State v. Collins

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Rockingham
Case No. 2022-0736
Citation: State v. Collins, 2024 N.H. 22

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

v.

TEAGAN DAVID COLLINS

Argued: March 28, 2024
Opinion Issued: May 14, 2024

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor
general (Elizabeth C. Woodcock, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief
and orally), for the State.

Pamela E. Phelan, senior assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the
brief and orally, for the defendant.

DONOVAN, J.

¶1 Following a jury trial in Superior Court (English, J.), the defendant,
Teagan David Collins, was convicted on two counts of criminal threatening: one
count alleging criminal threatening with a deadly weapon, see RSA 631:4, I(a)
(2016); RSA 625:11, V (2016), and one count alleging criminal threatening
against a law enforcement officer, see RSA 631:4, I(d) (2016); RSA 651:6, I(g)
(Supp. 2023). He was also convicted of misdemeanor disorderly conduct. See
RSA 644:2 (2016). On appeal, he challenges only his conviction for criminal
threatening with a deadly weapon, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on self-defense. We affirm.

¶2 At trial, the following evidence was presented to the jury. On the
evening of October 29, 2021, the defendant went to a restaurant and nightclub
in Portsmouth with his coworkers. The defendant was told that he could not
have a drink on the dance floor. Later, after receiving complaints regarding the
defendant’s behavior, the nightclub’s head of security told the defendant to
leave the nightclub and escorted him to the building’s exit.

¶3 Shortly thereafter, the head of security and another employee
responded to an “altercation” in front of the building involving the defendant.
The head of security spoke with the defendant and explained that he could not
reenter the nightclub that night. The defendant claimed that he was “cordial”
during this interaction, but the head of security testified that the defendant
was upset and “became enraged.” The head of security offered to buy the
defendant a drink if he returned to the nightclub another night, and the
defendant walked back to his car. Once he returned to his car, the defendant
realized that he had left his debit card and jacket behind at the nightclub. He
then decided to retrieve a firearm from his car and return to the nightclub to
search for his debit card and jacket.

¶4 The testimony of the defendant and the head of security regarding
subsequent events differed. According to the head of security, when the
defendant returned to the nightclub, he told the defendant that he was not
allowed to reenter, to which the defendant responded by saying, “[Y]ou think I
care? I don’t -- I don’t f***ing care,” and by revealing the firearm tucked into
his waistband. The head of security testified that the defendant grabbed the
firearm, moved it up and down, looked back at him, and said, “it’d only take
one shot.” The head of security then instructed another employee to call the
police. The defendant denied revealing the firearm at that time or telling the
head of security that “it’d only take one shot.” Rather, the defendant testified
that, upon returning to the nightclub, he was told that he could not retrieve his
debit card but could return the following day. However, the defendant
explained that he spoke with an acquaintance outside the nightclub who
agreed to retrieve the defendant’s belongings for him. The defendant testified
that, while he was waiting, the head of security approached him, was “inches
from [his] face,” and began “escalating the . . . situation.”

¶5 Once the acquaintance returned the defendant’s debit card to him,
the defendant walked away and the head of security and another employee
followed him from the building. According to the head of security, he followed

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the defendant from “a decent distance,” but closely enough so that he could
point out the defendant to the police. The other nightclub employee testified
that he followed the defendant on the opposite side of the street for
approximately one block. The defendant testified that the two employees
following him were within approximately ten feet. While walking up the street
ahead of the employees, the defendant, who explained that he “believed [he]
was acting within [his] rights,” lifted up his shirt to reveal the firearm tucked
into his waistband. The defendant testified that he revealed the firearm to the
two employees “to let [them] know that they should stop following,” but he
denied putting his hand on the firearm. Soon after, the police intercepted the
defendant, and he realized that he was “someone they were looking for.”

¶6 The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with, as
relevant here, one count of criminal threatening with a deadly weapon. The
indictment alleged, inter alia, that the defendant “placed or attempted to place
[the nightclub’s head of security] in fear of imminent bodily injury or physical
contact” by “displaying a handgun and/or placing his hand on a displayed
handgun and saying to [the head of security] ‘You don’t even know,’ and/or ‘It
would only take one shot.’”

¶7 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a notice of defense of justification,
stating that he intended to rely on the doctrines of self-defense and defense of
property. In the notice, the defendant argued that “[t]o the extent that [he]
‘brandished’ the gun, he did so only to the extent that he reasonably believed to
be necessary for purposes of defending himself and his personal property” and
that he believed that, “by informing those present that he had a gun[,] he
would be protecting himself from harm and deescalating the situation.”

¶8 At trial, the head of security and another employee of the nightclub,
the defendant, and several other witnesses testified. At the close of evidence,
the trial court heard arguments on the defendant’s request for a jury
instruction on self-defense and defense of property. The court denied the
request, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the nightclub employees
unlawfully held his property by preventing him from entering to retrieve his
debit card and jacket. Regarding the self-defense instruction, the trial court
concluded that “what was missing is evidence that [the defendant] reasonably
believed there was going to be an imminent use of unlawful, nondeadly force by
such other person.” The court reasoned that “there has to be something more
than just that he felt threatened.” The jury subsequently convicted the
defendant of, as relevant here, criminal threatening with a deadly weapon.
This appeal followed.

¶9 On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it
denied his request to instruct the jury on the display of a firearm as a means of
self-defense. As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree as to the proper

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standard of review. The defendant, relying on State v. Woodburn, 175 N.H.
645, 651 (2023), argues that we should review the trial court’s decision de
novo. The State asserts that we should apply our unsustainable exercise of
discretion standard. See State v. Cavanaugh, 174 N.H. 1, 7 (2020) (“We review
the trial court’s decision not to give a jury instruction for an unsustainable
exercise of discretion.”). However, we need not decide the proper standard of
review in this case because the defendant’s challenge fails under either
standard.

¶10 Self-defense is a pure defense under New Hampshire law. Id. at 8.
When evidence of self-defense is admitted, conduct negating the defense
becomes an element of the charged offense that the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. Therefore, a trial court must grant a defendant’s
requested jury instruction on a specific defense such as self-defense if there is
“some evidence” to support a rational finding in favor of it. Woodburn, 175
N.H. at 651 (quotation omitted).

¶11 Subject to exceptions not applicable in this case, RSA 627:4, I,
provides that “[a] person is justified in using non-deadly force upon another
person in order to defend himself . . . from what he reasonably believes to be
the imminent use of unlawful, non-deadly force by such other person.” “Non-
deadly force” is defined as “any assault or confinement which does not
constitute deadly force. The act of producing or displaying a weapon shall
constitute non-deadly force.” RSA 627:9, IV (2016); see also RSA 627:9, II
(2016) (defining “[d]eadly force” as “any assault or confinement which the actor
commits with the purpose of causing or which he knows to create a substantial
risk of causing death or serious bodily injury”). The person “may use a degree
of such force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose.”
RSA 627:4, I. A belief that is unreasonable, even though honest, will not
support the defense. State v. Vassar, 154 N.H. 370, 374 (2006).

¶12 The defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to find
that there was “some evidence” that he reasonably believed the nightclub
employees posed an imminent threat of the use of non-deadly force to him.
Specifically, he asserts that there was evidence that the two employees
threatened him by following him on the street. He contends that any
inconsistencies or contradictions about the strength of the evidence are a
matter for the jury, not the trial court, to decide, and therefore the trial court’s
refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense constitutes reversible error.

¶13 However, the criminal threatening indictment challenged on appeal
alleged that the defendant “placed or attempted to place [the nightclub’s head
of security] in fear of imminent bodily injury or physical contact” by “displaying
a handgun and/or placing his hand on a displayed handgun in his waistband
and saying to [the head of security] ‘You don’t even know,’ and/or ‘It would

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only take one shot,’ or words to that effect.” Accordingly, the indictment
alleged that the defendant committed the crime when he confronted the head of
security at the nightclub’s entrance and not at any point thereafter. Thus, the
relevant inquiry is whether the defendant reasonably believed that displaying
the firearm when he was at the door of the nightclub attempting to gain reentry
to retrieve his property was reasonably necessary to counter the imminent use
of non-deadly force at that time.

¶14 More importantly, the defendant denied engaging in the specific
conduct alleged in the indictment. Instead, he maintains that he was cordial
with the employees, “wasn’t trying to escalate anything,” and simply walked
away from the confrontation. A defense of justification requires that the
defendant admit the substance of the allegation. State v. Noucas, 165 N.H.
146, 155-56 (2013). Here, the defendant offered no such admission. A
defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on a proffered defense when he
simply presents evidence of a different factual scenario than that presented by
the State. Id. In other words, the defendant asked the jury to disbelieve the
testimony of the head of security and to believe instead his testimony that he
displayed the firearm only when he walked away from the nightclub and was
followed by two employees. Pursuant to our precedents, the defendant was not
entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense under these circumstances, and
we conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on
the defendant’s theory of the case.

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred;
HANTZ MARCONI, J., sat for oral argument but subsequently disqualified
herself and did not participate in further review of the case.

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