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[¶27] We further reasoned in Etienne that our prior decision in State v. Vassar, 154 N.H. 370 (2006), supported our construction of RSA 627:4, II as implicitly requiring reasonable necessity to justify the use of deadly force.

(quotation omitted); see also State v. Vassar, 154 N.H. 370, 373 (2006) (holding that a trial court’s decision not to give a particular jury instruction is reviewed under the unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

The person “may use a degree of such force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose.” RSA 627:4, I. A belief that is unreasonable, even though honest, will not support the defense.

A belief that is unreasonable, even though honest, will not support the defense.

We review the trial court’s decision not to give a jury instruction for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

State v. Pugliese, 122 N.H. 1141, 1146 (1982) (“A defendant asserting the defense of self-defense to a homicide charge tacitly admits the killing was intentional but claims it was justified or excused for some reason as defined by our Criminal Code.”); cf. State v. Vassar, 154 N.H. 370, 376 (2006) (describing self-defense as a “justification” claim).

“We review the trial court’s decision not to give a jury instruction for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” State v. Vassar, 154 N.H. 370, 373 (2006).

A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on his theory of defense if there is some evidence in the record that would support a rational finding in favor of the defense.

Although we have held that a “trial court must grant a defendant’s requested instruction on a specific defense if there is some evidence to support a rational finding in favor of that defense,” State v. Vassar, 154 N.H. 370, 373 (2006), this requirement presumes that the requested instruction is legally available in light of the charged offense and the evidence adduced at trial.

“The trial court must grant a defendant’s requested jury instruction on a specific defense if there is some evidence to support a rational finding in favor of that defense.” State v. Vassar, 154 N.H. 370, 373 (2006) (emphasis added).

Absent a clearer legislative indication, we will not construe a statute to change the common law.” Most recently, in State v. Vassar, 154 N.H. 370 (2006), we reasoned that the “jury could have concluded from the testimony that the defendant reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to stave off the threat of ‘unlawful, deadly force,’ ” and that the defendant was therefore entitled to a self-defense instruction.

However, rather than remand the matter for a new ruling, because the issue presented is a question of law, we choose, in the interest of judicial economy, to address the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.

We will search the record for evidence supporting the defendant’s requested jury instruction.