State of New Hampshire v. Harvey Martel

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2014-0614, State of New Hampshire v. Harvey
Martel, the court on September 17, 2015, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The
defendant, Harvey Martel, appeals his conviction, following a jury trial in
Superior Court (Temple, J.), for aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA).
See RSA 632-A:2, I(j) (2007). He argues that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion to dismiss in which he asserted that the State acted in bad
faith when it entered a nolle prosequi on the day that his trial was to begin and
subsequently indicted him for the same conduct. He asserts that: (1) the trial
court should have dismissed the second indictment as the “legal consequence[]”
of the State’s bad faith decision to enter a nolle prosequi on the charges; and
(2) the trial court’s ruling violated his right to a speedy trial under the State
and Federal Constitutions. We affirm.

The following facts are relevant to our review. In March 2004, the
defendant was indicted on one count of AFSA and one count of misdemeanor
sexual assault for acts he allegedly committed against the victim in November
2002. Between 2004 and 2008, a trial was scheduled sixteen times, but each
time it was continued. In May 2008, the Trial Court (Lynn, C.J.) issued an
order “specially assign[ing]” the case for trial on June 16, 2008, and stating
that “[t]here shall be no further continuances of [the] trial date.”

On the morning of trial, the State filed a motion to continue, representing
that the victim had failed to appear for a scheduled pretrial appointment earlier
that week, and, since that time, the State had been unable to locate her. Given
the absence of the complaining witness, the State explained that it would “nol
pros the indictment if the motion to continue was denied; in effect, . . . there
would be no trial on [June 16].” Before receiving the trial court’s ruling on the
motion to continue, the State entered a nolle prosequi on each of the charges.
The defendant subsequently filed petitions to annul the record of his arrest and
indictments. The State did not object, and the annulments were granted.

In June 2012, a grand jury issued a new AFSA indictment alleging the
same conduct as alleged in the 2004 AFSA indictment. The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the State had violated his rights to a speedy
trial and due process when it entered a nolle prosequi on the AFSA indictment
in 2008 but then indicted him four years later based upon the same conduct.
The defendant asserted that the State acted in bad faith by entering a nolle
prosequi to, in effect, give itself the continuance that the trial court had stated
that it would not grant.

The State objected, contending that it “did not drop the charges [in 2008]
as a tactical move to allow it more time to prepare for trial; they were dropped
because the State felt that a prosecution was no longer viable” due to the
disappearance of the complaining witness. The State explained that it entered
a nolle prosequi with the intent that the case would be closed, and issued the
2012 AFSA indictment only after the victim contacted the State and asked it to
refile the charges against the defendant.

After a hearing, the Trial Court (Temple, J.) accepted the State’s
explanation and concluded that the 2008 nolle prosequi was not entered “to
inflict confusion, harassment or other unfair prejudice.” The trial court found
that the State did not act in bad faith, and denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. Following a trial in 2014, the defendant was convicted on the AFSA
charge. This appeal followed.

The defendant first argues that the four-year delay between the State’s
entry of a nolle prosequi in 2008 and the 2012 indictment resulted in a
violation of his right to a speedy trial under Part I, Article 14 of the New
Hampshire Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 14; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
defendant contends that, because the State acted in bad faith when it entered
a nolle prosequi on the indictments, the four-year period between the State’s
2008 nolle prosequi and his re-indictment in 2012 resulted in an
unconstitutional delay of his trial. The defendant does not assert that either
the time period prior to the State’s entry of a nolle prosequi or the time period
between the denial of his motion to dismiss and his trial resulted in a violation
of his speedy trial right. The State counters that its action in entering a nolle
prosequi was taken in good faith, and, therefore, the four-year period should
not be counted for the purposes of a speedy trial analysis.

We first address this argument under the State Constitution, and cite
federal opinions for guidance only. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983).
We defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly
erroneous, and consider de novo the court’s conclusions of law with respect to
those factual findings. State v. Allen, 150 N.H. 290, 292 (2003).

In determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been
violated under the State Constitution, we apply Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
530 (1972), which requires that we balance the following factors: (1) the length
of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his
right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. State v. Brooks, 162 N.H. 570, 581 (2011). However, if the length of the delay is not
“presumptively prejudicial,” we do not consider the remaining three factors. Id.

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 The threshold inquiry, therefore, is the length of the relevant delay. A
delay of over nine months in a felony case is considered presumptively
prejudicial. Id. The period of delay begins to run when the defendant is
arrested or charged, whichever event occurs first. Id. We have held that if the
State enters a nolle prosequi in good faith and later recharges a defendant, the
time period between the nolle prosequi and the institution of new criminal
charges will not be counted against the State for purposes of a speedy trial
analysis. Allen, 150 N.H. at 293. Thus, whether the four-year period in this
case between the nolle prosequi and the refiling of the AFSA charge is included
in the relevant length of delay depends upon whether the State acted in good
faith when it entered the nolle prosequi.

The defendant asserts that the State used the nolle prosequi “as a means
to bypass the authority of the trial court and to usurp its ability to balance and
control its demanding docket to obtain a continuance,” which, he asserts,
constitutes bad faith. The State counters that it acted in good faith because it
entered a nolle prosequi to ensure that “the case would not be dismissed with
prejudice if the trial went forward without the complaining witness.”

The power to enter a nolle prosequi exists in the prosecuting officer; the
court has no right to interfere in its exercise. Id. Although “some jurisdictions
have abrogated the common law rule and require the court’s permission before
the prosecution may nolle prosse a case, such is not the rule in New
Hampshire.” Id. The State’s discretion, however, is not unlimited. The trial
court can judge “the effect of the [nolle prosequi] . . . or . . . the legal
consequences, which may follow from it.” State v. Pond, 133 N.H. 738, 741
(1990). Trial courts are empowered to remedy an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion — such as entering a nolle prosequi — that “is used to inflict
confusion, harassment, or other unfair prejudice upon a defendant.” Allen,
150 N.H. at 293.

Here, the State explained that it entered a nolle prosequi because the
complaining witness could not be located. The State may enter a nolle
prosequi on a charge when the evidence will not sustain the charge as alleged,
see id., and we have recognized that, for the purposes of a speedy trial analysis,
“a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate
delay.” Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 735 (1990)
(quotation omitted). Moreover, the defendant concedes that the “State’s
intention may not have been to inflict confusion, harassment, or unfair
prejudice upon” the defendant. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that, under “the unique and [atypical] circumstances of the case at
that particular time,” the State “was doing the right thing . . . [and] what justice
required” when it entered a nolle prosequi. Thus, on this record, we conclude
that the trial court’s finding that the State did not enter a nolle prosequi in bad
faith was not clearly erroneous. See Allen, 150 N.H. at 292.

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 Because the nolle prosequi was not entered in bad faith, the time
between the 2008 nolle prosequi and the 2012 indictment is excluded from the
length of delay for purposes of the speedy trial analysis. Id. at 293. Thus, the
proper measure of the delay for the purposes of a speedy trial analysis would
include the 51-month period between the defendant’s March 2004 indictment
and the June 2008 nolle prosequi of the case, and the 24-month period
between the re-filing in June 2012 and the 2014 trial. See id. at 293-94
(calculating relevant delay period absent finding that nolle prosequi was
entered in bad faith). The defendant, however, has not argued that this 75-
month time period violated his speedy trial right. Accordingly, we need not
consider this time period in our speedy trial analysis. See State v. Bisbee, 165
N.H. 61, 69 (2013).

Given that the defendant argues only that the four-year period when he
was not under indictment resulted in an unconstitutional delay, and because
we have concluded that this 48-month period cannot be included in the length
of delay for the purposes of a speedy trial analysis because the State did not
enter a nolle prosequi in bad faith, the defendant has failed to identify a
“presumptively prejudicial” delay as required under the first Barker factor. See
Brooks, 162 N.H. at 581. Thus, we need not address the remaining three
Barker factors. Id.

The defendant also argues that, even without a finding of bad faith, the
2012 charges should have been dismissed because “the State’s inaction over
the next several years [after entering a nolle prosequi] was at best negligent and
should compel relief” for the defendant. However, as the State correctly
observes, the defendant has not preserved this argument for our review, and
we decline to address it. See State v. Tsopas, 166 N.H. 528, 531 (2014).

Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has not established that he
was denied his right to a speedy trial under the State Constitution. Because
the Federal Constitution is no more protective of the defendant’s rights than
the State Constitution under these circumstances, see Allen, 150 N.H. at 295;
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, we reach the same conclusion under the Federal
Constitution. Given our conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding
that the State did not act in bad faith when it entered a nolle prosequi, we need
not address the defendant’s remaining argument that was contingent upon a
finding of bad faith.

Affirmed.

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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