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ception, an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel need not be raised on direct appeal and may be raised collaterally by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after the time for a direct appeal has expired, if the petitioner can establish “harmful constitutional error.” Kinne, 161 N.H. at 45; see Bonser v. Courtney, 124 N.H. 796, 807-08 (1984); cf. Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 732 (1990) (explaining that we will not consider an issue raised under the guise of an

The State may enter a nolle prosequi on a charge when the evidence will not sustain the charge as alleged, see id., and we have recognized that, for the purposes of a speedy trial analysis, “a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 735 (1990) (quotation omitted).

The period of delay considered for purposes of analyzing a defendant’s speedy trial claim begins to run when he is arrested or charged, whichever comes first.

He contends, relying upon Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727 (1990), and Crosby v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 152 N.H. 44 (2005), that procedural default does not prevent a review of his claim.

The broad language in Avery has been undercut by subsequent decisions.

In order for the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice in this case, he must show that a motion for dismissal, a directed verdict, or a JNOV based upon the State’s failure to establish the element of concealment or surprise would properly have been granted.

Analysis of the second factor requires that we assess why the trial has been delayed, to which party the delay is attributable and how much weight to give thé delay.

“The period of delay considered for purposes of analyzing a defendant’s speedy trial claim begins to run when he is arrested or charged, whichever comes first.” Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 734, 584 A.2d 763, 767 (1990).

We decline to review these claims at this juncture because the defendant has not yet raised these issues in the superior court, see, e.g., Petition of Dean, 142 N.H. 889, 890, 711 A.2d 257, 258 (1998) (motion for a new trial); Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 732-33, 584 A.2d 763, 766-67 (1990) (petition for a writ of habeas corpus).

The issue here was not litigated fully on direct appeal.

“No inquiry as to the remaining three Barker factors is required, however, unless the length of the delay is presumptively prejudicial.” Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 734, 584 A.2d 763, 767 (1990).

“The key to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a showing of actual prejudice.” Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 733, 584 A.2d 763, 767 (1990).

“The key to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a showing of actual prejudice.” Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 733, 584 A.2d 763, 767 (1990).

The delay in this case is measured from the dates of the defendant’s indictments on February 1, 1990, and March 8, 1990.

This court places “[substantial emphasis” on the last two factors.

We need not consider the remaining three factors unless the delay is “presumptively prejudicial.” Humphrey v. Cunningham, 133 N.H. 727, 734, 584 A.2d 763, 767 (1990); Tucker supra.

cumstances exist in which counsel’s ineffectiveness may give rise to a presumption of prejudice, such as an actual conflict of interest, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, generally “prejudice is presumed only ‘where circumstances leading to counsel’s ineffectiveness are so egregious that the defendant was *216 in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all....’” Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 737, 584 A.2d 763, 769 (1990) (citations omitted).

The analysis is the same under both the Federal and the State Constitutions, see Humphrey v. Cunningham, 133 N.H. 727, 733, 584 A.2d 763, 767 (1990), and “[t]he benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, reh’g denie