State of New Hampshire v. Crystal L. Eastman

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0473, State of New Hampshire v. Crystal
L. Eastman, the court on June 18, 2020, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The defendant, Crystal L. Eastman, appeals her conviction, following a
bench trial in Circuit Court (Mace, J.), on a charge of disobeying a police officer
by refusing, on demand, to produce her driver’s license. See RSA 265:4, I(e)
(2014). She argues that the trial court erred by: (1) not suppressing evidence
obtained as a result of a traffic stop on the basis that the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion under the State and Federal Constitutions; (2) finding
sufficient evidence to support her conviction; and (3) neither dismissing the
case based on the refusal of the Town of Canaan to produce an independent
investigation report of the officer’s conduct in effectuating her arrest, nor
compelling the State to produce the report.

We first address whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s
motion to suppress. We address this issue first under the State Constitution,
relying on federal law only to aid in our analysis. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226,
231-33 (1983). We accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they lack
support in the record or are clearly erroneous, and review its conclusions of
law de novo. State v. Joyce, 159 N.H. 440, 444 (2009).

It is well-settled that a police officer, within the parameters of Part I,
Article 19 of the State Constitution, may initiate an investigatory stop if the
officer has reasonable suspicion, based on specific, articulable facts taken with
all rational inferences from those facts, that the person stopped has been, is, or
is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 446. The officer’s suspicion
must have a particularized and objective basis, and the articulable facts must
lead to something specific, not simply a sense that this is a bad person who
may have committed a crime. State v. Perez, 173 N.H. ___, ___ (decided May
15, 2020) (slip op. at 7). However, reasonable suspicion is a standard that is
less demanding than probable cause both in terms of the quantum of
information required to satisfy the standard and the reliability of such
information, and it may be satisfied by activity that is consistent both with
guilty and innocent behavior. Id. (slip op. at 7-8). We consider the articulable
facts in light of all of the surrounding circumstances, mindful that a trained
officer may make inferences and draw conclusions from conduct that may
seem otherwise unremarkable. Id. (slip op. at 7). Upon conducting a lawful
investigatory stop, the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of
questions to determine the detainee’s identity and obtain information
confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. Id. (slip op. at 12).

In this case, a school bus driver, who was in the process of dropping
middle-school-aged children off from school, observed a white SUV-style car
following her school bus, including up and down several roads on which the
bus driver had turned the bus around. The SUV had been following the bus
continuously for five-to-ten minutes when the bus driver reported the issue to
her bus company. The bus driver did not know the identity of the SUV’s driver,
and at the time she reported the issue, she still had children on the bus, she
had approximately fifteen minutes remaining on her route, and she felt uneasy.

The bus company relayed the bus driver’s report to the Canaan police
department, and an officer responded, receiving updates along the way as to
the bus’s location as the SUV continued to follow the bus. Approximately five
minutes after receiving the call from the bus company, the officer observed a
white SUV following a school bus at the location where the bus company
reported that the bus would be, and he initiated a traffic stop of the SUV. The
bus driver continued on her route. The defendant was the driver of the SUV.

The defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the
stop, arguing that, because she had violated no law by following the bus, the
officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. In rejecting this
argument, the trial court observed that, at the time that the officer stopped the
defendant, all he knew was that a stranger had been following a school bus full
of children for some time, causing the bus driver concern, and that the officer
could reasonably infer from these facts that the safety of an occupant of the
school bus may have been at risk. Under these circumstances, the trial court
ruled that the officer had specific and articulable facts that, together,
reasonably warranted the stop. On appeal, the defendant argues in part that
the stop was unjustified because there was no evidence that the defendant had
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. We disagree.

The mere act of following someone in a motor vehicle, for no reason
known to the person being followed, may cause the person being followed
reasonable fear for her safety or the safety of an occupant of her vehicle, and
may itself, under certain circumstances, amount to a crime. See RSA 633:3-a,
I, II(a)(2) (Supp. 2019); State v. Gubitosi, 152 N.H. 673, 681 (2005) (finding
sufficient evidence of a “course of conduct” for purposes of stalking based, in
part, upon evidence that the defendant had driven his car to a restaurant
where the victim was eating, drove through the restaurant’s parking lot, and
was approximately three car lengths from the victim when the victim saw him);
State v. Small, 150 N.H. 457, 464 (2004) (finding that single act of following

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someone in a car could constitute stalking for purposes of RSA 633:3-a, I(c)
(Supp. 2002)). In this case, at the time that the officer stopped the defendant:
(1) the defendant had been following a school bus continuously for
approximately fifteen minutes; (2) the defendant had followed the bus up and
down several roads on which the bus had turned around, making it unlikely
that the defendant’s presence was coincidental; (3) the bus driver had several
children in her care; (4) the bus driver did not know who the defendant was;
and (5) the defendant’s behavior had unnerved the bus driver.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the officer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the defendant was in the process of committing, or
was about to commit, a crime so as to justify the stop for purposes of the State
Constitution.1 See Gutierrez v. Texas, 2013 WL 2107183 (Tex. Ct. App. May
13, 2013) (finding sufficient reasonable suspicion “that something of an
apparently criminal nature was brewing” to justify traffic stop based on report
that the stopped motorist had been continuously following a woman, who did
not know the motorist following her and was frightened, for five miles at 3:00
a.m.). Because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater
protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances, see
Perez, 173 N.H. at ___ (slip op. at 6-8); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-30 (1968),
we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution.

We next address whether the trial court erred by finding sufficient
evidence to support her conviction. To prevail on her challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant must demonstrate that no rational
trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in
the light most favorable to the State, could have found her guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Leith, 172 N.H. 1, 11 (2019). We consider each
item of evidence within the context of all of the evidence, and not in isolation.
State v. Saintil-Brown, 172 N.H. 110, 117 (2019).

When evidence as to one or more elements of the charged offense is
solely circumstantial, the defendant must establish that the evidence does not
exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt. Id. When the proof involves
both direct and circumstantial evidence, however, a sufficiency challenge will
fail if the evidence and credibility determinations of the trier of fact are such
that a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
even if the evidence would also support a rational conclusion other than guilt.

1 Because we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to undertake a lawful

investigatory stop, we need not address the defendant’s arguments that the community care
exception did not apply and that there was no public interest that justified the stop, or the
State’s contention that these arguments are not preserved. Accordingly, the defendant’s
motion to supplement the record with her motion to suppress and the State’s objection, which
she filed in response to the State’s contention that the record is insufficient to establish that
she preserved these arguments, is moot.

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Id. at 117-18. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s
convictions raises a claim of legal error, which we review de novo. Id. at 117.

RSA 265:4, I(e) makes it unlawful for the driver of a vehicle to “[r]efuse,
on demand of [a law enforcement] officer, to produce his license to drive such
vehicle.” RSA 265:4, I(e) (emphasis added). In this case, the officer testified
that the defendant refused to produce her license, claiming that she was not
required to produce it despite the officer’s multiple explanations to the
contrary, and that when she eventually retrieved the license and held it up, she
took it back when the officer tried to take it from her. The defendant likewise
testified, claiming that she has never refused to produce her license when
stopped. Nevertheless, she conceded that: (1) the officer asked for her license;
(2) when the officer asked for her license, she did not initially produce it, but
instead asked him why he needed it since he already knew who she was; (3) the
officer told her that they could stay there all day if she did not produce the
license; and (4) she then asked whether she was under arrest, to which the
officer responded that he would arrest her if she did not produce her license.
Consistent with the officer’s testimony, the defendant testified that she then
held the license up to the window, but disputed that she pulled it away from
the officer, testifying instead that she had merely turned toward the interior of
her car to retrieve her registration and to record the incident on her phone.

The trial court found that both witnesses credibly testified that the officer
demanded the defendant’s license and that the defendant “did not hand it to
him on demand for examination.” Because the defendant herself “clearly
testified that she did not follow [the officer’s] commands with respect to her
license,” the trial court concluded that “she is beyond a reasonable doubt guilty
of disobeying a police officer according to the plain language of the statute.”

On appeal, the defendant characterizes her culpability as turning upon
whether she had taken “too long” to produce her license, and argues that this
presents a “credibility issue.” Because the officer had also asked the defendant
for her registration, and because he agreed on cross-examination that she
could have been reaching for her registration when she turned toward the
interior of the car, the defendant argues that the evidence fails to exclude a
reasonable conclusion that she was not refusing to produce her license, but
was merely reaching for her registration, and that her conviction is thus
unsupported by, and contrary to the weight of, the evidence.

As the trial court correctly reasoned, however, RSA 265:4, I(e) requires a
driver to produce her license upon demand of a law enforcement officer; it does
not authorize the driver to respond to a law enforcement officer’s demand for a
license by engaging in a debate concerning whether the officer really needs to
see the license. Here, the defendant’s own testimony that she responded to the
officer’s demand for her license by asking why he needed to see it and whether
she was under arrest amounted to direct evidence of her refusal to produce the

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license upon demand. See State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449, 454 (2009)
(distinguishing direct from circumstantial evidence). Accordingly, we agree
with the trial court that the witness’s own testimony established her guilt,
beyond a reasonable doubt, on the charge of disobeying a police officer.

Finally, we address whether the trial court erred by denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the failure of the Town of Canaan to
produce an independent investigation report concerning her arrest, and by not
compelling the production of the report. The record establishes that, during
the course of the defendant’s arrest, a struggle ensued that led to an injury to
the defendant requiring surgery. The State charged the defendant with
resisting arrest, and the defendant asserted that the officer had used excessive
force in her arrest. As a result of the defendant’s allegations, the Town of
Canaan engaged a third party to conduct an independent investigation of the
arrest, and came into possession of an investigation report. The report became
the subject of multiple discovery motions.

Within the context of resolving the discovery dispute, the trial court
directed the prosecutor to review the report and determine whether it contained
exculpatory information. See State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 327-30 (1995).
However, the town refused to provide the report to the prosecutor, asserting
that it was privileged. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that she was
entitled to the report pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The
Trial Court (Bamberger, J.) denied the motion, but ruled that the State’s
privilege claim “can and should be considered by the [trier] of fact as it
considers the issues of credibility in this matter.” Following trial, the Trial
Court (Mace, J.) acquitted the defendant of resisting arrest, resolving all
credibility issues against the officer as a result of the privilege claim.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion
to dismiss and its failure to compel production of the report. The defendant
argues that the relief granted by the trial court – its decision to resolve
credibility issues against the State – was “unworkable” because the officer’s
credibility was an issue not only with respect to the resisting arrest charge, but
also with respect to the charge of disobeying a police officer.

We review the trial court’s ruling on an alleged discovery violation for an
unsustainable exercise of discretion. See State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 287
(2012). To establish that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion,
the defendant must demonstrate that its decision was clearly unreasonable to
the prejudice of her case. Id. “In the context of a discovery violation, actual
prejudice exists if the defense has been impeded to a significant degree by the
nondisclosure.” Id. (quotation omitted).

We have held that the State’s duty to disclose exculpatory information
does not extend to records that are not within the control of the prosecutor or

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the prosecuting police department. State v. Downs, 157 N.H. 695, 698 (2008);
State v. Lavallee, 145 N.H. 424, 427 (2000). The record in this case
demonstrates that the report was in the control of the town, not its police
department or the prosecutor.

Moreover, even if the Canaan Police Department or the prosecutor had
access to, or control of, the report, we agree with the State that the failure to
disclose the report did not affect the verdict. See Laurie, 139 N.H. at 330. The
trial court acquitted the defendant of resisting arrest, the charge to which the
report would have directly pertained, as a result of the discovery sanction that
it imposed. Moreover, as discussed above, the trial court correctly concluded
that the defendant’s own testimony established her guilt, beyond a reasonable
doubt, of disobeying a police officer. On this record, we cannot say that the
trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by not ordering disclosure of
the report or dismissing the case.

Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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