Cited by

State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62-63 (1999) (clarifying standard of review applicable to custody determinations on similar grounds).

The defendant argues that a criminal act “‘consists of the sum of discrete actions that together constitute an offense,’” and that a court should consider time, location, or intended purpose when identifying an act.

When we conduct our appellate review, the trial court’s findings of historical fact, that is, its determination of “what happened,” are entitled to the deference we normally accord its factual findings.

“The trial court is in a better position than we to assess the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62 (1999); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (“The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.”).

v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011)); see also State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62 (1999) (explaining that “the trial court’s findings of historical facts relevant to the question of custody, that is, its determinations of ‘what happened,’” are entitled to the deference normally given to factual findings).

In a custody analysis, “‘the crucial question entails an evaluation made after determination of the historical facts: if encountered by a “reasonable person,” would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda?’” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 63 (1999) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113 (1995)) (brackets omitted).

On appeal, we recognize that the custody determination “is a law- dominated mixed question in which ‘the crucial question entails an evaluation made after [the] determination of [the historical facts]: if encountered by a “reasonable person,” would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda?’” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62-63 (1999) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113 (1995)).

Our standard of review on appeal recognizes that the custody determination “is a law-dominated mixed question in which ‘the crucial question entails an evaluation made after determination of the historical facts: if encountered by a “reasonable person,” would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda?’” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62-63 (1999) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113 (1995)) (brackets omitted).

State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 226 (1989) (“We will not overturn the superior court’s decision on appeal simply because we might have ruled differently.”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 8 62-63 (1999), and State v. Spencer, 149 N.H. 622, 625 (2003).

“Because the ultimate determination of custody requires an application of a legal standard to historical facts, it is not merely a factual question but a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62 (1999).

State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62 (1999) (quotation omitted).

Compare State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 60 (1999) (holding that under the New Hampshire Constitution the State must “prove the voluntariness of [a] defendant’s statements beyond a reasonable doubt”), with Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1972) (holding that under the Federal Constitution the State must prove the voluntariness of a defendant’s statemen

We focus upon whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.

We focus upon whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.

“Because the ultimate determination of custody requires an application-of a legal standard to historical facts, it is not merely a factual question but a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62 (1999).

Although we will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the ultimate determination of custody de novo.

In light of our holding in State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57 (1999), however, we find it necessary to clarify our standard of review.

Because “the Federal Constitution affords no greater protection than the State Constitution with regard to the defendant’s rights under Miranda, we will not undertake a separate federal analysis.” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 63 (1999).

Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 282 (1992) (mixed questions of law and fact concern the application of a rule of law to the facts and the consequent determination of whether the rule is satisfied); see also State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62 (1999).

Because we have established that the Federal Constitution affords no greater protection than the State Constitution with regard to the defendant’s rights under Miranda, we will not undertake a separate federal analysis.

State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 61 (1999) (determination of voluntariness in context of criminal confession relies on unique position of fact-finder).

A defendant is also placed in double jeopardy if he is charged with both a lesser-included offense and the greater offense and both offenses derive from the same criminal act.

On July 21,1999, this court issued its opinion in State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57 (1999), holding that “when an individual is incarcerated for an offense unrelated to the subject of his interrogation, custody for Miranda purposes occurs when there is some act or circumstance that places additional limitations on the prisoner.” Id.

“Because our State Constitution affords greater protection to a criminal defendant than the Federal Constitution in requiring the State to prove the voluntariness of the defendant’s statements beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, we need not undertake a separate federal analysis.” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 60 (1999); see also N.H. CONST. pt.

“[While] we will not overturn the factual findings [of the trial court] unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the ultimate determination of custody de novo.” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 63, 738 A.2d 937, 942 (1999).

“[Although we will not overturn the factual findings [of the trial court] unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the ultimate determination of custody de novo.” State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 63, 738 A.2d 937, 942 (1999).