between the parties, and the probate
court’s judgment or decree thereon shall be conclusive. The
existence of an adequate remedy at law or in equity shall not
preclude any person from obtaining such declaratory relief.

RSA 547:11-b (2019).

The trial court found that all of the plaintiff’s allegations in her complaint
“fall within the purview of RSA 547:3, I(b) or (m).” We agree with the trial court
regarding some allegations, disagree with the trial court regarding others, and
for some of the allegations, we lack sufficient information upon which to decide
whether jurisdiction is in the superior court or the probate division of the
circuit court.

Determining the proper forum for the plaintiff’s claims requires assessing
the nature of those claims. See Rogers, 171 N.H. at 745. Here, we conclude
that the plaintiff’s claims for return of Mother’s wedding rings and any other
personal property allegedly bequeathed to her in Mother’s purported will or
codicil fall squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate division
under RSA 547:3, I(b) and I(c). The plaintiff’s claims for return of Mother’s
wedding rings and other personal property allegedly bequeathed to her in the
purported will or codicil specifically challenge the defendant’s “final distribution
of [Mother’s] estate[],” RSA 547:3, I(b), and resolving them depends upon “the
interpretation and construction of” Mother’s will, RSA 547:3, I(c). To the extent

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that the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment with regard to her right to
recover any property allegedly bequeathed to her in the purported will or
codicil, the probate division is the exclusive forum from which to obtain that
declaration. See RSA 547:3, I(m); RSA 547:11-b.

By contrast, the plaintiff’s claims regarding the joint accounts she held
with Mother do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate division.
Resolving them does not require interpreting the alleged will or its codicil. The
joint accounts would not have been part of Mother’s estate to be probated (had
the will been filed with the court). The plaintiff’s claims related to the joint
accounts she held with Mother are claims against the defendant in her
personal capacity, not in her representative capacity as co-executrix of
Mother’s estate. In these claims, the plaintiff does not challenge the
defendant’s “final distribution of [Mother’s] estate[].” RSA 547:3, I(b). In these
claims, “[t]he plaintiff seeks monetary damages,” rather than “a redistribution
of estate property.” Rogers, 171 N.H. at 746. Thus, the superior court has
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims that: (1) the defendant improperly used
her power of attorney to remove the plaintiff as “the sole beneficiary” of one of
Mother’s Members First Credit Union accounts; and (2) the defendant
improperly used the power of attorney to make “unauthorized transactions,”
including the defendant’s alleged withdrawals from the plaintiff’s joint savings
account with Mother, joint Citizens Bank Account with Mother, and joint
certificate of deposit with Mother.

With respect to the plaintiff’s other allegations, such as her allegations
related to Mother’s unused tax exemption and the alleged $10,000 difference
between the “real value” of Mother’s life estate in certain property and the value
the defendant “recorded” in 1997, plus $4,683.00 in interest, we vacate the
trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to reconsider, in light of this
order, whether these allegations state any claims upon which relief can be
granted over which the superior court has subject matter jurisdiction.

Although the plaintiff argues that all of her claims constitute ancillary
matters over which the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction, she is
mistaken. RSA 547:3-l defines the ancillary matters over which the superior
court has exclusive jurisdiction as “claims for . . . damages or for the recovery
of money or property brought on behalf of an estate . . . against a third party or
brought by a third party against an estate . . . in which the right to trial by jury
exists and is demanded.” RSA 547:3-l (2019). While the plaintiff has
demanded a jury trial, her claims are not against the estate, but are against
the defendant.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims
for return of Mother’s wedding rings and any other personal property Mother
allegedly bequeathed to her in the purported will or codicil, reverse the court’s

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dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims related to the joint accounts she held with
Mother, and vacate the court’s order as it relates to the plaintiff’s remaining
alleged claims. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Affirmed in part; reversed in
part; vacated in part; and
remanded.

MACDONALD, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and
DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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