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[¶20] I continue to be concerned with the effect of our overruling Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624 (1993), as I expressed in my dissent in Union Leader Corp. v. Town of Salem, 173 N.H. 345, 358-62 (2020) (Hantz Marconi, J., dissenting).

The Town denied the request, citing the “internal personnel practices” exemption set forth in RSA 91-A:5, IV (2013) and this court’s opinion in Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624 (2007).

elaborated, “if the State provides discovery of documents that 2 are subject to mandatory public disclosure under the Right to Know statute, RSA 91-A:4, a protective order is inappropriate.” The court observed sua sponte that the legal landscape regarding the Right-to-Know Law had recently changed with our overruling of Union Leader v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624 (1993), overruled by Seacoast Newspapers v. City of Portsmouth, 173 N.H. 325, 337 (2020), and our decision in Union Leader Corp. v. Town of

Union Leader Corp.,173 N.H. at 353-57 (overruling Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 627 (1993), to the extent that it applied a per se rule, rather than a balancing test, precluding the disclosure of records falling within the exemption for “internal personnel practices”); Reid v. N.H. Attorney Gen., 169 N.H. 509, 527-28 (2016).

Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624 (1993), overruled by Seacoast Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth, 173 N.H. ___, ___ (decided May 29, 2020) (slip op.

Regardless, the trial court noted, citing Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 627 (1993), even if the citizen complaints were at issue, they would be exempt under RSA 91-A:5, IV.

ocusing on time and attendance practices.” Collectively, we refer to these documents as the “Audit Report.” The trial court upheld many of the redactions made to the Audit Report by the defendant, the Town of Salem (Town), concluding that they were required by the “internal personnel practices” exemption to the Right-to-Know Law, RSA chapter 91-A, as interpreted in Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624 (1993), and its progeny.

Today, we take the opportunity to redefine what falls under the “internal personnel practices” exemption, overruling our prior interpretation set forth in Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624 (1993).

Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 626 (1993).

The plaintiff misreads our decision in Reid and ignores our decisions in Hounsell v. North Conway Water Precinct, 154 N.H. 1, 4 (2006), and Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 626 (1993).

The trial court, relying upon our decisions in Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624 (1993), and Hounsell v. North Conway Water Precinct, 154 N.H. 1 (2006), found that the subject of the investigative records at issue “directly involved the Rockingham County Attorney’s Office’s personnel practices.” The plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously “applied a subject matter exemption contr

“[W]e must honor the expressed intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute itself.” Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 627 (1993).

We first applied the “internal personnel practices” exemption of RSA 91-A:5, IV in Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 626 (1993).

V (Supp. 2005) exempts from disclosure “[r]eeords pertaining to internal personnel practices.” We have recognized that the traditional balancing test employed in Right-to-Know cases, see, e.g., Chambers v. Gregg, 135 N.H. 478, 481 (1992), is not necessary where “the legislature has plainly made its own determination that certain documents are categorically exempt.” Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 627 (1993).

Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 626 (1993).

Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 626 (1993).

Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 626 (1993).

Although the trial court agreed with Largy that police internal investigative files are categorically exempt from disclosure under RSA 91-A:5 (1990 & Supp. 1997), see Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 627, 620 A.2d 1039, 1041 (1993), the court also noted that “this exemption does not define these documents as privileged or confidential per se.” The court concluded that RSA 91-A:5, which is part of the Right-to-Know Law, RSA ch. 91-A, “pertains to public access to documents,” whil

cf. Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 627, 620 A.2d 1039, 1041 (1993) (balancing test inappropriate where legislature has plainly determined that certain documents are categorically exempt under RSA 91-A:5, IV).

Appeal of Astro Spectacular, 138 N.H. 298, 300, 639 A.2d 249, 250 (1994); Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 626, 620 A.2d 1039, 1040 (1993).

Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 626, 620 A.2d 1039, 1040 (1993); Barksdale v. Town of Epsom, 136 N.H. 511, 514, 618 A.2d 814, 816 (1992).

Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 620 A.2d 1039 (1993).

Assuming the language of RSA 524:1-b is ambiguous, cf. Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 626, 620 A.2d 1039, 1040 (1993), our examination of the legislative history leads us to the contrary conclusion.