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While the court, in its discretion, may “consider when and by whom property was acquired in determining its distribution,” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006), “all property of the parties is subject to distribution, provided that it was acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or divorce,” In the Matter of Preston & Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 50 (2001).

Marital property includes “all tangible and intangible property and assets, real or personal, belonging to either or both parties, whether title to the property is held in the name of either or both parties.” RSA 458:16-a, I. The statute “makes no distinction between property brought to the marriage by the parties and that acquired during marriage.” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

Among other things, she contends that the 2022 amendment to Paragraph VII changed the applicable standard from that set forth in In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 429-30 (2006).

RSA 458:16-a, II (Supp. 2023) requires the trial court to divide marital property, including marital debt, see Maldini v. Maldini, 168 N.H. 191, 195 (2015) (stating that “marital property” includes “marital debt”), in a manner that is equitable, see In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

RSA 458:16-a, II (Supp. 2023) requires the trial court to divide marital property, including marital debt, see Maldini v. Maldini, 168 N.H. 191, 195 (2015) (stating that “marital property” includes “marital debt” for purposes of property division), in a manner that is equitable, see In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

“The trial court’s statutory obligation is to apportion the property equitably.” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

The statute lists factors that the court may consider, see RSA 458:16-a, II, and also permits the court to consider any other factor it deems relevant, see RSA 458:16-a, II(o); see also In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

RSA 458:16-a, II (Supp. 2022) requires the trial court to divide marital property, including marital debt, see Maldini v. Maldini, 168 N.H. 191, 195 (2015) (stating that “marital property” includes “marital debt” for purposes of property division), in a manner that is equitable, see In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

RSA 458:16-a, II (Supp. 2022) requires the trial court to divide marital property, including marital debt, see Maldini v. Maldini, 168 N.H. 191, 195 (2015) (stating that “marital property” includes “marital debt” for purposes of property division), in a manner that is equitable, see In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

The statute lists factors that the court may consider, see RSA 458:16-a, II, and also permits the court to consider any other factor it deems relevant, see RSA 458:16-a, II(o); see also In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

The statute lists factors that the court may consider, see RSA 458:16-a, II, and also permits the court to consider any other factor it deems relevant, see RSA 458:16-a, II(o); see also In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

The trial court has discretion to allocate responsibility for debts in the manner it deems equitable, see In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, 327-28 (2007), and to require security for payments required by the decree, see In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 436-37 (2006).

The statute lists factors that the court may consider, see RSA 458:16-a, II, and also permits the court to consider any other factor it deems relevant, see RSA 458:16-a, II(o); see also In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

“Regardless of the source, all property owned by each spouse at the time of divorce is to be included in the marital estate.” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

Although the property division statute provides the trial court with discretion to consider acts that diminish the marital estate, see RSA 458:16-a, II(f) (2004), the trial court was not required to adjust the property division to account for the wife’s withdrawal, see In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006) (The trial court need not consider all of the statutory factors or give them equal weight.).

We have interpreted the statute to require that, “[a]bsent special circumstances, the court must make the distribution as equal as possible.” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 430 (2006).

“The plain meaning of ‘drunkard’ is ‘one who habitually becomes drunk[;] one suffering from or subject to acute or chronic alcoholism.’” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 429 (2006).

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

“The trial court’s statutory obligation is to apportion the property equitably.” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

“In a divorce proceeding, marital property is not to be divided by some mechanical formula but in a manner deemed ‘just’ based upon the evidence presented and the equities of the case.” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006) (quotation omitted).

“In a divorce proceeding, marital property is not to be divided by some mechanical formula but in a manner deemed ‘just’ based upon the evidence presented and the equities of the case.” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006) (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006).

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 436 (2006); In the Matter of Rossino & Rossino, 153 N.H. 367, 370 (2006).

RSA 170-C:5, VI (2002) (providing that “[incarceration in and of itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights”); cf. In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 436 (2006) (in divorce cases, parent’s loss of job because of his own wrongdoing does not constitute voluntary underemployment).

In light of Rossino, we subsequently vacated a trial court’s finding of voluntary underemployment “to the extent that the trial court found the [parent] to be voluntarily underemployed because he lost his job(s) due to his own wrongdoing.” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 436 (2006).

Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76 (1983) (holding that a change in financial condition “due to fault or voluntary wastage or dissipation of one’s talents and assets,” is not grounds for modification), superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized by In the Matter of Sarvela and Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 435 (2006), and In the Matter of Rossino and Rossino, 153 N.H. 367, 370 (2006); see also Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. 547, 549-50 (1961) (holding that obligations resulting from associating w

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 435 (2006).

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 436 (2006).

In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 429 (2006).