Cited by

To the extent Port City raises additional arguments not addressed above, they are deemed waived because they were raised for the first time on appeal in its reply brief, see Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 9 617-18 (1987), or otherwise do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003); Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617- 18 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 611-12 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987); see also In the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006) (self-represented litigants are bound by the same procedural rules that govern parties represented by counsel).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987) (declining to address argument raised for first time in reply brief due in part to opposing party’s inability to respond and unacceptability of allowing submission of additional briefs after briefing schedule had closed).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617 (1987) (stating that a reply brief may only respond to the opposing party’s brief).

Citing our decision in Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 529 A.2d 976 (1987), DOIT asserts that Cole waived any argument as to the existence of jurisdiction by not addressing the issue in his brief.

Citing our decision in Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591 (1987), DOIT asserts that Cole waived any argument as to the existence of jurisdiction by not addressing the issue in his brief.

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617 (1987) (stating that “a reply brief may only be employed to reply to the opposing party’s brief, and not to raise entirely new issues”).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987) (declining to address argument raised for the first time in reply brief due in part to opposing party’s inability to respond and unacceptability of allowing submission of additional briefs after briefing schedule has closed).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987) (holding that a reply brief may not raise entirely new issues).

Thus, we held that “an annulment under RSA 651:5 does not expressly turn the public event of a criminal conviction into a private, secret, or secluded fact.” Lovejoy, 161 N.H. at 486 (quotations and brackets omitted); see also Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 611 (1987) (observing that annulment statute “only extends as far as evidence of the conviction itself” and that although annulment statute “effectively erases the conviction, no such similar erasure is effected against the fa

Consequently, just as “the fact of an annulment also necessarily discloses the fact of a conviction,” Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 610 (1987), a habitual offender designation necessarily discloses the fact of more than one prior criminal conviction.

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987).

Assuming, without deciding, that it was proper to do so, but see Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987) (court will not 3 address issues raised for the first time on appeal in a reply brief), he does not address the Quintero factors.

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987).

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT In Case No. 2014-0410, Peter Saunders & a. v. Town of Kingston, the court on April 23, 2015, issued the following order: The defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ reply memorandum is granted to the extent that the memorandum raises new issues, see Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987), and relies upon evidence not presented to the trial court, see Flaherty v. Dixey, 158 N.H. 385, 387 (2009); Sup.

Ct. R. 16(3)(b) (“The statement of a question presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein.”); Town of Barrington v. Townsend, 164 N.H. 241, 245 (2012) (broad question of whether campground was illegal fairly encompassed question whether it violated particular section of zoning ordinance); Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617 (1987) (holding that reply brief is properly employed to reply to opposing party’s brief).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617 (1987) (holding that reply brief may be employed only to reply to opposing party’s brief, and not to raise entirely new issues).

s raised for the first time during oral argument, see, e.g., Petition of Beauregard, 151 N.H. 445, 449 (2004) (declining to reach the merits of an argument raised by the appellee for first time at oral argument); State v. Scovill, 144 N.H. 409, 414 (1999) (declining to reach merits of State’s harmless error argument raised for first time at oral argument); cf. Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18 (1987) (court will not address an issue raised for the first-time on appeal in

*466 However, “the jury verdict must be an unreasonable one before the [trial court] may set it aside.” Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 603 (1987) (citation omitted).

We do not address whether this distinction between a motion to set aside a verdict because of insufficient evidence and a motion to set aside a verdict because it is against the weight of the evidence is still viable following our decision in Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp. 129 N.H. 591 (1987), because the parties have not raised that issue.

*391 Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 599 (1987) (quotations omitted).

Also within the trial court’s sound discretion are determinations of whether to bifurcate, see Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 607 (1987), or sever, see Morley v. Clairmont, 110 N.H. 12, 14 (1969), the issues before it.

The defendant argues that contesting preservation is not raising a new issue within the meaning of Scovill; rather, it is a rebuttal to an issue raised in a responding brief and, therefore, appropriate for a reply brief, see Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18, 529 A.2d 976, 992 (1987), or oral argument.

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 613, 529 A.2d 976, 990 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 608, 529 A.2d 976, 986 (1987).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18, 529 A.2d 976, 992 (1987) (court will not address an issue raised for the first time on appeal in a reply brief).

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 617-18, 529 A.2d 976, 992 (1987).

405(b); see Keiser, 57 F.3d at 857; compare Lapierre v. Sawyer, 131 N.H. 609, *202 612, 557 A.2d 640, 642 (1989) (defendant’s character not an element of plaintiff’s claim that defendant negligently struck racquetball no longer in play; specific instances of prior unsportsmanlike conduct therefore held inadmissible under Rule 405(b)) with Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 613, 529 A.2d 976, 989 (1987) (evidence that employee security guard had falsely represented himself as a po

“It is within the discretion of a trial court to declare a mistrial if some circumstance exists which indicates that justice may not be done if the trial continues to a verdict.” Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 615, 529 A.2d 976, 990 (1987) (quotation and brackets omitted).

For example, we have upheld a trial judge’s choice of curative instructions over a declaration of mistrial where the offending remarks were ambiguous, see State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 4, 599 A.2d 477, 480 (1991), where the complaining party appeared to have brought the problem on himself, see Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 614-15, 529 A.2d 976, 990 (1987), and where the incremental prejudicial effect of the remarks seemed to have been minimal, see Blais v. Town of Goffstown,

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 602-03, 529 A.2d 976, 983 (1987).

Absent a finding of damages and their legal causation from the accident, the verdict may properly be expressed as one “for the defendant.” We address, then, whether the verdict was one which must be characterized as unreasonable.

She also argues that the recent decision of Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 529 A.2d 976 (1987) has softened the inflexible mandates of the annulment statute.

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 600-01, 529 A.2d 976, 982 (1987) (citing Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 245-46, 186 A. 769, 771 (1936)).

405(b); Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 612-13, 529 A.2d 976, 989 (1987).

y of the trial judge, who may disturb a verdict as excessive (or inadequate) if its amount is “conclusively against the weight of the evidence,” Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 246, 186 A. 769, 771 (1936), and, specifically, may order remittitur if the verdict is “manifestly exorbitant.” Seaman v. Berry, 114 N.H. 474, 475-76, 322 A.2d 922, 923 (1974); see Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 529 A.2d 976 (1987); Lahey v. Shaw, 123 N.H. 648, 651, 466 A.2d 911, 913 (1983) (quoting