State v. Clegg

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Merrimack
Case No. 2024-0034
Citation: State v. Clegg, 2026 N.H. 11

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

v.

LOGAN CLEGG

Argued: November 12, 2025
Opinion Issued: March 17, 2026

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor
general (Audriana Mekula, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally),
for the State.

Thomas Barnard, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the
brief and orally, for the defendant.

PER CURIAM

¶1 Following a jury trial in Superior Court (Kissinger, J.), the defendant,
Logan Clegg, appeals his convictions on two counts of knowing second degree
murder, see RSA 630:1-b, I(a) (2016), four counts of falsifying physical

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evidence, see RSA 641:6, I (2016), and one count of being a felon in possession
of a firearm, see RSA 159:3, I (2023), arising out of the fatal shooting of the two
victims. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) relied upon
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement to deny his
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless searches of
data from his cell phone carrier; (2) admitted at trial lay opinion testimony
about certain photographs; and (3) struck certain testimony about the
certification testing performance of a police dog trained to detect gunpowder.
Because we agree with the defendant that the trial court erred in relying upon
exigency grounds to deny his motion to suppress, we vacate the suppression
ruling and remand.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 For the purposes of reviewing the trial court’s denial of the motion to
suppress, we accept the trial court’s findings where supported by the
suppression record. See State v. Ruiz, 170 N.H. 553, 555 (2018). On the
afternoon of April 18, 2022, the victims were fatally shot while walking on a
trail in the Broken Ground Trail System (trail system) in Concord. The victims,
who were husband and wife, were reported missing on April 20 and the
Concord Police Department (CPD) began investigating their disappearance.
During a search of the trail system and surrounding area on April 20, officers
located a tent site that was occupied by a man who identified himself as Arthur
Kelly. On April 21, officers discovered the victims’ bodies hidden in a natural
depression under leaves and other debris in a wooded area of the trail system.

¶3 The next day, officers returned to the Arthur Kelly tent site and
found that it had been “completely cleared.” By reviewing surveillance footage
from nearby businesses and through subsequent investigation, CPD concluded
that the man who identified himself as Arthur Kelly was, in fact, the defendant.
CPD also learned that the defendant had a criminal history, including an
outstanding warrant for his arrest for absconding from probation in Utah, that
he had been in possession of a firearm at the time of two prior arrests, and that
he had previously traveled to Europe. After further investigation, CPD
ultimately identified the defendant as the murder suspect based upon, among
other things, his purchases at nearby businesses prior to and immediately
following the victims’ deaths, his provision of the false Arthur Kelly identity to
officers while at a tent site near the crime scene, and an eyewitness description
of the shooter that was consistent with the defendant’s appearance.

¶4 On October 3, 2022, CPD discovered that, on May 15, an “Arthur
Kelly” had traveled to Burlington, Vermont. Despite an investigation of that
area, CPD found no evidence of a person using either the defendant’s name or
his alias.

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[¶5] As of October 11, CPD had not located the defendant. At
approximately noon that day, a Utah police detective notified CPD that
Homeland Security had informed him that the defendant had “booked a flight
to Berlin, Germany from JFK airport in New York scheduled to depart on
October 14, 2022 at 12:30 a.m.” Homeland Security then sent CPD the
defendant’s flight booking information at 4:41 p.m. that afternoon. The
booking information included an address of a Burlington post office and a
phone number, which CPD confirmed belonged to a legitimate Verizon account.

¶6 Believing that the defendant intended to leave the country in
approximately 56 hours, CPD attempted to ascertain his location by requesting
from Verizon location data connected to his phone number. CPD was “under
the impression that a request to Verizon made with a warrant could take days
or weeks to process before cell phone location data would be produced.”
(Emphasis added.) Consequently, CPD submitted three warrantless requests
to Verizon through its exigency hotline over the next 17 hours.

¶7 Within thirty minutes of learning of the phone number, CPD
submitted an exigency request to Verizon for “ping” data connected to the
phone number. Ping data provides “the radius from the phone to the cell tower
it most recently connected to.” Verizon approved the request and provided ping
data showing that the phone was active in Burlington, Vermont in a wooded
area near hiking trails. Verizon then sent CPD emails with updated ping data
every fifteen minutes.

¶8 CPD made a second exigency request to Verizon around 7:00 p.m.,
seeking “text messaging details” that would identify any phone numbers that
texted, or received texts from, the defendant’s phone number (historical data).
At around the same time, CPD dispatched two officers to Burlington. The
officers arrived there at 11:00 p.m. and searched certain locations for the
defendant, including the bus station. The officers did not search in the wooded
area, however, as such a search was deemed unsafe at that time. The officers
then slept for “a few hours at a hotel.” Also during the evening and late night
hours of October 11, a detective applied for, and was granted, a search warrant
to use a cell site simulator device belonging to federal law enforcement, which
could help pinpoint the location of the defendant’s phone. CPD ultimately
never used that device.

¶9 By the next morning, October 12, CPD had learned through the
second exigency request that the defendant’s phone had received a text
message from an employee at a Burlington grocery store. Officers located the
defendant at the grocery store at approximately 9:30 a.m. and, after tracking
him, arrested him for the Utah probation violation. Meanwhile, also on the
morning of October 12, CPD made a third exigency request to Verizon, this
time for “Range to Tower” (RTT) data, to determine a more precise location for
the phone. CPD did not use the RTT data to locate the defendant.

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[¶10] The defendant was later arrested for the victims’ murders and
indicted on two counts of knowing second degree murder, two alternative
counts of reckless second degree murder, four counts of falsifying physical
evidence, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to
trial, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the
warrantless ping, historical data, and RTT searches of data from his cell phone
carrier. The trial court denied his motion following a three-day suppression
hearing. It concluded that the searches were lawful pursuant to the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

¶11 Specifically, the trial court found that the police had probable
cause to believe that the defendant’s location “would be found from a search of
cell phone location data of the phone number” and that the data would aid in
the defendant’s apprehension. It further determined that the State had proved
that an exigency existed based on the following circumstances: the defendant
was a “strong suspect” for the victims’ murders; there was evidence that he
would soon attempt to flee the country or otherwise continue to avoid
apprehension; there was a substantial likelihood that the defendant would
discard the murder weapon before fleeing; the defendant was likely armed;
given the random nature of the murders, the defendant might “randomly
endanger others”; the officers “acted reasonably leading up to the exigency
requests” to Verizon; and the exigency was not foreseeable. Based upon these
circumstances, the trial court ruled that “the police faced a compelling need for
immediate action” and that “there was a grave risk that the delay of even a few
hours caused by seeking a search warrant would create a substantial threat of
imminent danger to life or public safety and a likelihood that evidence would be
destroyed” or that the defendant would evade apprehension. Because the trial
court relied upon exigency grounds to deny the motion, it did not address the
State’s alternative argument that the contested evidence was admissible under
the inevitable discovery doctrine.

¶12 At the subsequent jury trial, evidence obtained as a result of the
defendant’s apprehension was admitted, including a firearm found in the
defendant’s possession. The jury convicted the defendant of all charges. This
appeal followed.

II. Appellate Arguments and Standard of Review

¶13 The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because no exigency existed to justify the warrantless
searches of data from his cell phone carrier. Consequently, he contends that
the searches violated his state and federal constitutional rights. See N.H.
CONST. pt. I, arts. 2-b, 19; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. We first address the
defendant’s claim under the State Constitution and rely upon federal law only
to aid our analysis. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). The defendant
cites Part I, Article 19 and Part I, Article 2-b of the State Constitution in

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support of his argument. Because we conclude that the defendant prevails
under Part I, Article 19, we need not address his claim under Part I, Article 2-b.

¶14 Part I, Article 19 provides that “[e]very subject hath a right to be
secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses,
his papers, and all his possessions.” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19. Under this
provision, a warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, and evidence
derived from such a search or seizure is inadmissible, unless the search or
seizure falls within the narrow confines of a judicially crafted exception to the
warrant requirement. See State v. Robinson, 158 N.H. 792, 797 (2009); State
v. Gay, 169 N.H. 232, 240 (2016). The State bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search or seizure falls within
one of these exceptions. See Gay, 169 N.H. at 240. “One such exception exists
for exigent circumstances that make it impracticable to obtain a warrant.”
State v. Graca, 142 N.H. 670, 673 (1998). This “exigent circumstances”
exception has two elements: probable cause and exigent circumstances. Gay,
169 N.H. at 240. The defendant does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion
that the State satisfied the probable cause element. Accordingly, we need not
address probable cause, and we instead focus upon whether exigent
circumstances existed.1

¶15 “Exigent circumstances exist where the police face a compelling
need for immediate official action and a risk that the delay caused by obtaining
a search warrant would create a substantial threat of imminent danger to life
or public safety or likelihood that evidence will be destroyed.” Id. at 241
(quotation and emphasis omitted). “Whether a situation is sufficiently urgent
to permit a warrantless search depends upon the totality of the circumstances .
. . .” Id. Our totality of the circumstances review includes an examination of
how the exigency came about and the overall reasonableness of the officers’
conduct prior to the search. See Robinson, 158 N.H. at 798. Other
circumstances that may be especially relevant where, as here, the police
conduct a warrantless search to apprehend a suspect include: the danger of
imminent destruction of evidence; the gravity of the offense; the likelihood the
suspect is armed; the need to prevent a suspect’s escape; and the risk of
danger to the police or other persons. See Gay, 169 N.H. at 241; see also
Robinson, 158 N.H. at 799-801 (declining to adopt six-factor “fleeing suspect”
exigency test but considering relevant factors as part of totality of the
circumstances analysis). No single factor controls. See Gay, 169 N.H. at 241.

¶16 As a threshold matter, the parties disagree about the standard of
review we should apply in reviewing the trial court’s ruling that exigent
circumstances existed. The State contends that this court has long recognized

1 It is worth noting that the State does not contest that, absent exigent circumstances, CPD was
required to obtain a warrant to seek the defendant’s cell phone data from Verizon.

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that “[w]hether exigent circumstances exist is largely a question of fact to be
determined by the trial court” and that we therefore will not disturb that
finding “unless clearly erroneous.” State v. MacDonald, 129 N.H. 13, 21
(1986). The defendant concedes that exigency is “largely” a question of fact but
points out that this phrase implies that there is a legal component to the
analysis. He asserts that our general standard of review for suppression
decisions applies equally here and, accordingly, we should review the trial
court’s factual findings for clear error and its ultimate legal conclusion — that
exigent circumstances existed — de novo.

¶17 We first stated that exigency “is largely a question of fact” and
applied the “clearly erroneous” standard of review to exigency determinations
in MacDonald, relying upon federal law. Id. We subsequently reiterated that
exigency is “largely a question of fact” and characterized MacDonald as
“implying that determinations of whether exigent circumstances exist also
involve questions of law.” Graca, 142 N.H. at 673. We have since, however,
never clarified whether and to what extent this determination involves a
question of law, and we have, at times, inconsistently stated or applied the
standard set forth in MacDonald. See, e.g., State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798,
804 (1991) (omitting the word “largely”); State v. Pseudae, 154 N.H. 196, 201
(2006) (comparing “facts of this case” to “the level of urgency demonstrated in
previous cases” in a manner akin to de novo review). We therefore take this
opportunity to clarify our standard of review for exigency determinations.

¶18 Although highly fact-specific, a determination of exigency ultimately
requires the application of an objective legal standard to historical facts. See
State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580 (1979) (stating that a warrantless
entry may be sustained under the exigency exception if “the officers’ perception
of the emergency was reasonably grounded in the facts known to them at the
time” (emphasis added)); Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2017)
(explaining that “bottom-line question” in exigency inquiry “is whether
a reasonable officer would have thought, given the facts known to him, that the
situation he encountered presented some meaningful exigency”). The exigency
inquiry therefore presents a mixed question of fact and law. Cf. State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57, 62-63 (1999) (clarifying standard of review applicable to custody
determinations on similar grounds). Similar to our analysis of whether a
person is in custody for Miranda purposes, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), whether exigent circumstances exist “is a law-dominated mixed
question in which the crucial question entails an evaluation made after
determination of the historical facts.” Ford, 144 N.H. at 62-63 (quotation and
brackets omitted). Accordingly, we will accept the trial court’s factual findings
unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous, and we will
now review de novo the trial court’s ultimate determination of whether, based
upon the totality of the circumstances, exigent circumstances existed. See
Robinson, 158 N.H. at 795; cf. Ford, 144 N.H. at 62-63.

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III. Analysis

¶19 Having clarified the applicable standard of review, we turn to
applying the legal standard of exigency to this case. The defendant argues that
the totality of the circumstances does not support the trial court’s exigency
ruling; the State argues to the contrary. Because the trial court and the
parties focused upon whether exigent circumstances existed at the time of
CPD’s initial exigency request to Verizon, we also examine the totality of the
circumstances at that point in time. We agree with the defendant that the trial
court erred in determining that the circumstances were exigent.

¶20 We first consider the trial court’s finding that CPD’s conduct
leading up to the initial exigency request was reasonable and the court’s
assessment of the delay that would have been caused by obtaining a warrant.
The trial court explained that “[w]hile police could have applied for a warrant
prior to making the exigency request, officers were under the impression that a
request to Verizon made with a warrant could take days or weeks to process
before cell phone location data would be produced.” (Emphasis added.)
Although the defendant argued that the officers’ impression was mistaken
because the officers “could have obtained a warrant and then made the same
exigency requests,” the trial court rejected that argument by saying that “it was
reasonable for the officers to rely on their personal experience in determining
how long it would take to receive location data from Verizon.” The trial court
thereby implicitly concluded that it was reasonable for CPD to believe that it
could not make an exigency request while having a warrant and that the
officers reasonably believed the delay caused by obtaining a warrant would
have been days or weeks. The defendant argues that this reasoning was
erroneous because there was no basis for CPD to believe that it could not
utilize Verizon’s exigency hotline if it first obtained a warrant. The State
counters that such belief was reasonable based on the officers’ personal
experience. We agree with the defendant.

¶21 The record reflects that CPD was aware that Verizon has a team of
employees designated to respond to law enforcement requests for cell phone
information, including an exigency hotline that is “staffed 24/7” and a separate
process for responding to search warrants and subpoenas. The record
supports CPD’s belief that, if it had submitted a search warrant to Verizon
through the ordinary search warrant process, Verizon would not have produced
the ping data for days or weeks, whereas Verizon would respond to an exigency
request almost immediately. Thus, it was reasonable for CPD to conclude that
it was necessary under the circumstances presented to request data via the
exigency hotline.

¶22 There is not, however, an objective basis in the record for CPD’s
apparent belief that using the exigency hotline and obtaining a search warrant
were mutually exclusive — that is, that officers could not request ping data via

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the exigency hotline with a warrant in hand. The State has not demonstrated a
reasonable basis for believing in the existence of a Verizon policy that would
prioritize warrantless requests over those accompanied by a warrant.
Furthermore, the CPD lieutenant who made the decision to forgo a warrant
conceded that Verizon’s guidelines for law enforcement do not expressly
prohibit police from using the exigency hotline if they have a warrant. He
testified that he believed that this limitation is “implied” by the fact that the
guidelines describe separate processes for exigency requests and search
warrants. The State did not, however, offer into evidence Verizon’s guidelines
for law enforcement and the version of the guidelines offered by the defendant
and admitted as an exhibit, albeit outdated, neither states nor suggests that
obtaining a warrant and then making an exigency request is prohibited. The
CPD lieutenant also acknowledged that, although he had experience using
Verizon’s exigency hotline, he had never attempted to use the hotline while also
having a warrant. Additionally, a CPD detective conceded that the Verizon
form that CPD used to submit its exigency requests does not prohibit law
enforcement from utilizing the exigency process if officers have a warrant, and
the detective observed that the form states that Verizon will not provide
location data for more than 48 hours without a warrant. Based on this
information, a reasonable officer would have inferred that nothing prevented
CPD from requesting data via the exigency hotline while in possession of a
warrant. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it
determined that CPD’s impression about Verizon’s policy was reasonable.

¶23 Moreover, the length of time it would take for Verizon, or any other
cell phone carrier, to respond to a search warrant has no bearing upon our
consideration of whether “the delay caused by obtaining a search
warrant would” give rise to a substantial threat of imminent danger or a
likelihood of destruction of evidence or a suspect’s flight. Gay, 169 N.H. at 241
(emphasis added); cf. State v. Murphy, 292 A.3d 660, 675-76 (Vt. 2023)
(observing that fact that it took cell phone carrier two weeks to respond to
warrant for historical location data did not bear upon whether it would have
been “impractical to obtain a warrant” for real-time location data police sought
via exigency request). The exigency exception to the warrant requirement
considers only the consequences of a delay in obtaining a warrant. See Gay,
169 N.H. at 241. It is immaterial to the application of the exception that a
third party’s response to the warrant may be delayed. Put another way, Part I,
Article 19 protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. 19. It is unreasonable that any individual’s freedom from
governmental intrusion might be curtailed by virtue of how long it may or may
not take a third party to respond to a warrant.

¶24 Setting aside the delay of days or weeks inherent in Verizon’s
ordinary search warrant process, the record reflects, as the trial court found,
that the delay caused by obtaining a search warrant alone would have been “a
few hours.” Indeed, in less than six hours, an officer drafted an application for

9
a warrant to search for the phone using cell site simulator technology,
submitted the warrant application, and received a decision from a court
granting the warrant after business hours. The record also demonstrates that
Verizon responded to CPD’s request for ping data via the exigency hotline in
less than thirty minutes.

¶25 Notwithstanding the above-discussed error, the trial court’s
exigency analysis ultimately focused upon the delay of “a few hours” that would
have been caused by obtaining a warrant. Because this timeframe was the
focus of the court’s analysis and is supported by the record, we review the
remainder of the trial court’s exigency reasoning with this timeframe in mind.

¶26 We next consider the trial court’s determination that there was a
risk that the delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant would create a likelihood
that the defendant would evade apprehension. The trial court reasoned that
the defendant had a demonstrated history of evading apprehension, that he
had booked an international flight leaving in approximately 56 hours, and that
the delay of a few hours to obtain a warrant “could have permitted [the
defendant] to escape [CPD’s] reach” because the defendant could have disabled
his phone “at any moment . . . making real-time location information
impossible to collect.” It also reasoned that, notwithstanding the defendant’s
upcoming flight, he had previously abandoned prior planned international
travel, and he might therefore skip the flight and travel elsewhere. The trial
court consequently concluded that “the fact that police could have potentially
apprehended [the defendant] at JFK airport does not weigh strongly against a
finding of exigency.”

¶27 We disagree with the trial court’s reasoning and the weight it
accorded these facts. From the perspective of a reasonable officer in CPD’s
position, there were two likely scenarios: either the defendant would attempt to
board the international flight in 56 hours; or he would not appear at the
airport, instead remaining at his current unknown location or traveling to
another unknown location. There was not, however, an objective basis to
believe that under either scenario a delay of a few hours would risk the
defendant’s evading apprehension. As to the first possibility, CPD had concrete
information about the defendant’s upcoming flight, which provided it an
opportunity to work with federal or local law enforcement to apprehend him in
the highly regulated setting of an international airport. There is no indication
in the record that CPD needed the defendant’s then-current whereabouts to
facilitate his apprehension at the airport, so any delay to obtain a warrant for
the cell phone data would not have frustrated the defendant’s apprehension in
this scenario.

¶28 On the other hand, if the defendant did not appear for his flight,
the critical urgency relied upon by the trial court and the State was the fact
that the defendant could disable or discard his phone “at any moment.” We

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acknowledge that an individual can “disable” any cell phone for the purposes of
preventing the collection of ping location data by simply turning off the phone.
See Commonwealth v. Reed, 647 S.W.3d 237, 246 (Ky. 2022). However, the
mere possibility that a suspect could disable or discard his cell phone is not
sufficient to give rise to exigency. Cf. State v. Morse, 125 N.H. 403, 409 (1984).

¶29 Moreover, the State has not identified any facts specific to this case
that provided reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant would
imminently disable or discard his phone. Although it was reasonable for CPD
to believe that the defendant was on the run from Utah authorities on the
probation violation, that he had presumably fled New Hampshire in relation to
the murders, and that he was generally adept at evading apprehension, the
State conceded at oral argument that the record contains no evidence that the
defendant knew law enforcement had obtained his phone number.
Accordingly, from a reasonable officer’s perspective, there was no reason to
believe CPD would lose the ability to collect ping data from the phone within
the few hours needed to obtain a warrant and, therefore, the possibility that
the defendant might not board his flight did not heighten the urgency of the
situation. In short, we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that there was
a risk that a few hours’ delay to obtain a warrant would likely have allowed the
defendant to continue to evade apprehension because such delay would not
have prevented CPD from intercepting him at the airport or meaningfully
frustrated its efforts to locate him elsewhere. A theoretical risk untethered
from any specific circumstances demonstrating that it is likely to be realized
will not support a finding of exigency.

¶30 Also critical to the trial court’s exigency ruling and to the State’s
argument is the trial court’s implicit finding that the defendant still possessed
the murder weapon and the court’s determination that “there was a substantial
likelihood” that the defendant would discard the gun prior to his scheduled
flight. This reasoning gave insufficient weight to two important facts: the
length of time that had elapsed between the murders and the initial exigency
request; and how quickly the defendant had destroyed other evidence following
the murders. Given that there was proof that the defendant destroyed other
evidence shortly after the murders, the passage of five months made it
objectively less likely that the defendant still had the gun at the time of the
exigency request. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460, 464
(1971) (holding exigent circumstances did not justify warrantless search of a
vehicle in part because defendant was aware he was a murder suspect and had
“already had ample opportunity to destroy any” incriminating evidence),
overruled on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137-41,
(1990). Additionally, other than the fact that CPD had not recovered the gun
during those five months, there appears no objective basis in the record to
believe that the defendant still possessed it. Cf. Commonwealth v. Almonor,
120 N.E.3d 1183, 1188-89, 1198-1200 (Mass. 2019) (concluding warrantless
ping of defendant’s cell phone was justified by exigent circumstances where

11
witness told police that defendant still possessed the murder weapon when
witness helped defendant flee the scene and police requested warrantless ping
of defendant’s phone approximately seven hours later). We thus determine
that the trial court erred in concluding that, under these circumstances, there
was a risk that a delay of a few hours would make it likely that the defendant
would destroy or discard the murder weapon, even assuming he still had it.

¶31 Finally, we conclude that the trial court improperly determined that
a delay of a few hours under these circumstances would have posed an
imminent and substantial threat of danger to life or public safety. We
acknowledge that there was considerable evidence before the trial court that
the defendant posed a substantial threat of danger to the public. It
supportably found that there was probable cause to believe the defendant
committed the victims’ violent murders, that CPD reasonably believed the
defendant might be armed, and that, because the murders appeared to have
been a random act of violence, the defendant might engage in other
unpredictable, violent behavior. Yet, the trial court did not address the fact
that five months had elapsed between the murders and the initial exigency
request and that there was no evidence that, during that time, the defendant,
or a person using the alias Arthur Kelly, committed any crimes. This lapse of
five months without any indication of further violent or dangerous behavior
distinguishes this case from those involving a demonstrated immediate and
ongoing threat to public safety. Compare Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. at 577,
580-82 (affirming ruling that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry
of apartment when police were attempting to apprehend unidentified sniper
who fired shots into police station two hours earlier and who they believed was
in the immediate vicinity and could continue shooting), with People v. White,
512 N.E.2d 677, 686 (Ill. 1987) (concluding that in “this case, the lapse of
nearly two weeks between the commission of the crime and the discovery of the
suspect’s whereabouts rendered it extremely unlikely that an additional several
hours of delay to obtain a warrant would have . . . permitted [the defendant] to
commit another serious crime”).

¶32 In sum, applying our exigency standard to the totality of the
circumstances, we disagree with the trial court that exigent circumstances
existed at the time of the first exigency request. As explained above, the trial
court erred in treating as reasonable CPD’s belief that the delay occasioned by
obtaining a warrant would have been days or weeks due to Verizon’s internal
policy. Moreover, even after limiting the relevant delay timeframe to “a few
hours,” the trial court did not properly weigh the circumstances relevant to the
risk of the defendant’s escape or the risk that the defendant would destroy
evidence or imminently endanger life or public safety. In short, the
circumstances did not “make it impracticable to obtain a warrant.” Graca, 142
N.H. at 673. Courts must exercise particular caution when applying the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement because “it is an
exception which by its nature can very easily swallow the rule unless applied in

12
only restricted circumstances.” Santana, 133 N.H. at 804 (quotation omitted).
For all these reasons, upon our de novo review of the trial court’s ultimate
determination of exigency, we conclude that it erred when it ruled that the
circumstances were sufficiently exigent to justify the warrantless searches. See
Pseudae, 154 N.H. at 200-01. Because the searches were unlawful under the
State Constitution, we need not reach the federal issue. See Ball, 124 N.H. at
237.

IV. Conclusion

¶33 We vacate the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and
remand this case to the trial court for the limited purpose of deciding whether
the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been denied on the basis of
the inevitable discovery doctrine. See State v. Broadus, 167 N.H. 307, 313-15
(2015). On or before June 15, 2026, the trial court shall hold any further
proceedings it deems necessary to resolve this issue and report its findings and
rulings to this court. All further processing of this appeal is stayed until the
trial court completes its review in accordance with this opinion. Any issues the
defendant raised in the notice of appeal but did not brief are deemed waived.
See Gay, 169 N.H. at 252.

So ordered.

MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ.,
concurred.