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to a criminal defendant applies to 3 impeachment evidence because “[t]he jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend.” State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 327 (1995) (quotation omitted).

As a result, both cases implicated the prosecution’s “obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added); see also State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995) (“Upon a showing by the defendant that favorable, exculpatory evidence has been knowingly withheld by the prosecution, the burden shifts to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the undisclosed evidence would not h

As the trial court noted, the rule requiring disclosure applies to impeachment evidence because “[t]he jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend.” State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 327 (1995) (quotation omitted).

Interest Journalism v. N.H. Dep’t of Justice, 173 N.H. 648, 651 (2020).

xculpatory in a case “‘where it mattered whether [the plaintiff’s] conduct conformed to legal requirements.’” The AGO also contends that the plaintiff’s arguments concerning whether evidence of his conduct would be admissible are misplaced because “admissibility does not control when assessing a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations” under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1993).

ruling was not precluded by the 2014 circuit court order and that the plaintiff had received 1 See Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777 (2015) (explaining that the “Laurie List” arose from the “well-recognized proposition that, in a criminal case, the State is obligated to disclose information favorable to the defendant that is material to either guilt or to punishment”).

[¶24] Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiff’s conduct is not reasonably capable of being material to guilt or to innocence because it is stale and does not reflect negatively on his character and credibility, cf. State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 327 (1995), and because his criminal charges were nolle prossed and annulled.

impeachment purposes.” Approximately one year later, a county attorney notified the plaintiffs that their names were removed from the “Laurie List.” However, more than ten years later, the plaintiffs “heard rumors” that their names were reinstated on the “Laurie List.” Then, in September 2021, the plaintiffs were notified that their names were in fact included on the EES.2 1 See State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 327, 333 (1995) (overturning a defendant’s murder conviction because the State failed t

We note that the defendant did not argue in the trial court, as he does on appeal, that the State’s failure to provide the footage violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) or State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1995), and violated New Hampshire Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(a)(2)(B).

It also issued a public order informing the parties that the court had held the ex parte hearing to “assess whether the State ha[d] a duty to disclose possibly exculpatory ‘Laurie’ material.” See State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1995); RSA 105:13-b (2023).

We have recognized that RSA 105:13-b is linked to the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995).

Under the Federal Constitution, the defendant has the burden of proving that the evidence is “material.” State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995).

State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

The defendant next asserts that both the prior “use of force” reports and the disciplinary actions he sought constitute exculpatory information and, therefore, the State was compelled to provide them to him under RSA 105:13-b, I, and Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 327, 330, 333 (1995) (overturning a defendant’s murder conviction because the State failed to disclose certain employment records of a testifying detective that “reflect[ed] negatively on the detective’s character and credibility”).

A criminal defendant’s interest in obtaining disclosure of material helpful to his defense is rooted in the constitutional right to due process.

Although the precise timing is unclear from the record before us, in the months leading up to trial, the trial court conducted an in camera review of a file relating to an internal police department investigation into the petitioner’s conduct.1 The court determined that the file contained exculpatory evidence; accordingly, it ordered that portions of the file be disclosed to the defendant.

Within the context of resolving the discovery dispute, the trial court directed the prosecutor to review the report and determine whether it contained exculpatory information.

If a question on the LAP could be answered affirmatively based upon the video, he answered “yes”; if a question could not be so answered, he answered “no.” The interview, which pertained only to the incident for which the accused had been arrested, did not cover many of the questions on the LAP, which mainly ask about past acts or behaviors.

He then suggests that the State may have violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1995), and requests that we remand for a Brady hearing.

LYNN, J. The petitioners, Jonathan Duchesne, Matthew Jajuga, and Michael Buckley, appeal a decision of the Superior Court (Garfunkel, J.) denying their request for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to remove their names from the so-called “Laurie List.”1 We reverse and remand.

See, e.g., State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 638-39 (2009) (holding that reputation alone is a sufficient interest to require state due process protection and rejecting the federal “stigma-plus” approach); State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995) (requiring State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that undisclosed exculpatory evidence would not have affected the verdict); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147 (1977) (adopting *592 beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining the voluntar

Since no one person in the Attorney General’s Office knew not only of the existence of the evidence, but also of its value as impeachment evidence and that it was not provided to the defense, the court concluded that the prosecution had not “knowingly withheld” the evidence for burden-shifting purposes.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1995).

The arbitrator ' considered, among other things, the testimony of witnesses, the PPD’s rule prohibiting false statements in connection with official matters, and our holding in State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1995).

Relying upon Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1995), the defendant counters that he has a constitutional right to receive exculpatory information, including credibility and impeachment evidence contained in a police officer’s personnel file, from the prosecution.

The plaintiff makes the following arguments on appeal: (1) the Town did not have “substantial cause” to terminate him; (2) the trial court’s admission of the Attorney General’s investigation file as evidence was erroneous and prejudicial; and (3) the trial court improperly concluded that, consistent with State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1995), the plaintiff’s credibility problems would impair his ability to function as Chief of Police.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 653 A.2d 549 (1995).

He further argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the indictments on the basis that DCYF failed to disclose the records pursuant to State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 653 A.2d 549 (1995), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and our State and Federal Constitutions.

1979), aff’d, 624 F.2d 1112 (1st Cir.), cert.

The defendant does not argue that the conversation at issue contains exculpatory evidence; therefore, this court’s constitutional jurisprudence regarding disclosure of favorable evidence is not applicable to this case.

We first determine whether the evidence withheld by the State was exculpatory, see, e.g., State v. Arthur, 118 N.H. 561, 563, 391 A.2d 884, 886 (1978), and then, if so, whether the evidence was material, therefore requiring reversal.