In the Matter of Samantha Curran and James Curran, Jr.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0686, In the Matter of Samantha Curran
and James Curran, Jr., the court on September 1, 2023, issued
the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The respondent, James Curran, Jr., appeals a final decree
issued by the Circuit Court (Forrest, J.) in his divorce from the petitioner,
Samantha Curran. On appeal, the respondent raises several arguments
challenging the trial court’s division of marital property. Specifically, the
respondent contends that the division of marital property was not equitable,
and that the trial court erred by: (1) awarding the marital home, in its entirety,
to the petitioner; (2) crediting the petitioner’s evidence concerning the value of
the marital home and the amount by which it is encumbered; and (3) allegedly
not equitably dividing the parties’ personal property and household
furnishings. The respondent further challenges the parenting plan entered by
the trial court, arguing that the court erred by awarding the petitioner sole
residential responsibility for the parties’ child, and by limiting his parenting
time to supervised visitation and telephone contact. We affirm.

The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a final decree of
divorce. In the Matter of Braunstein & Braunstein, 173 N.H. 38, 46 (2020).
The trial court’s discretion includes decisions concerning property division and
parenting rights and responsibilities. Id. We will not overturn the trial court’s
rulings on such matters absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion,
reviewing the record only to determine whether it contains an objective basis to
sustain the trial court’s discretionary judgments. Id. at 47. If the trial court
could reasonably have reached its findings on the evidence before it, they will
stand. Id. We defer to the trial court’s judgment in resolving conflicts in
testimony, evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, and determining the
weight of the evidence presented. Id. It is the burden of the appealing party,
here the respondent, to provide a record that is sufficient to decide the issues
raised on appeal, and in the absence of a transcript, we assume that the
evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings of fact. See Bean v.
Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004).

We first address the respondent’s challenges to the trial court’s division
of marital property. RSA 458:16-a, II (Supp. 2022) requires the trial court to
divide marital property, including marital debt, see Maldini v. Maldini, 168
N.H. 191, 195 (2015) (stating that “marital property” includes “marital debt” for
purposes of property division), in a manner that is equitable, see In the Matter
of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006). The trial court is required to
presume that an equal division of marital property is equitable unless it
determines, after considering one or more statutory factors, that an equal
division would not be equitable or appropriate. RSA 458:16-a, II; Sarvela, 154
N.H. at 430-31. The trial court need not consider all of the enumerated factors
or give them equal weight, and is not required to divide the property by some
mechanical formula, but in a manner it deems just based upon the evidence
presented and the equities of the case. Sarvela, 154 N.H. at 431. The trial
court may award a particular marital asset in its entirety to one party under
the statute. In the Matter of Henry & Henry, 163 N.H. 175, 183 (2012).

In this case, the trial court awarded the marital home to the petitioner
and allocated responsibility to pay all mortgage debt, taxes, insurance costs,
and other associated expenses to her, finding that the property is encumbered
by a mortgage, and that the petitioner, as custodial parent of the parties’ minor
child, needs to occupy the property for the child’s benefit. See RSA 458:16-a,
II(e) (trial court may consider the need of the custodial parent to occupy or own
the marital residence in effecting an unequal division of property). The trial
court further found that the respondent’s ability to pay child support “is highly
questionable, at best,” observing that he testified that he believes he “is
disabled” and “unable to work a regular wage job,” that he had paid only $50 in
child support throughout the divorce, and that he listed his self-employment
income at between $0 and $400 per week. As to the petitioner’s financial
resources, the trial court found that her gross monthly income from two jobs is
$2,962 per month, that she receives food stamps of $300 per month, and that
she and the child are covered by Medicaid. See RSA 458:16-a, II(b) (trial court
may consider, among other factors, the health, economic status, occupation,
vocational skills, employability, amount and sources of income, and the needs
and liabilities of each party). With respect to personal property, the trial court
awarded one car to the petitioner, a motorcycle and any motor vehicles in his
possession to the respondent, and certain household furniture, furnishings,
and personal effects in the possession of either party to that party. The trial
court additionally awarded certain specific items of personal property in the
petitioner’s possession to the respondent.

We note that the respondent has not provided a transcript of the final
hearing, or copies of any of the exhibits introduced at the final hearing.
Accordingly, we assume that the evidence supports the trial court’s findings
with respect to the valuation and division of marital property. See Bean, 151
N.H. at 250. Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s
valuation and division of marital property amounted to an unsustainable
exercise of its discretion. Braunstein, 173 N.H. at 47. We note that, to the
extent the respondent is contending that the petitioner did not comply with the
property division terms of the final decree with respect to items of personal
property awarded to him, this order is without prejudice to the respondent

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seeking whatever relief may be available from the trial court with respect to
enforcing such terms.

We next address the respondent’s challenges to the parenting plan.
“When determining matters of child custody, a trial court’s overriding concern
is the best interest of the child.” In the Matter of Miller & Todd, 161 N.H. 630,
640 (2011) (quotation omitted); see RSA 461-A:6 (Supp. 2022). Because
resolution of the best interest of a child largely depends upon the firsthand
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court’s findings on such
matters are binding upon us if the evidence supports them. In the Matter of
Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011).

Although it is the policy of this State to “[s]upport frequent and
continuing contact between each child and both parents” following a divorce,
RSA 461-A:2, I(a) (2018); see Miller & Todd, 161 N.H. at 640, here, the trial
court specifically found, based upon the evidence presented at the final
hearing, that frequent and continuing contact between the child and the
respondent was not in the child’s best interest. In the absence of a transcript
or copies of the exhibits submitted at the final hearing, we assume that the
evidence supports this finding. Bean, 151 N.H. at 250. Upon this record, we
cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by
awarding sole residential responsibility for the parties’ child to the petitioner,
and by limiting the respondent’s parenting time to supervised visitation and
telephone contact. Braunstein, 173 N.H. at 46-47.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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