State of New Hampshire v. Gokhan Kumpas

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2017-0716, State of New Hampshire v. Gokhan
Kumpas, the court on September 17, 2018, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The defendant, Gokhan Kumpas, appeals his conviction, following a
bench trial in the Circuit Court (Morrison, J.), on a charge of driving while
under the influence of alcohol, first offense. See RSA 265-A:2 (2014). We
construe his brief to argue that the circumstantial evidence did not exclude all
reasonable conclusions other than that he was impaired and, thus, that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We assume, without
deciding, that this issue is preserved.

To prevail on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant
must demonstrate that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence and
all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, could
have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ducharme, 167
N.H. 606, 616-17 (2015). We examine each item of evidence in the context of
all the evidence, and not in isolation. Id. at 617. Circumstantial evidence may
be sufficient to support a conviction. Id. When, however, evidence as to one or
more of the elements of the charged crime is solely circumstantial, it must
exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt. Id.

To convict the defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol, the
State was required to prove that he drove or attempted to drive a vehicle upon
a way while he was “under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” RSA 265-A:2,
I(a). To establish that the defendant was “under the influence of intoxicating
liquor,” the State was required to prove only that he was impaired to any
degree. Ducharme, 167 N.H. at 617. Our review of the defendant’s challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence is de novo. Id.

At the outset, we agree with the State that the evidence of the
defendant’s impairment was not solely circumstantial and, thus, that the
evidence was not required to exclude all reasonable inferences other than his
guilt. See State v. Cable, 168 N.H. 673, 678 (2016). “Direct evidence is
evidence which, if accepted as true, directly proves the fact for which it is
offered, without the need for the factfinder to draw any inferences.” State v.
Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009) (quotation omitted). In the context of a
prosecution under RSA 265-A:2, direct evidence of impairment may include
direct observations that the arresting law enforcement officer made of the
defendant. See id. In this case, the police officer who arrested the defendant
testified that, at the time of his arrest, the defendant: (1) smelled of alcohol; (2)
admitted that he had consumed a twenty-ounce beer; (3) was unsteady on his
feet, and had to lean on the trunk of his car to support himself; and (4) refused
to take an alcohol concentration test after being advised of the consequences of
the refusal, RSA 265-A:10 (2014). See Kelley, 159 N.H. at 454.

In his brief, the defendant does not contest that he performed poorly on
field sobriety tests. Nor does he contest that, prior to the stop, he had
consumed at least a portion of a twenty-ounce beer, and that he refused to
take an alcohol concentration test. Instead, he suggests that his own
testimony at trial was more credible than the officer’s testimony, and that the
trial court should have credited his explanations for why he performed poorly
on the field sobriety tests and refused to take an alcohol concentration test. In
resolving a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal
conviction, however, credibility determinations are within the exclusive
province of the trier of fact. See State v. Carr, 167 N.H. 264, 275 (2015).
Moreover, the record does not reflect that the defendant properly preserved his
challenge to the weight of the evidence. See State v. Hill, 163 N.H. 394, 396
(2012). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant was impaired to any degree when he was stopped.
Ducharme, 167 N.H. at 616-17.

Affirmed.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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