Cited by

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

The fact finder may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness or party, and is not required to believe even uncontroverted evidence.

“[T]he statute does not require public officials to retrieve and compile into a list random information gathered from numerous documents, if a list of this information does not already exist.” Brent v. Paquette, 132 N.H. 415, 426 (1989); see also RSA 91-A:4, VII (2013) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require a public body or agency to compile, cross-reference, or assemble information into a form in which it is not already kept or reported by that body or agency.”).

Auth., 142 N.H. 540, 552, 555-59 (1997); Chambers, 135 N.H. at 481; Brent v. Paquette, 132 N.H. 415, 426-28 (1989).

As the trier of fact, the trial court could accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness or party, and was not required to believe even uncontroverted evidence.

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

Additionally, the trier of fact is not required to believe even uncontroverted testimony.

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

In Brent v. Paquette, 132 N.H. 415, 426 (1989), for instance, we held that the Right-to-Know Law “does not require public officials to retrieve and compile into a list random information gathered from numerous documents, if a list of this information does not already exist.” The plaintiff in Brent had requested a school superintendent to create a list

The PUC was not required to believe even uncontroverted evidence.

The fact finder may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness or party, and is not required to believe even uncontroverted evidence.

The fact finder may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness or party.

Brent v. Paquette, 132 N.H. 415, 419 (1989) (“we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court”).

As the petitioner concedes, these customers have a privacy interest in the disclosure of their names and home addresses.

On appeal, the city argues that: (1) imposing a duty to compile records is contrary to Brent v. Paquette, 132 N.H. 415 (1989); and (2) releasing the photographs is an unwarranted invasion of privacy and contrary to the purposes of the Right-to-Know Law.

v. Watson, 121 N.H. 118, 120 (1981); see also Brent v. Paquette, 132 N.H. 415, 426 (1989) (“[T]he Right-to-Know Law guarantees every citizen the right to inspect all public records except as otherwise prohibited by statute or RSA 91-A:5.” (quotation omitted)).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. at 475-76, 686 A.2d at 312; Brent v. Paquette, 132 N.H. 415, 426-27, 567 A.2d 976, 983-84 (1989); Mans, 112 N.H. at 162, 290 A.2d at 867; cf. Washington Post v. U.S. Dept. of Health, Etc., 690 F.2d 252, 261 (D.C.