Cited by

See, e.g., State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 804 (1991) (omitting the word “largely”); State v. Pseudae, 154 N.H. 196, 201 (2006) (comparing “facts of this case” to “the level of urgency demonstrated in previous cases” in a manner akin to de novo review).

State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 808-09 (1991) (declining to address the State’s “independent source” doctrine argument, raised for the first time on appeal, as unpreserved in part because it was the State’s burden to prove the warrantless search was constitutionally permissible).

State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 807-09 (1991) (declining to address the State’s assertion that, even if the warrantless entry was unconstitutional, the seized evidence should not be suppressed pursuant to the independent source doctrine because the State “never identified for the trial court the ‘independent source doctrine’ as a ground justifying

“When reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we consider the degree to which the exigency relied upon by the State was foreseeable.” State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 806 (1991).

When reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we consider the degree to which the exigency relied upon by the State was foreseeable.

Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”); State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 803 (1991) (noting, in warrantless search case, that “when the entry is made into an individual’s private dwelling, where *223 there exists a strong expectation of privacy and protection from government intrusion, the requirement of a warrant is partic

For example, in State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 807-09 (1991), we declined to address an alternative ground for upholding the trial court’s decision because the State did not raise the issue at trial and thus “the defendant.

For example, in State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 807-09, 586 A.2d 77 (1991), we declined to address an alternative ground for upholding the trial court's decision because the State did not raise the issue at trial and thus "the defendant...

State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 803, 809 (1991) (warrantless entry in violation of Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution requires suppression of evidence).

State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 803 (1991); State v. Beede, 119 N.H. 620, 625 (1979), cert.

Sergeant Lecuyer testified that he was familiar with the Airport Economy Inn and that each room in the hotel had “indoor plumbing, a toilet facility, sink, running water.” See State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 804 (1991) (agreeing with trial court that “[w]hile the Fourth Amendment and Part I, Article 19 are not relaxed for drug investigations, the ease of destruction of that evidence sets the framework for the determination of exigent circumstances” (quotation omitted)).

Under Part I, Article 19, warrantless entries are per se unreasonable and illegal unless they fall within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Exigent circumstances exist when the delay caused by obtaining a search warrant would create a substantial threat of imminent danger to life or public safety or likelihood that evidence will be destroyed.

Without such consideration, we will not address the issue on appeal.” State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 809 (1991).

Before the trial court, the State asserted, to the contrary, that it was not arguing “that this man was pulled over for reasonable suspicion of committing or about to be committing a crime.” Because the State did not argue below that the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a motor vehicle offense, we decline to address this argument on appeal.

Under Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution, warrantless entries are per se unreasonable and illegal unless the entry falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.

At oral argument, the defendant objected to the State’s reliance on its independent crime argument as not preserved for our review.

State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 803, 586 A.2d 77, 80 (1991); State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-32, 471 A.2d 347, 350-51 (1983).

*372 As to pure questions of fact, we will uphold a trial court’s findings unless unsupported by the record or found to be clearly erroneous.

e starting point for our analysis is part I, article 19 of our constitution, which provides that “[e]very subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.” “[Warrantless entries are per se unreasonable and illegal, unless the entry is made pursuant to one of a few recognized exceptions.” State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 803, 586 A.2d 77, 80 (1991) (quotation omitted).

As to pure questions of fact, we will uphold a trial court’s findings unless unsupported by the record or found to be clearly erroneous.

Because the State acquiesced in this finding before the trial court, it has foregone the opportunity to challenge it on appeal.

State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 804, 586 A.2d 77, 81 (1991) (evidence derived from search challenged under State and Federal Constitutions).

endant’s right to be free from an unreasonable seizure under part I, article 19 had been violated and ordered that “any evidence obtained in violation of this right cannot be *386 used at trial.” See also State v. Silvestri, 136 N.H. 522, 528, 618 A.2d 821, 824 (1992) (defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted because seizure was illegal under State Constitution); State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 809, 586 A.2d 77, 84 (1991) (illegal warrantless entry in violation of part I, article

We need not decide whether the State can raise on appeal alternative grounds for admission that were either not presented to or not considered by the trial court, compare State v. McLaughlin, 135 N.H. 669, 672, 610 A.2d 809, 810-11 (1992) and State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 807-09, 586 A.2d 77, 83-84 (1991) with State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 153, 536 A.2d 1236, 1239-40 (1987) and State v. Goulet, 129 N.H. 348, 351, 529 A.2d 879, 881 (1987), because even assuming all this evidence was properly

State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 809, 586 A.2d 77, 84 (1991) (trial court’s findings upheld unless unsupported by record or found clearly erroneous).

The State Constitution does not forbid searches without a warrant being present, despite the alleged danger of confrontations.

State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 808-09, 586 A.2d 77, 83-84 (1991) (grounds for suppression not raised at trial will not be considered on appeal).

Claiming that the defendant plainly manifested his adoption of Susan’s statement made in his presence, the State seeks to circumvent the rule of State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 807-09, 586 A.2d 77, 83-84 (1991), requiring the State to raise at trial alternative grounds of admissibility in order to rely on them on appeal.

However, because the State failed to articulate this argument to the trial court we do not address this issue.

The defendant presents two additional arguments as to why the trial court’s ruling should be affirmed, but we do not address them because they were not raised below.