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“To convict the defendant, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove or attempted to drive a vehicle upon a way while [the defendant] was ‘under the influence of intoxicating liquor.’” State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 452 (2009) (quoting RSA 265-A:2, I(a)).

To prevail in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant bears the burden of proving that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

To prevail in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant bears the burden of proving that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (defining direct evidence).

State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (officer’s testimony sufficient to prove impairment).

State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (officer’s testimony sufficient to prove impairment).

or any combination of intoxicating liquor and controlled drugs, prescription drugs, over-the-counter drugs, or any other chemical substances, natural or synthetic, which impair a person’s ability to drive.” To prove that the defendant was “under the influence” of an intoxicating liquor or drug or combination thereof, the State need only prove that he was “impaired to any degree.” State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 452 (2009) (quotation omitted).

Prior to its amendment, we held on several occasions that to obtain a conviction under this statute, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove or attempted to drive a vehicle upon a way while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

“Direct evidence is evidence which, if accepted as true, directly proves the fact for which it is offered, without the need for the factfinder to draw any inferences.” State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (quotation omitted).

Direct evidence is evidence which, if accepted as true, directly proves the fact for which it is offered, without the need for the factfinder to draw any inferences.

[w]hile such person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” To prove that the defendant was “under the influence of intoxicating liquor,” the State need only prove that the defendant was “impaired to any degree.” State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 452 (2009) (quotation omitted).

State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (distinguishing direct from circumstantial evidence).

State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (“Direct evidence is evidence which, if accepted as true, directly proves the fact for which it is offered, without the need for the factfinder to draw any inferences.” (Quotation omitted.)) Although the defendant testified that the victim consented, the jury resolved the conflicting testimony in the victi

This evidence, together with the laboratory results showing that the defendant’s blood contained clonazepam and an elevated level of fentanyl, is direct evidence of impairment.

Although our general rule is that we will uphold a jury’s verdict unless no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454-55 (2009), we employ a different test when the evidence is solely circumstantial, see State v. Ruiz, 170 N.H. 553, 568 (2018).

It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In doing so, we examine each evidentiary item in the context of all the evidence, not in isolation.

“Direct evidence is evidence which, if accepted as true, directly proves the fact for which it is offered, without the need for the factfinder to draw any inferences.” State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (quotation omitted).

To prevail in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant bears the burden of proving that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Contrary to the defendant’s argument, this case is factually distinguishable from State v. Lorton, 149 N.H. 732 (2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449 (2009).

The defendant likens this case to State v. Lorton, 149 N.H. 732 (2003), overruled in part by State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009).

Although the record contains direct evidence that the defendant consumed alcohol and then drove, see State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (direct evidence, if accepted as true, directly proves the fact for which it is offered, without need for fact finder to draw any inferences), we will assume, without deciding, that the circumstantial evidence 2 standard applies.

Ct. App. 1975) (holding that expert’s testimony that powder tested by crime laboratory “contained cocaine was direct, not circumstantial” evidence); cf. State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (noting that “chemical evidence does not constitute the sole form of direct evidence of [alcohol] impairment”).

The defendant argues that “[t]he State presented less evidence of impairment due to alcohol in this case than in” State v. Lorton, 149 N.H. 732 (2003), overruled in part by State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009).

In reviewing the evidence, we examine each evidentiary item in the context of all the evidence, not in isolation.

State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 453-54 (2009) (distinguishing circumstantial from direct evidence of impairment within the context of driving while intoxicated).

In reviewing the evidence, we examine each evidentiary item in the context of all the evidence, not in isolation.

see State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (defining “direct evidence” as “evidence which, if accepted as true, directly proves the fact for which it is offered, without the *356 need for the factfinder to draw any inferences,” such as “the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of facts about the crime charged such as an eyewi

We deem waived the remaining questions that the defendant raised in his notice of appeal but did not brief.

Finally, we deem waived the remaining questions that the defendant raised in his notice of appeal but did not brief.

Although the defendant argued to the trial court that her consent was not voluntary, she did not brief this issue, thus waiving it.

We deem waived the remaining questions that the defendant raised in his notice of appeal but did not brief.

responded, “When he first got the phone.” “The trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from facts proved and also inferences from facts found as a result of other inferences, provided they can be reasonably drawn therefrom.” State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 455 (2009).

Also, we deem waived issues the defendant raised in his notice of appeal but did not brief.

An error is not harmless unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the verdict.