State v. Suzanne Walsh

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2017-0360, State of New Hampshire v. Suzanne
Walsh, the court on March 7, 2018, issued the following order:

Having considered the brief filed by the defendant, Suzanne Walsh, the
State’s memorandum of law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). The
defendant appeals her conviction, following a bench trial in Circuit Court
(Crocker, J.) for misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, first offense. See RSA 265-A:2, I(a) (2014). We affirm.

The sole issue for our review in this appeal is whether the evidence was
sufficient to prove that the defendant drove while impaired. “When considering
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we objectively review the record
to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
State.” State v. Francis, 167 N.H. 598, 604 (2015). “In reviewing the evidence,
we examine each evidentiary item in the context of all the evidence, not in
isolation.” State v. Thelusma, 167 N.H. 481, 487 (2015) (quotation omitted).
“Further, the trier may draw reasonable inferences from facts proved and also
inferences from facts found as a result of other inferences, provided they can
be reasonably drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted).

To prove that the defendant was guilty, the State was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that she “drove or attempted to drive a vehicle upon
a way while [she] was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” State v.
Wiggin, 151 N.H. 305, 309 (2004) (quotation omitted); see also RSA 265-A:2,
I(a). “To prove that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, the State need only prove impairment to any degree.” Wiggin, 151 N.H.
at 309 (quotations omitted).

Considering all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to find the defendant drove while impaired. A police officer found the
defendant’s vehicle stopped in the southbound lane on Route 13 in Milford,
such that its right half was over the white fog line and its left half was in the
southbound travel lane. To pass the defendant’s vehicle, other drivers had to
cross into, and partially travel in, the northbound lane.
 When the officer asked the defendant if she was okay, she failed to
respond, but, instead, just stared at him. The officer had to ask the defendant
three times before “[s]he mumbled that she was just trying to go home.” The
officer asked the defendant for her license, and, again, she just stared at him.
Eventually, she produced her license. The officer observed that the defendant’s
speech was “slowed and slurred” and that her responses to his questions were
“delayed.”

When the officer asked the defendant whether she had consumed any
alcoholic beverages, she admitted that she had had two or three margaritas
while waiting for her food at a restaurant. When the officer asked the
defendant why she had pulled her vehicle off to the side of the road, she told
him that she “was just taking a break.” When he asked her if this was her
normal route to her home in New Ipswich, she responded, “Um, I don’t know.”
At this point, the defendant’s vehicle, which had a manual transmission, began
to roll backwards. The officer repeatedly told the defendant to apply the
parking brake, and she eventually did so. The officer asked the defendant if
she was “okay” to drive home, and she just stared at him “blankly.” The officer
asked the defendant if she would perform field sobriety tests, and she declined
his request.

The officer then arrested the defendant for driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. Upon arresting her, the officer removed the defendant’s
sunglasses and observed that she appeared “glassy-eyed” and that her eyes
“were red” and “bloodshot.” The officer smelled “the odor of an alcoholic
beverage emanating from her breath.” Inside the defendant’s vehicle were
“several bottles of alcoholic beverages,” all still sealed.

With the officer’s assistance, the defendant got into his cruiser. Once at
the police station, she stumbled when she exited the cruiser. The defendant
refused to submit to a blood alcohol test.

Contrary to the defendant’s argument, this case is factually
distinguishable from State v. Lorton, 149 N.H. 732 (2003), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449 (2009). In Lorton, the defendant
failed to use a turn signal while making a right turn, but “stopped in a safe and
prudent manner.” Lorton, 149 N.H. at 734. Here, the defendant stopped her
vehicle so that half of it was in the southbound lane of traffic, requiring other
drivers to cross into, and partially travel in, the northbound lane in order to
pass. The defendant in Lorton immediately produced his license, id.; the
defendant here had to be asked several times to produce her license. In
Lorton, the defendant had no difficulty getting out of his car and “walked with
a normal gait without stumbling or faltering in any way.” Id. Here, the
defendant stumbled when she exited the police cruiser. Although the
defendant had no difficulty entering the cruiser, she was helped by the officer.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that

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it was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant drove while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. See Kelley, 159 N.H. at 455.

Affirmed.

Hicks, Lynn, Bassett, and Hantz Marconi, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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