Cited by

“Favorable evidence includes that which is admissible, likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, or otherwise relevant to the preparation or presentation of the defense.” State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 33 (1998).

That motion was titled “Motion For New Trial” and relied heavily on State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 32-33 (1998), which involved the appeal of a denial of a motion for a new trial.

Because the defendant has failed to demonstrate on appeal that she preserved her federal constitutional argument, see State v. DeCato, 156 N.H. 570, 573, 938 A.2d 898 (2007), we limit our review to her state constitutional argument and rely upon federal law merely to aid our analysis, see State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 33, 719 A.2d 570 (1998); State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 233, 471 A.2d 347 (1983).

Because the defendant asserts a violation of his rights only under the New Hampshire Constitution, we limit our review to that claim and rely upon federal law merely to aid our analysis.

f defendant’s motion for new trial because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance); cf. State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 767-75 (2009) (discussing merits of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in motion for new trial); State v. Croft, 145 N.H. 90, 91-95 (2000) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion for new trial because trial counsel was not ineffective); State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 29-32 (1998) (analyzing merits of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim i

Part I, Article 15 “imposes on the prosecutor the duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 33 (1998) (quotation omitted).

State n Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 27 (1998); cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

To meet the first prong of the test, a defendant must show that counsel made such egregious errors that he or she failed to function as the counsel that the State Constitution guarantees.

State v. Weeks, 140 N.H. 463, 467 (1995); see also State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 26-27 (1998); cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

See, e.g., State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24 (1998) (upholding trial court’s decision to admit entire two-hour videotape).

We afford a high degree of deference to the strategic decisions of trial counsel, bearing in mind the limitless variety of strategic and tactical decisions that counsel must make.

The standard for determining whether counsel’s performance is constitutionally deficient is the same under both the State and Federal Constitutions.

Because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection in this context, we need not conduct a separate federal analysis.

“The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the trial court’s broad discretion, and we will not upset [its] ruling absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 26-27, 719 A.2d 570, 572 (1998).

We have construed Part I, Article 15 of our State Constitution to impose upon a prosecutor a “duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 33, 719 A.2d 570, 576 (1998) (quotation omitted); see N.H. Const. pt.

The standard for determining whether counsel’s performance is constitutionally deficient is the same under both the State and Federal Constitutions.

Under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 401, the trial court has discretion to determine whether evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.H. R. Ev.

“[A] witness’s mental health may be relevant to that witness’s credibility.” State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 35, 719 A.2d 570, 577 (1998).

The standard for determining whether counsel’s performance is constitutionally deficient is identical under both the State and Federal Constitutions.

“The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the trial court’s broad discretion, and we will not upset the court’s ruling absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Dewitt, 143 N.H. 24, 26-27, 719 A.2d 570, 572 (1998).