Marianne Salcetti & a. v. City of Keene

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0217, Marianne Salcetti & a. v. City of
Keene, the court on June 3, 2020, issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The
petitioners, Professor Marianne Salcetti and her journalism students at Keene
State College — Colby Dudal, Alex Fleming, Meridith King, Grace Pecci, and
Abbygail Vasas — appeal several orders of the Superior Court (Ruoff, J.)
granting, in part, and denying, in part, their petition under the Right-to-Know
Law, RSA chapter 91-A (2013 & Supp. 2019). The petitioners argue that the
trial court erred when it: (1) interpreted certain of their Right-to-Know requests
filed with the respondent, the City of Keene, as requests for “lists”; (2) found
that the City conducted a reasonable search for certain requested records; (3)
allowed the City to withhold and redact certain information regarding citizen
complaints of excessive force used by City police officers; (4) upheld the City’s
proposed $300 charge for access to certain records; (5) found that the
petitioners lacked standing to challenge the City’s requirement that requesters
submit signed, written requests; and (6) found that the City’s response times to
the requests were reasonably necessary. We affirm, in part, reverse, in part,
vacate, in part, and remand.

The pertinent facts are as follows. In the Fall of 2017, Salcetti taught a
journalism class at Keene State College during which she instructed her
students to file Right-to-Know requests with public entities seeking information
on topics of public interest. Several of these requests were submitted to the
City, and five of them were denied in full or in part. In December 2017,
Salcetti, as a non-attorney representative for her students, see Super. Ct. Civ.
R. 20, filed a petition in the superior court requesting that the court order the
City to fulfill the students’ Right-to-Know requests. The trial court held a
hearing in June 2018, and issued a series of orders in August 2018, December
2018, and January 2019, which resolved the issues raised by the petitioners
primarily in favor of the City. The petitioners filed a motion to reconsider. The
motion was denied, and this appeal followed.

Resolution of this appeal requires that we interpret the Right-to-Know
Law, RSA chapter 91-A. “The ordinary rules of statutory construction apply to
our review of the Right-to-Know Law.” N.H. Right to Life v. Dir., N.H.
Charitable Trusts Unit, 169 N.H. 95, 102-03 (2016) (quotation omitted). Thus,
“we are the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of
the statute considered as a whole.” Id. at 103 (quotation omitted). “When
examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary
meaning to the words used.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We interpret legislative
intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature
might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “We also interpret a statute in the context of the overall
statutory scheme and not in isolation.” Id. (quotation omitted).

The purpose of the Right-to-Know Law “is to ensure both the greatest
possible public access to the actions, discussions and records of all public
bodies, and their accountability to the people.” RSA 91-A:1 (2013). “Thus, the
Right-to-Know Law furthers our state constitutional requirement that the
public’s right of access to governmental proceedings and records shall not be
unreasonably restricted.” N.H. Right to Life, 169 N.H. at 103 (quotation
omitted); see also N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 8. “Although the statute does not
provide for unrestricted access to public records, we resolve questions
regarding the Right-to-Know Law with a view to providing the utmost
information in order to best effectuate these statutory and constitutional
objectives.” N.H. Right to Life, 169 N.H. at 103 (quotation omitted). “As a
result, we broadly construe provisions favoring disclosure and interpret the
exemptions restrictively.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We also look to the
decisions of other jurisdictions interpreting similar acts for guidance, including
federal interpretations of the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).” Id.
“Such similar laws, because they are in pari materia, are interpretatively
helpful, especially in understanding the necessary accommodation of the
competing interests involved.” Id. (quotation omitted).

“When a public entity seeks to avoid disclosure of material under the
Right-to-Know Law, that entity bears a heavy burden to shift the balance
toward nondisclosure.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We review the trial court’s
statutory interpretation and its application of law to undisputed facts de novo.”
Id.

I. Interpretation of the Right-to-Know Requests

The petitioners first argue that the trial court erred when it interpreted
the Right-to-Know requests filed by Dudal, Fleming, and Vasas as requests for
“lists,” rather than as requests for the responsive governmental records
themselves. The City counters that the trial court did not err in finding that
the students had requested “lists,” and that the City is not required to compile,
cross-reference, or assemble governmental records into a form that does not
already exist. We examine each student’s request in turn.

We first consider Dudal’s Right-to-Know request. On September 26,
2017, Dudal hand-delivered a request to the City seeking “[a] list of the . . .
food establishments that are a part of license class I, license class II, and

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license class III in Keene that received a score of less than 85” during a
specified time period, and “[a] list of the violations for any and all food
establishments that are a part of license class I, license class II, and license
class III in Keene that received scores of 85 or less, and the checklist of the
inspection accompanying each score,” during the same time period. The City’s
deputy clerk and records manager, William Dow, acknowledged receipt of the
request the following day. On October 4, Dudal called Dow, who instructed
him to contact the City’s Code Enforcement Department regarding his request.
On October 5, Dudal e-mailed a second Right-to-Know request to the Code
Enforcement Department. This request sought “[a]ll food establishments’
scores and dates of inspections for the city of Keene, NH within the past [three]
years for food establishments that are in classes I, II and III,” and “[t]he criteria
in which the food establishments were scored and graded.” Also on October 5,
Dow notified Dudal that there were existing governmental records responsive to
his request.

On October 19, Corinne Marcou, an administrative assistant at the City’s
Code Enforcement Department, e-mailed Dudal, stating that “[a]fter much
conversation[] with William Dow and our City Attorney, the information from
our data system isn’t a government document and as there is no report
currently created with this specific request criteria, the City isn’t obligated to
create one.” On October 26, while at the Code Enforcement Department,
Dudal was told that the information regarding food establishment inspections
was not available because “food establishment records are kept in a database
and no governmental records containing that information existed nor was [the
City] required to create one.”

The trial court found that “the ‘records’ [Dudal] seek[s] from the City are
not existing records that the City keeps or maintains; the data compilations [he
has] requested do not exist in a form [he] requested, but rather exist as
uncollected data in a database, and for the data to be in a form that [he was]
entitled to have, the City would need to create a new record.” Thus, because
“[t]he law is clear that a public body or agency has no obligation to create a
‘list’ of existing data,” the trial court found that the City properly denied
Dudal’s requests.

We agree with the trial court’s decision upholding the City’s denial of
Dudal’s first request, which explicitly sought “lists” that were not compiled or
maintained by the City. “[T]he statute does not require public officials to
retrieve and compile into a list random information gathered from numerous
documents, if a list of this information does not already exist.” Brent v.
Paquette, 132 N.H. 415, 426 (1989); see also RSA 91-A:4, VII (2013) (“Nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to require a public body or agency to
compile, cross-reference, or assemble information into a form in which it is not
already kept or reported by that body or agency.”).

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 However, we disagree that Dudal’s second request was similarly deficient.
Dudal’s second request sought “[a]ll food establishments’ scores and dates of
inspections for the city of Keene, NH within the past [three] years for food
establishments that are in classes I, II and III.” In Dudal’s second request, he
did not seek a compiled list of information; rather, he sought governmental
records that would themselves be responsive to his request. See RSA 91-A:4,
IV (2013) (amended 2016 & 2019) (providing that a request need only
“reasonably describe[]” the records sought). Thus, the trial court erred when it
upheld the City’s denial of Dudal’s second request.

Next, we consider Fleming’s Right-to-Know request. On September 25,
2017, Fleming e-mailed a request to the City seeking “[a]ll documents
including, but not limited to, printed document and electronic documents
police citations involving infractions pertaining to” RSA 179:10 (2014)
(Unlawful Possession and Intoxication) and RSA 644:18 (2016) (Facilitating a
Drug or Underage Alcohol House Party), from 2012 through 2016. On
September 26, Dow acknowledged receipt of the request, informing Fleming
that the City requires that requests be in writing and signed by the requester.
Nonetheless, Dow stated that the City would begin to process the request.
Thereafter, Fleming submitted a signed, written request seeking “documents . .
. of police citations involving the total number of infractions” of the two
statutes. (Emphasis added.)

On October 23, Fleming e-mailed Dow to inquire about the status of his
request. Dow responded the following day, stating that, with regard to
Fleming’s request “received by this office on September 25, 2017[,] [t]he City
. . . has determined that there is no existing governmental record listing all
[such] citations.” On November 20, Fleming appealed to Dow for an
explanation, stating: “These are state laws. Shouldn’t there be a record of
when they are violated?” Dow responded the following day, stating that “[t]he
Keene Police Department records all incidents and arrests in various
recordkeeping systems maintained in their department,” and that the “Police
Department staff have reviewed the record systems . . . for a report listing all
citations[,] . . . [and determined] that the requested governmental record does
not exist.”

The trial court found that “[i]t is clear from Mr. Fleming’s written request
that he sought documents reflecting the ‘total number’ of infractions, rather
than the individual case files that would contain the ‘infractions’ themselves.”
Thus, the trial court upheld the City’s denial of Fleming’s request, finding that
the City properly construed it as seeking a list of all such infractions, which
was not a record maintained by the City.

On appeal, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred because “Dow
did not ever receive [Fleming’s second] request referring to the ‘total number’ [of

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infractions] prior to denying Fleming’s [first] request,” and because Fleming’s
first request cannot reasonably be construed as seeking a “list.” We agree.

The record reflects that the City’s denial of Fleming’s Right-to-Know
request was premised solely upon his initial e-mailed request. On October 24,
the City specifically denied Fleming’s initial “September 25, 2017” request. The
City’s denial was part of the same e-mail chain as Fleming’s initial request, and
contained no reference to Fleming’s second, written, request. Indeed, Dow
confirmed in his affidavit submitted to the trial court that “Mr. Fleming’s
written request was never received.” Therefore, the trial court erred when it
looked to the language of Fleming’s second request, which the City never
received, to uphold the City’s rejection of Fleming’s first request, which
contained no such “total number” language.

Additionally, we find that Fleming’s first request could not reasonably be
interpreted as seeking a list. Fleming sought “[a]ll documents including, but
not limited to, printed document and electronic documents police citations
involving infractions pertaining to” certain statutes during a certain time
period. Thus, Fleming did not seek a list, but rather the responsive
“documents” themselves. Indeed, after trial, the City admitted that Fleming’s
request “could have been interpreted differently by the City upon initial review,
and that governmental records responsive to [his] request[] are contained in the
City’s Police Department files, subject to appropriate redaction.” Accordingly,
we find that the trial court erred in upholding the City’s denial of Fleming’s
initial request.

We now consider Vasas’s request. On September 25, Vasas delivered a
signed, written request to the City seeking “[a]ll charges of Aggravated
Felonious Sexual Assault” and “[a]ll charges of Drug/Alcohol Facilitated Sexual
Assaults” from 2013 to 2017, as well as “[a] [c]opy of [Keene Police
Department’s] protocol for sexual assault incidents.” On September 26, Dow
acknowledged receipt of the request. On October 30, Vasas e-mailed Dow to
inquire about the status of her request. Dow replied the same day, stating that
“[t]he City . . . has determined that there are no existing governmental records
listing all charges of aggravated felonious sexual assaults for the years 2013
through 2017 or charges of drug-alcohol facilitated sexual assaults from 2013
through 2017.” Dow also informed her that the Keene Police Department’s
sexual assault protocol was being reviewed by the city attorney, and that it
would be made available to her. The protocol was indeed made available later
that week.

The trial court upheld the City’s denial of the remainder of Vasas’s
request, finding that “[t]he rhetoric of criminal procedure make[s] Ms. Vasas’
request impossible to respond to literally, as a ‘charge’ is not a record but
rather an accusation . . . that may or may not result in a conviction.” The trial
court observed that “a ‘charge’ could pertain to an indictment or a complaint

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filed by the state against a defendant,” and thus found that “[i]t would be
reasonable for the City . . . to find Ms. Vasas’ request too vague to respond to
at all.” However, the trial court continued, “[r]ather than deny her request as
vague, the City interpreted Ms. Vasas’ request to be one for a list of charges of
the two statutes, a reasonable interpretation because of the nature of a ‘charge’
and the lack of detail in Ms. Vasas’ request.” The trial court concluded that,
because the petitioners “[have] not suggested any other form of records Ms.
Vasas could have meant with her request[,] [t]he Court finds the City’s
interpretation was reasonable.”

On appeal, the petitioners observe that the City did not deny Vasas’s
request on the basis that her request was too broad or too vague, but rather
because the City did not maintain a list of all charges of the specified crimes.
They contend that “[t]his is not a valid or reasonable basis for denial, as Vasas
clearly never asked for anything like a list,” and that “Vasas is entitled to each
and every document, not otherwise exempt, that could reasonably be construed
as a ‘charge.’” We agree.

Vasas sought governmental records regarding “[a]ll charges” of certain
crimes during a specified time period. Nowhere in her request did she seek a
“list.” Plainly read, Vasas’s request was not for a list of charges, but was a
request for the charges themselves. Although we recognize that Vasas’s
request could have been clearer, it still “reasonably described” the
governmental records sought, as required by RSA 91-A:4, IV. Indeed, the trial
court itself identified potentially responsive documents — indictments and
complaints — which should have been provided in response to the request,
provided that the City maintained such records. Moreover, the City admitted,
as it had with regard to Fleming’s request, that Vasas’s request “could have
been interpreted differently by the City upon initial review, and that
governmental records responsive to [her] request[] are contained in the City’s
Police Department files, subject to appropriate redaction.” Accordingly, we find
that the trial court erred in upholding the City’s denial of Vasas’s request.

II. Adequacy of Search for Requested Documents

The petitioners argue that the trial court erred by finding that the City
did not violate RSA chapter 91-A in regard to the adequacy of its search for the
records requested by Fleming and Vasas. In the trial court’s August 2018
order, it stated that, “[h]aving found that the City properly construed both Mr.
Fleming’s and Ms. Vasas’ requests as requests for lists, the Court only analyzes
whether the City adequately searched for responsive records that already
existed in the form of lists.” Thus, because we have determined that the trial
court erred in construing Fleming’s and Vasas’s requests as requests for lists,
we vacate the trial court’s decision with regard to the adequacy of the City’s
search, and remand for reconsideration.

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 III. Redaction and Withholding of Information

Next, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred when, in response to
Pecci’s request for documents related to police use of excessive force, it allowed
the City to redact officer names that were listed in a summary report, and did
not order the City to produce the underlying citizen complaints which provided
the basis for the report.

On September 24, 2017, Pecci e-mailed a request to the City, seeking
“[a]ny and all documents from August 1, 2012-September 22, 2017 . . .
regarding: any and all citizen complaints, logs, calls, and emails regarding
charges of excessive police force and/or police brutality.” Pecci also requested
“a list of every officer who . . . was reprimanded for using excessive force and or
brutality” during the same time period. On September 25, Dow acknowledged
receipt of the request, informing Pecci that the City requires that requests be in
writing and signed by the requester. Nonetheless, Dow stated that he would
begin processing the request, and informed her that fulfilling the request may
take up to 30 days. Thereafter, Pecci hand-delivered an unsigned, written
request to the City.

On October 16, Pecci e-mailed Dow inquiring about the status of her
request. He replied the following day, informing her that he was out of the
office, but that he would follow up on her request. On October 31, Dow
e-mailed Pecci advising her that he had not yet received a signed, written
request from her. Dow also e-mailed the police chief and city manager to
inform them of the request and ask them to search for responsive records. On
November 2, Pecci submitted a signed, written request. On November 15, Pecci
e-mailed the city manager regarding her request, but did not receive a
response. The following day, Dow e-mailed Pecci, informing her that the City
had located responsive documents, and that the City’s legal department was
reviewing them to determine whether they were subject to disclosure. On
November 21, Dow e-mailed Pecci and informed her that documents were
available for her review, but he noted that, pursuant to exemptions found in
RSA 91-A:5, IV (2013), the City had redacted police officers’ names, and
withheld copies of formal complaints made through the police department’s
internal investigation process. Thus, the only record provided to Pecci was a
report created by the former police chief, which contained statistical
summaries of citizen complaints of excessive force during the requested time
period. In the report, the City redacted certain columns and headings within
the tables. On December 11, Pecci reviewed the documents.

In its August 2018 order, the trial court found that the City failed to
carry its burden to show that the records it withheld and redacted were subject
to the exemption for “internal personnel practices,” as provided by RSA 91-A:5,
IV. However, the trial court could not determine whether the documents were,
in fact, exempt from disclosure without viewing them in their entirety. It

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therefore ordered the City to submit within 30 days “the unredacted records
Ms. Pecci requested for in-camera review with explanation of why the privacy
interest supporting redactions outweigh the public’s interest in access.”

In its January 2019 order, the trial court observed that “[d]espite the
Court’s direct order to provide the unredacted Summary Reports Tables that
Ms. Pecci requested, the City did not provide them, redacted or unredacted.
The City has instead submitted 119 pages of citizen complaints . . . and stated
that these documents are responsive to Ms. Pecci’s request.” The trial court
found that, “even with two opportunities, the City has failed to explain why the
redactions on the summary reports were proper and in compliance with RSA
91-A:5, IV.” Nonetheless, the trial court found that it “cannot order disclosure
of records that are exempt under the Right-to-Know law,” and proceeded to
analyze whether the redactions were proper based on the information available
to it.

In its analysis, the trial court first considered the scope of the
information sought by the petitioners. The trial court found that the
petitioners had not requested the officers’ names in their petition, and,
moreover, that they had conceded that the officers’ names were properly
redacted. However, because the trial court determined that the column
headings in the Summary Reports Tables would not fall within the “internal
personnel practices” exemption, or the “personnel file” exemption under RSA
91-A:5, IV, it concluded that the City must “provide Ms. Pecci with the
Summary Reports Tables with no redactions other than the officer names,
which must be replaced with an anonymous signifier so as to permit the reader
to observe repeated entries.” Separately, with regard to the underlying citizen
complaints, the trial court reasoned that, although they were responsive to
Pecci’s request, the petitioners had not requested the documents in their
petition to the court, and, therefore, the documents were not at issue in the
case. Regardless, the trial court noted, citing Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 627 (1993), even if the citizen complaints were at issue, they
would be exempt under RSA 91-A:5, IV.

On appeal, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred in failing to
order that the unredacted report be released, because the City failed to meet its
burden to show that its redactions were lawful. Further, the petitioners argue
that the officers’ names were clearly requested by both Pecci’s request and the
petition to the court, and that the petitioners did not concede that the
redaction of the names was proper. Separately, the petitioners also argue that
the citizen complaints were clearly sought by Pecci’s request and by their
petition. Additionally, they contend that the trial court’s alternative reasoning
— that, pursuant to Fenniman, the citizen complaints were exempt under RSA
91-A:5, IV — is also erroneous. Lastly, the petitioners argue that Fenniman
should be overruled.

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 The City counters that governmental records related to, or arising from,
an internal police department investigation of alleged police officer misconduct
are categorically exempt from public disclosure under Fenniman. The City
admits that the summary report was not submitted to the trial court “through
inadvertence and mistake but not intentionally,” but notes that it adhered to
the trial court’s order and released the summary report to Pecci with non-
identifying letters in place of the redacted officers’ names.

We agree with the petitioners that the trial court erred in finding that the
petitioners, in their petition, failed to request the officers’ names that the City
had redacted in the summary report. Pecci’s Right-to-Know request sought
documents regarding “any and all citizen complaints, logs, calls, and emails
regarding charges of excessive police force and/or police brutality,” and “a list
of every officer who worked for KPD and was reprimanded for using excessive
force and or brutality.” Because Pecci’s request specifically sought the officers’
names, the petitioners’ petition — requesting that the court “fulfill these 5
Right-to-Know requests” — sought the officers’ names as well.

Moreover, we agree with the petitioners that they did not concede that
the City’s redaction of the officers’ names in the summary report was proper.
In their memorandum of law, the petitioners argued that “[w]hile the specific
names of the officers may be properly exempted, their identity would still be
protected by replacing each name with an arbitrary but consistent identifier,
such as Officer #1.” (Emphasis added.) We do not read this statement as a
concession, but rather as an alternative argument that, even if the officers’
names were properly redacted, the use of arbitrary identifiers would protect the
officers’ identities while still enabling “officers with multiple complaints [to]
stand out.” Indeed, the petitioners took that position in their motion to
reconsider the trial court’s second order: “when [the petitioners] wrote ‘the
names of the officers may be properly exempted,’ they did not inten[d] to
concede this point, but to anticipate that as a possible position taken by [the
City]. The [petitioners] were trying to argue in the alternative.”

Separately, with regard to the citizen complaints underlying the
summary report, we find that the complaints were unquestionably within the
scope of Pecci’s request, and, therefore, for the same reasons discussed above
with regard to the officers’ names, were also, by extension, within the scope of
the petitioners’ petition to the trial court.

Accordingly, having found that the petitioners indeed requested the
officers’ names, that they did not concede that the redaction of the names was
proper, and that they also requested the underlying citizen complaints, we
reverse the trial court’s rulings to the contrary. However, because the
remainder of the trial court’s analysis regarding the redacted summary report
and the underlying citizen complaints was inexorably intertwined with those
contrary rulings, and because our recent decisions in Seacoast Newspapers,

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Inc. v. City of Portsmouth, 173 N.H. ___ (decided May 29, 2020), and Union
Leader Corporation & a. v. Town of Salem, 173 N.H. ___ (decided May 29,
2020), overruled Fenniman, thereby changing the nature of the exemption
analysis, we vacate the remainder of the trial court’s order on these issues, and
remand for reconsideration in light of Seacoast Newspapers, Union Leader, and
this decision. On remand, the City shall provide the trial court with the
unredacted summary report for in camera review.

IV. Charge for Access to Requested Records

The petitioners argue that the trial court erred when it upheld the City’s
proposed $300 charge for access to the records requested by King. King
requested “[a]ny and all email correspondence[]” between the City and local
restaurants regarding food safety inspections during 2016 and 2017. The City
responded that it had conducted between 800 and 1,000 inspections during
the time period, and that, because the City “would need to retrieve and print
these emails[,] . . . the cost to provide this information would be approximately
$300.” The City urges us to adopt the reasoning of the trial court, which found
that

the City [could not have] provided these emailed reports without
either providing Ms. King with computer access to the email
account or accounts that sent the reports[,] or printing the emails.
There is no reasonable argument that the City should provide Ms.
King with access to a City employee’s account or access to a City
computer to view these emails. Therefore, Ms. King’s only option of
receiving these emailed reports was for them to be printed out.

We agree with the petitioners that the trial court erred. The Right-to-
Know Law provides that “[n]o fee shall be charged for the inspection or delivery,
without copying, of governmental records, whether in paper, electronic, or
other form.” RSA 91-A:4, IV (amended 2019). King did not request copies of
the e-mails; rather, she requested that the e-mails be made available to her for
inspection. The City is obligated to provide access to non-exempt governmental
records free of charge. Id. Furthermore, the City is required to maintain its
records “in a manner that makes them available to the public.” Hawkins v.
N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 147 N.H. 376, 379 (2001). Thus, even
if we were to accept the questionable proposition that printing the e-mails is
the only acceptable means of making them available to King for inspection — a
proposition that does not appear to reflect the realities of the digital age — King
is not obligated to pay the City merely to inspect these records. See RSA 91-
A:4, IV.

The City also argues that, because “the governmental records requested
by Ms. King are numerous, and exist in various email accounts and potentially
across several City agencies,” providing access to the responsive records would

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— in contravention of the Right-to-Know Law — require the City to “compile,
cross-reference, or assemble information into a form in which it is not already
kept.” RSA 91-A:4, VII; see also Brent, 132 N.H. at 426 (“[T]he statute does not
require public officials to retrieve and compile into a list random information
gathered from numerous documents, if a list of this information does not
already exist.”). We disagree. “Right–to–Know requests often require a public
official to retrieve multiple documents. . . . While the Brent rule shields
agencies from having to create a new document in response to a Right-to-Know
request, it does not shelter them from having to assemble existing documents
in their original form.” N.H. Civil Liberties Union, 149 N.H. at 439-40.

V. Signed, Written Requests

Next, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred when it found that
they lacked standing to challenge the City’s requirement that requesters
submit signed, written requests. The trial court found that the petitioners
“failed to allege that any of the students were prohibited from receiving
responsive records because of the City’s practice or that their rights to access
were otherwise affected by the practice.” Therefore, the trial court declined to
consider whether the City’s “signed, written request” requirement was a
violation of RSA chapter 91-A because “no particularized harm ha[d] been
alleged,” and the court “[did] not have a sufficient allegation before it to
adjudicate the issue.” The petitioners contend that it was improper for the trial
court to ignore “technical” or “harmless” violations that did not result in
prejudice to the requester. See ATV Watch v. N.H. Dept. of Resources & Econ.
Dev., 155 N.H. 434, 440-41 (2007). The City counters that the trial court did
not err because the City never relied on the policy when denying the requests
for records, and none of the petitioners allege that they were prejudiced or
harmed by the policy. We agree with the City.

“Whether a person’s interest in the challenged administrative action is
sufficient to confer standing is a factual determination to be undertaken on a
case by case basis.” Censabella v. Hillsborough Cnty. Attorney, 171 N.H. 424,
427 (2018) (quotation omitted). To have standing under RSA 91-A:7, the
parties must have “personal legal or equitable rights that are adverse to one
another, with regard to an actual, not hypothetical, dispute, which is capable
of judicial redress,” and “a party must demonstrate harm to maintain a legal
challenge.” Id.

Here, none of the petitioners’ requests were denied on the ground that
they failed to provide a signed, written Right-to-Know request. Although the
City’s response to Pecci’s request was delayed as a result of her failure to
adhere to the City’s policy, she did receive responsive documents, and there is
no allegation that she was harmed by the delay.

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 Although we have held that “[t]he plain language of [RSA 91-A:4, IV] does
not allow for consideration of the factors . . . such as ‘reasonable speed,’
‘oversight,’ ‘fault,’ ‘harm,’ or ‘prejudice,’” ATV Watch, 155 N.H. at 440-41, that
case dealt with a clear violation of the five-day response deadline set forth in
RSA 91-A:4, IV. See id. Here, the City satisfied that requirement when it
provided an initial response to each request — whether written, or signed, or
unsigned — within the five-day period. We need not address the issue of
whether a delay in responding to a request could pose harm and, in and of
itself, give rise to standing, because the petitioners have not alleged that they,
in fact, suffered any harm. Thus, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the
petitioners lack standing to challenge the City’s policy.

Nonetheless, we observe that the City’s practice of requiring signed,
written Right-to-Know requests may be susceptible to challenge. As we
observed in Censabella, “it would not be unreasonable for a requester to desire
anonymity in the early stages when making a Right-to-Know Law request.
Such requests may implicate political, policy, or public interest considerations,
particularly when the request is pursued by a whistleblower or advocacy
organization.” Censabella, 171 N.H. at 428. For these reasons, the City may
wish to revisit its policy.

VI. Response Times

Lastly, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred when it found that
the City’s response times to their Right-to-Know requests were “reasonably
necessary.” Specifically, the petitioners contend that “Pecci was told by Dow
that she would have a response by October 25th, thirty (30) days from receipt
of her request. She received her response on November 21st, after she
appealed to the City Manager on November 15th.” The petitioners argue that
this delay was unreasonable because it was caused by the City’s policy of
requiring signed, written Right-to-Know requests. The City counters that we
should adopt the trial court’s reasoning. The trial court found that

[t]he plain language of the statute requires the responding public
body or agency to send receipt to a request with a statement of the
time reasonably necessary to determine whether the request shall
be granted or denied. It is required that an estimate be given;
what that estimate is, however, is explicitly left to the responding
public body or agency to determine what is reasonable.

(Citations and quotations omitted.) We agree with the City.

“[P]ublic bodies have a statutory duty to respond diligently to all records
requests, regardless of who makes the request.” Censabella, 171 N.H. at 427-
28 (quotation omitted).

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 The time period for responding to a Right–to–Know request is
absolute. The statute mandates that an agency make public
records available when they are immediately available for release,
or otherwise, it must within five business days of the Right–to–
Know request: (1) make the records available; (2) deny the request
in writing with reasons; or (3) acknowledge receipt of the request in
writing with a statement of the time reasonably necessary to
determine whether the request will be granted or denied.

ATV Watch, 155 N.H. at 440-41 (emphasis omitted); see also RSA 91-A:4, IV.

As noted above, the City responded to each student’s request within five
business days. However, we have not previously considered the outer limits of
what constitutes a “reasonably necessary” response time for providing
documents that are not immediately available. RSA 91-A:4, IV. Such a
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Here, the circumstances
are unusual if not unique: within a short period of time, the City received
numerous and expansive requests from Salcetti’s students raising complicated
issues under the Right-to-Know Law, and requiring careful analysis by the
City. Only some of those requests are the subject of this litigation. Pecci’s
request, in particular, required careful analysis by the city attorney in a
notably complex and sensitive area of the Right-to-Know Law. Accordingly,
under the circumstances, we conclude that the City’s response time was not
unreasonably long. See ATV Watch, 161 N.H. at 756 (finding that an initial
response within five business days, coupled with an estimated response time of
50 days for the requested documents, complied with the Right-to-Know Law
“[o]n its face”).

In conclusion, we observe that this dispute has consumed an inordinate
amount of time, energy, and resources — judicial and otherwise. The salutary
purpose of the Right-to-Know Law — to “ensure both the greatest possible
public access to the actions, discussions and records of all public bodies, and
their accountability to the people,” RSA 91-A:1 — is best served when the
members of the public and the governmental bodies are guided by a spirit of
collaboration. We take this opportunity to encourage all public bodies, and
members of the public making Right-to-Know requests, to embrace that spirit,
and work together to efficiently and effectively resolve disputes involving RSA
chapter 91-A. This case, on remand, presents just such an opportunity.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part;
vacated in part; and remanded.

HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

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