State of New Hampshire v. Kile A. Madsen

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0663, State of New Hampshire v. Kile A.
Madsen, the court on June 12, 2024, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on
appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct.
R. 20(2). The defendant, Kile A. Madsen, appeals his convictions, following a
multi-day jury trial in Superior Court (Temple, J.), on one felony count of theft by
unauthorized taking, see RSA 637:3 (2016), and one felony count of conspiracy
to commit theft by unauthorized taking, see RSA 629:3 (2016). The defendant
advances two arguments challenging his convictions, which we will address in
turn. We affirm.

In this case, the basis of the defendant’s convictions was that he, in
concert with his wife, exercised unauthorized control over funds belonging to his
elderly father, who suffered from dementia, and then used those funds on
unauthorized purchases which were to his, and his wife’s, benefit. At trial, the
defendant requested jury instructions relative to the definition of mental
“competency.” The trial court denied the defendant’s request, ruling that a
finding as to the victim’s competency was not required as an element of the
charged crimes, nor of the sentencing enhancement sought by the State. See
RSA 637:3 (theft); RSA 629:3 (conspiracy); RSA 651:6, I(l) (2016) (providing a
sentencing enhancement when victim is 65 years of age or older, or has a
physical or mental disability, and defendant intended to take advantage of that
condition). Thus, the court concluded that to instruct the jury as to the legal
concept of competency, when it was not an essential issue for the jury to resolve,
would create unnecessary confusion for the jury.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his
request for a “competency” instruction because the victim’s competency was in
question, and because the victim’s competency was relevant to the ultimate issue
of whether the victim had authorized the defendant to use the victim’s funds.
See RSA 637:3. We disagree.

“The necessity and the particular scope and wording of a jury instruction
generally fall within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Boggs, 171
N.H. 115, 122 (2018). “The purpose of a trial court’s jury instructions is to state
and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law
applicable to the case.” State v. Gribble, 165 N.H. 1, 29 (2013). Thus, “[w]hen
reviewing jury instructions, we determine whether the instructions adequately
and accurately explain each element of the offense and reverse only if the
instructions did not fairly cover the issues of law arising in the case.” Id.
Accordingly, “[w]e review the trial court’s decisions on these matters for an
unsustainable exercise of discretion,” and, to prevail, “the defendant must
demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the
prejudice of his case.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also State v. Vassar, 154 N.H.
370, 373 (2006) (holding that a trial court’s decision not to give a particular jury
instruction is reviewed under the unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

We can discern no error in the trial court’s decision. Here, the pertinent
question before the jury was whether the victim had authorized the defendant’s
use of the funds. See RSA 637:3. Although the victim’s state of mind, and, by
extension, his mental competency, was relevant to that question as a factual
matter, the jury was not tasked with making a finding as to the victim’s legal
competency, because, as the trial court correctly ruled, that is not a required
element of the charged offenses nor of the requested sentencing enhancement.
See RSA 637:3; RSA 629:3; RSA 651:6, I(l). Accordingly, given that the parties
were permitted to adduce considerable evidence as to the victim’s mental
capacity, and to argue the issue in their closing arguments, we conclude that the
trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by declining to give the
requested instruction. See Boggs, 171 N.H. at 122; Gribble, 165 N.H. at 29;
Vassar, 154 N.H. at 373.

Next, we consider the defendant’s argument that the State failed to
introduce sufficient evidence to prove that his use of the victim’s funds was
“unauthorized.” He argues that the relevant evidence adduced was all
circumstantial, and that it failed to foreclose the reasonable conclusion that the
victim authorized the defendant’s use of the funds out of generosity toward his
son, and gratitude for the defendant’s assistance in defeating a guardianship
petition brought by another of the victim’s adult children, and for the defendant’s
assistance in maintaining the victim in his own home, where he wished to
continue living. Even assuming, without deciding, that the evidence was solely
circumstantial, we disagree with the defendant.

“A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a question of law,
which we review de novo.” State v. Seibel, 174 N.H. 440, 445 (2021). Where the
defendant challenges a finding for which the record contains only circumstantial
evidence, “the defendant must establish that the evidence fails to exclude all
reasonable conclusions except guilt.” Id. “The proper analysis is not whether the
evidence excludes every possible conclusion consistent with innocence, but
whether it has excluded all reasonable conclusions other than guilt.” Id. “We do
not determine whether the defendant has suggested another possible hypothesis
that could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion.” Id. “Rather, we
evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and determine
whether the alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational trier
of fact could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

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“Where solely circumstantial evidence is at issue, the critical question is whether,
even assuming all credibility resolutions in favor of the State, the inferential
chain of circumstances is of sufficient strength that guilt is the sole rational
conclusion.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted).

Here, based upon our review, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, foreclosed any reasonable conclusion that the
victim authorized the defendant to make these expenditures. For example, there
was ample evidence demonstrating that, once the victim’s cognitive ability
declined, the spending of the defendant, and his wife, increased; that that
spending — which amounted to tens of thousands of dollars spent on casino
trips, cosmetics products, and related items — was drastically out of character
for the victim; and that it was inconsistent with the victim’s longstanding
financial plan not to “run out of money before [he] ran out of time.”

Additionally, the evidence demonstrates that the defendant lied to the
victim’s financial institution when requesting transfers from the victim’s account.
Although he stated that the funds would be used for various purposes for the
benefit of the victim, a significant portion of those funds was actually used for the
benefit of the defendant and his wife. Further, both the defendant and his wife
made misleading and contradictory statements to police and other investigators
when asked about the relevant accounts, their use of the funds, the victim’s
cognitive ability, and whether or not the victim participated in the numerous
casino trips and other expenditures. Such statements are evidence of the
defendant’s consciousness of guilt, and further negate the reasonableness of the
notion that the victim authorized the expenditures.

Although the defendant highlights circumstances that may have given the
victim “reason to treat [the defendant] generously,” the evidence he references to
support his assertion that the victim actually authorized the expenditures at
issue amounts to statements he and his wife made to investigators to the effect
that they showed bills and bank statements to the victim — who, as noted, was
elderly and suffered from dementia — and that he “never objected to any of the
expenditures.” Regardless of whether or not such evidence could support a
reasonable finding that the victim actually authorized the expenditures, under
our standard of review, we must “assum[e] all credibility resolutions in favor of
the State,” Seibel, 174 N.H. at 445 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Folley, 172 N.H. 760, 769-70 (2020).

Accordingly, based upon our review of the evidence, we conclude that the
defendant’s alternative exculpatory hypothesis — that the victim supposedly
authorized the expenditures at issue — is not sufficiently reasonable to prevent a
rational trier of fact from finding proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Here,
“the inferential chain of circumstances is of sufficient strength that guilt is the
sole rational conclusion.” Seibel, 174 N.H. at 445 (quotation omitted); see also

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Folley, 172 N.H. at 767-70 (holding, on very similar facts, that the circumstantial
evidence introduced by the State was sufficient to prove lack of authorization,
and that the defendants’ alternative explanation, that the victim authorized their
use of the money because she wanted to repay them for all that they had done for
her and help them “in their time of need,” was not reasonable).

Affirmed.

Bassett and Countway, JJ., concurred; Nadeau, J., retired superior court
chief justice, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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